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Credit scoring is the collection of techniques used for risk assessment in
consumer credit. Traditionally a credit scoring model is constructed to fit a specific
credit portfolio which normally consists of residents of one country (customised
models). But the political desire for further integration of the European Union into
the single internal market opens the possibility for the lenders to compete across
national borders. Therefore the necessity arises to assess the risk of a mixed
heterogeneous population consisting of residents of several European countries.
This thesis shows how a single generic model can be used to credit score the
applicants for a revolving store card from three different European countries. First,
the EU harmonisation process is reviewed with the aim to establish its likely impact
on credit scoring practice. In particular, the legal restrictions on the information used
in credit scoring models are examined and the effect of such restrictions for both
lenders and borrowers is investigated. A comparison of credit regulations is provided
between the USA and the EU, and for the latter the differences in the national
legislation of the EU member states are presented.
Second, several generic models are developed using logistic regression and
survival analysis, and their predictive accuracy is benchmarked against the
performance of equivalent national (customised) models. Whilst logistic regression is
the most established approach in the credit industry, survival analysis is a relatively
new application that offers an advantage of predicting time to the event of interest
and therefore, lays the foundation for estimating the applicant's profitability.
Predicting profitability requires estimates of both the probability of default
and the likely usage of the store card. Whereas modelling default is the traditional
task of credit scoring, estimation of usage is far less common. Time to the second
purchase is considered as the measure of the card usage and dependencies in
application and behavioural data are examined that can be used for predicting the
customer's future behaviour.
Generic models are found to perform well across three countries under
different modelling approaches and in different applications. In predicting default
they are competitive with the national models, whilst in other applications generic
models demonstrate marginally inferior results. However, harmonisation of the data
available for the analysis is likely to further enhance the predictive power of generic
models and expand the possible scope of their application.
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With 12 countries joining the Euro, the exchange rate risk faced by credit
applicants has been removed for those who earn and spend within these 12 Member
States. This offers potentially an extremely attractive possibility of market expansion
for credit institutions, provided they can manage the risk related not only to the
residents of their own country, but also to applicants from other Euro States.
Credit scoring is the collection of techniques used for risk assessment in
consumer credit. Its aim is to construct a classification rule that distinguishes
between 'good' and 'bad' credit risks according to some specified definition. The
accuracy of classification may be affected when the overall population comprises
heterogeneous subgroups. It is not uncommon in credit scoring to develop separate
models for each of such subgroups.
This thesis addresses several issues that arise in anticipation of the single
European market in financial services. First, how different are the national credit risk
patterns across Europe? Second, how accurate will the classification be if residents of
several European countries are scored with one model? And third, what is the
magnitude of improvement in classification from segmentation, i.e. from building
individual models for different nations.
In a wider context these questions translate into the comparison of
performance between generic models and customised ones. Generic models are
models developed to fit several geographically or socio-economically different
populations. In contrast to this, customised models are developed on, and applied to,
only one population.
The examination of classification accuracy of different models is complicated
by a problem of data comparability across countries and by diverse legislative
environments that credit scoring models operate in. This calls for an investigation of
the impact of the EU harmonisation on credit scoring practice.
The last but not the least aspect of the research project is an examination of
the differential effects the generic/customised models may have on the
inclusion/exclusion of certain groups of credit applicants.
1
1.2 Credit scoring
Credit scoring provides analytical support for decision making in consumer
credit and allows for automation of the loan granting process. By relating the
observable characteristics of new applicants for credit to the known performance of
the previous borrowers, a credit scoring system ranks the applicants according to
their attractiveness to a lender. The attractiveness, which is commonly referred to as
creditworthiness, is most often based on the probability that the potential customer
repays the loan on time.
The philosophy of credit scoring is predictive, not explanatory. It can be
viewed as the behaviourist tradition that seeks to establish relations between human
actions and some manifestations associated with them, not necessarily the causes of
these actions. The cause is hard to establish and very often is not possible to observe
at the point of application for credit, therefore the approach of credit scoring is
extremely pragmatic: the exact cause of non-payment or default may be unknown,
but prediction is still possible based on what is known, namely, the past experience
and the available information about the potential customers. Such information is
supplied by the applicant (from the application form), by credit reference agencies
(CRA), and in the cases of existing customers can be derived from the lender's
internal records.
There is a distinction between application scoring, that is concerned with the
decisions whether to accept the applicant or not, and behavioural scoring, that
supports decisions related to existing customers and uses the information about their
transactions or behaviour. For a more detailed overview of application and
behavioural scoring see Crook (1997); Hand (1998); Lewis (1992a); Thomas (1998);
Thomas (2000); Thomas et al. (2002).
The credit scoring problem can be viewed as a supervised classification
problem, where the task is to find some function or model that is the best separator
between certain pre-defined classes (see Hand (1997)). Most frequently the model is
a weighted sum of the applicant's observed characteristics (age, marital status, etc.),
data on the incidence of defaults in the area where the applicant lives, and his/her
previous performance pattern that produces a score. The score is a summary of the
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applicant's creditworthiness and reflects his or her ranking relative to other
applicants. The classification into 'good' and 'bad' is achieved by comparing the
score to a predetermined threshold or a cut-off level.
The credit scoring problem can be solved by a number of approaches. These
include classical discriminant analysis, regression analysis, decision trees, neural
networks, genetic algorithms and support vector machines. Each approach has its
advantages and disadvantages, and their comprehensive discussion is given in
Thomas (1998), Thomas et al. (2002), Henley and Hand (1996), Boyle et al. (1992),
Davis et al. (1992), Yobas et al. (1997), Srinivasan and Kim (1987), Desai et al.
(1997), Baesens (2003) and Schebesch and Stecking (2003). However, Table 1.1.
shows that classification accuracy of different approaches is very close.
The numbers in Table 1.1 present the percentage of correctly classified
accounts with the same acceptance rate, and should be compared across the rows
only, since the authors used different definitions of 'good' and different cut-off levels.
Table 1.1 Comparison of classification accuracy for different scoring





RPA LP NN k-NN SVM GA
Henley
(1995)
43.4 43.3 43.8 - - -
Boyle et al.
(1992)




87.5 89.3 93.2 86.1
Yobas et al.
(1997)
68.4 - 62.3 - 62.4 64.5
Desai et al.
(1997)
66.5 67.3 67.3 - 64.0 -
Baesens
(2003)1
74.4 74.4 74.8 74.8 75.0 74.8 74.8 -
1 This study reports a range of results that vary depending on the type of the classifier used, on the
dataset it was developed and tested on, and on the cut-off chosen. Table 1.1 gives results for the
dataset UK1 assuming a cut-off of 0.5. Where several classifiers of the same type were used, the best
predicting classifier is chosen.
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So the choice of algorithm will depend on some additional features that any
given approach can offer, its suitability for the problem under consideration and for
the dataset used for modelling.
Linear programming is good for handling any constraints or conditions that
may be desirable in a scorecard, e.g. to give older people equal or greater scores than
scores of other age groups - the requirement that follows from credit regulations in
the USA. Classification trees are effective in modelling the interactions between
characteristics, whereas for regression models interactions have to specified in
advance. Neural nets and support vector machines are particularly well suited for
problems with non-linear relations. The nearest neighbour approach provides the
possibility of developing models that are continuously updated and this allows one to
adapt the scorecard to changing populations. Genetic algorithms screen a wide range
of different models in search of the optimal one.
Regression approaches are among the most popular ones, since they offer the
possibility of selecting statistically significant characteristics and performing
collinearity tests. Logistic regression is favoured by the industry and has been chosen
as the method of modelling in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Logistic regression overcomes
the limitations of linear regression where the dependent variable can take values
from -°e to + °c, whereas the observed probability can range only between 0 and 1. It
also gives less weighting to extreme values, and therefore is less sensitive to them
than linear discriminant analysis or linear regression.
However, although one may intuitively expect logistic regression to give a
greater classification accuracy than linear regression, Henley (1995) showed this is
not the case. The reason lies in the fact that the central part of the logistic function is
linear, and non-linearity starts in the regions where it is not difficult to separate
goods from bads (Thomas (2000)), given that reasonable discrimination is possible.
One of the problems inherent to credit scoring is reject inference, which
arises from the fact that the performance of rejected applicants is not known. There is
a belief that developing the model only on the subset of accepted applicants may lead
to a bias in estimation. There are several methods for incorporating rejected cases
into the model, these include augmentation, parcelling, bivariate probit, multiple
imputation and other methods (Hsia (1978), Joanes (1993)).
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These methods have been criticised by Hand and Henley (1993), and the most
recent papers by Banasik et al. (2001a), Banasik and Crook (2002) and Banasik and
Crook (2003) showed that reject inference gives a very modest improvement, or even
no improvement at all. Hand and Henley (1993) also argued that direct models of
posterior probabilities (logistic regression among them) will give unbiased parameter
estimates even if developed only on accepted cases, provided all the variables used in
the previous accept-reject model are included into the new model to be estimated.
Following these results, reject inference is not pursued in this thesis.
Traditionally credit scoring has been concerned with relating the applicant's
observed characteristics to the probability of default within some specified period of
time. However, it has been shown that the default probability is not necessarily a
good indicator of the profit the applicant will generate (Hopper and Lewis (1992),
Leonard (1997)). Some high risk applicants can generate a significant profit if they
use the credit product actively and pay interest and charges for long enough before
defaulting. On the contrary, low risk applicants may pay the full balance every
month, thus keeping the revenues from such 'good' accounts low.
So recently the focus of credit scoring has been shifting from default to profit.
In terms of the profitability of an account, one of the most important aspects is its
lifetime, i.e. time before the borrower defaults or closes the account. Modelling the
lifetime is the domain of survival analysis. Whilst survival analysis is a well-
established technique in medical research and reliability, there have been only a few
applications in credit scoring (Narain (1992), Banasik et al. (1999), Stepanova and
Thomas (2001), Hand and Kelly (2001), Till (2001), Baesens (2003)). These studies
found that in terms of classification accuracy the survival analysis approach is
competitive and in certain applications superior to logistic regression. The advantage
is that survival analysis provides an indication of both a customer's risk level and
profit. This can be used to aid decision-making in relation to any individual borrower
and also for debt provisioning based on the estimates of default levels over time.
Previous analyses investigated mainly fixed-term credit products. This thesis
extends the application of survival analysis to the area of revolving credit (Chapters 5
and 6) and tests the performance of generic models under a number of modelling
approaches.
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1.3 Measuring classification accuracy
All datasets used in the analysis were randomly split into training sets (70%)
on which the models were developed, and hold-out sets (30%), reserved for testing
the quality of prediction. It is well known that testing the classification accuracy of a
rule on a sample it was trained on gives a biased indication of its performance.
The performance of models was compared using two measures: area under
the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUROC) and percentage of
incorrectly classified accounts.
The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve originated from the
Theory of Signal Detection and initially was applied to quantify the ability of a
system to detect a signal from noise when the two-alternative forced choice
technique was used. The two alternatives were 'signal plus noise' and 'noise', and
the distinction between the two classes could vary arbitrarily depending on how
much noise was allowed to intervene with the signal. Sensitivity (or the true-positive
fraction) is plotted on the y-axis against 1-Specificity (or the false-positive fraction),
and this is done for all definitions of a 'signal'. Sensitivity is (the number of
successful detections of a 'signal' according to a given definition)/(the number of
'signals' in total). Specificity is (the number of failures to classify 'noise' correctly)/
(the number of 'noise' instances in total).














0.0 0.1 0.2 0.30.40.5 0.60.7 0.80.9 1.0
1 -Spec i f ic i ty
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Subsequently this method was used to judge the discrimination ability of
various statistical methods in application to a number of different classification
problems. In the context of credit scoring it is a plot of the proportion of correctly
classified good accounts (Pcg) against the proportion of incorrectly classified bad
accounts (Pib ) for all levels of predicted probability, or in other words for all
possible cut-off levels (c). Therefore it provides a measure of classification accuracy
which is not dependent on any threshold or acceptance rate.
The perfectly discriminating system would have a graph joining (0,0) to (0,1)
to (1,1) because
(PCG) = [0;1] and (PIB ) = 0 for c<PG
(Pcg) = 1 and (Pib ) = (0; 1] for c > PG, where PG is the proportion of actual
good accounts in the sample. A system giving no discrimination would correspond to
a diagonal line. The dotted curve in Figure 1.1 corresponds to a system with better
classification performance than the solid line.
The area under the curve offers a convenient measure for comparison.
Alternatively, one may use the Gini coefficient, which can be easily obtained once
the area under the curve is known (Hand (1997)):
G = (A-l/2)*2,
where A is AUROC.
It was shown by Bamber (1975) and Hanley and McNeil (1982) that
conceptually AUROC corresponds to the Wilcoxon or Mann-Whitney or U statistic.
This statistic estimates the probability, 6, that a ranking of a randomly selected bad
account will be less than or equal to a ranking of a randomly selected good account.
This property allows for testing the significance of the difference between 2
or more ROC-curves. DeLong et al. (1998) extended the methodology to correlated
ROC-curves, i.e. to curves that were generated by different tests or classification
rules applied to the same sample. Using a method of structural components (Sen
(I960)) the variance-covariance matrix of a vector of U-statistics is re-estimated.
This is equivalent to jackknifing, because re-estimation is done by pairwise deletion
of 'goods' and 'bads' from the sample.
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DeLong et al. (1998) provided the formulation of the test of significance that
can be applied to a vector of areas under correlated ROC-curves:
(i9-6)L,[LSL']~lL0-Oy,
where Q = a vector of statistics representing the areas under ROC-curves,
S - its estimated covariance matrix,
L - a contrast (a row vector of coefficients showing the sequence of
comparison of elements of Q ).
The test has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom corresponding
to the rank of LSL'.
The second measure used for comparison is based on the confusion matrix,
which presents the counts of good and bad accounts correctly and incorrectly
classified by the model.
Table 1.2 Example of confusion matrix
Actual Class
Good Bad
Predicted Good a b
Class Bad c d
The use of the matrix requires the choice of a cut-off level or acceptance rate.
For the purpose of this analysis the cut-off level was fixed at the level of the default
rate in the hold-out sample, that is, such that the observed proportion of bads
equalled the predicted proportion of bads in the hold-out sample.
The sum of percentages for incorrectly classified goods and incorrectly
classified bads (error rate) was chosen as the measure for comparison:
Error rate = c + b
a + b + c + d
Hand (2003) argued that the most relevant measure for assessing the
scorecard performance is the 'bad' rate among the applicants predicted as 'good' by
the model and hence accepted. The difference between bad rate and error rate is that
the former measures one type of error, whereas the latter takes account of both types




This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 looks at the effects
of the anti-discrimination and data protection legislation in application to credit
scoring. The existing regulations in the EU and USA together with legal and
economic concepts of discrimination are reviewed. The analysis of previous research
gives grounds to conclude that the existing legal restrictions on information, while
impairing the quality of risk assessment, has failed to provide any tangible benefits to
protected groups.
Chapter 3 presents a review of the previous research on generic models/
segmentation in credit scoring. The majority of studies demonstrate the superior
prediction of customised/ segmented models over generic ones.
Chapter 4 analyses the differences in credit risk patterns of Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands and presents the logistic regression generic model that
produces a good prediction for all three countries, comparable to that of national
models. However, the applicants accepted by generic and customised models are not
the same, and the implications for credit applicants from using a particular model are
investigated.
Chapter 5 addresses the possibility of incorporating the time perspective into
the analysis of credit risk and the differences in national patterns of default over time.
Survival analysis methods (accelerated failure time and proportional hazards models)
are compared to logistic regression in predicting the probability of default, and
generic models are compared to the national ones.
Chapter 6 explores the possibility of predicting the future usage of the card.
Time to the second purchase is considered since the interest lies in the timings of
customer spending behaviour that provide the information on how quickly the
lender's intervention is required in order to retain a profitable customer or to prevent
the loss from an unprofitable one. The proportional hazards (PH) generic model is
benchmarked against the proportional hazards national models.




This thesis addresses a crucial problem which is very likely to face European
and eventually British banks in the near future, when households in countries of the
European Monetary Union realize that the exchange rate risk they once faced has
been removed, and start comparing the interest rates and loan terms across Europe
rather than just within their own country. Institutions which fail to see this new
market opportunity and to accurately assess the risk of lending to such households
will yield market share to those who react quickly and adjust their credit-granting
practice accordingly.
To maintain a competitive position and gain a competitive advantage banks
must develop ways of assessing the creditworthiness of applicants from other
countries. This presents a number of problems, such as the legal acceptability of
predictor variables that can be used in such 'foreign' scorecards, including the issue
of the very possibility of building separate models for each different EU country. In
some countries the legislative context may make the generic models the only legally
acceptable models. Therefore, it is important to know how the performance of
generic models compares to specific national scorecards.
This thesis provides the first critical review of the differences in legislation
relating to credit scoring models between the USA and European countries, in
particular, the differences in laws on discrimination and data protection. It is argued
that legitimate lending decisions are not necessarily 'fair'. Also the aspect of
inclusion/exclusion has been considered in the use of generic versus customised
models and observations have been made on the likely social impact.
Second, it provides a much more comprehensive analysis than previous
literature of the comparative performance of generic European scorecards against
national customised models. It shows that national models using the same variables
as a generic model are only minimally more accurate than the corresponding generic
model. But national models that use the full range of data available for the relevant
countries are superior to generic models. This highlights the necessity for
harmonisation of data across the EU.
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Third, the thesis presents the first cross-country comparison of the application
of survival analysis to predict when a borrower defaults. It shows that survival
analysis generic models are competitive with the logistic regression generic models.
No previous research has made such a comparison.
The desirability of offering a store card to an applicant depends not just on
the chance the borrower will default but also whether s/he will use it. The fourth
contribution of this thesis is to present the first inter-European comparison of
survival analysis to predict when a store card holder will make a second purchase.
Such a comparison has not been addressed in previous literature.
This thesis uses a unique and up to date dataset, which is particularly suited to
reveal inter-country differences because it relates to the same type of credit product.
The analysis therefore identifies inter-country differences in repayment and
purchasing behaviour accurately because it controls for the differences in repayment
behaviour that arise from the type of product.
In general, the thesis provides insight into national differences in credit risk
patterns, contributes to an understanding of the harmonisation aspects of credit
scoring practice in an integrated Europe, and investigates the performance of generic
models across several countries and across different applications.
1.6 Summary
This Chapter presented the problems that were investigated and gave an
overview of the paradigm of the research area (credit scoring), within which the
problems were addressed. We can now proceed to discussion of the process of
integrating the European financial markets into one entity, the difficulties associated
with this process and its likely implications for credit scoring.
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Chapter 2. The legislative environment of credit scoring
models
2.1 Introduction
The personal character of the information used in automated decision-making
gives rise to a number of legal and ethical questions as to what is appropriate to use
in a credit scoring model (scorecard). The basis for resolving these questions is laid
down by the relevant legislation that seeks to promote social justice policies and to
ensure the confidential handling of personal information. Hence, it was pointed out
by Hand (1998) that 'statistical scoring and classification systems all have to work
within the boundaries defined by such legislation. The problems are thus not merely
ones of mathematical optimisation, and neither are the solutions entirely clear cut.'
The problems of the legislative influence on credit scoring models become
even more complicated when the lenders operate on an international level and need
to consider several levels of regulations and to take into account the national
differences in legislative frameworks. This is especially evident in Europe, where the
process of economic and political integration has already brought to light some
problems that have not received substantial attention before, such as whether the
principal of non-discrimination on national grounds implies the prohibition to use
nationality as a variable in credit scoring models.
This chapter addresses the impact of EU harmonisation on the practice of
credit scoring. Given the complexity of the subject we wish to restrict ourselves to
one aspect behind these differences - legislation. It seems to be justified for the
following reasons:
1. The very process of the European integration is manifested in and
implemented through certain legislative provisions.
2. Whilst the composition of scoring models is affected by a whole complex
of different factors, and their impact is difficult to establish, the
legislation has relatively direct and traceable effects, although sometimes
(as it will be shown later) these effects may be complicated and
controversial.
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3. At the same time the legislature is influenced by the complex blend of the
national political, economic and cultural factors and international
interactions. To a certain extent, the national regulations are shaped by the
same forces that manifest themselves in the diversity of the national credit
risk patterns.
Against this background the objectives of this chapter are: first, to assess the
nature of differences in national laws regulating consumer credit and the level of
harmonisation achieved at the EU level. Second, we aim to establish whether the
existing legal framework provides for effective credit risk assessment and smooth
operation of the single European market in consumer credit.
Section 2 of the Chapter gives an overview of the legislation aimed at the
creation of the single European market and the current state of the single market in
financial services. It also investigates the national differences in the regulatory
framework and their effects on the quality of credit risk assessment and functioning
of the single market.
The legal measures can be broadly classified into two groups:
Measures that follow from anti-discrimination legislation and seek to protect the
principles of social justice;
Measures that follow from the legislation protecting personal information.
Section 3 investigates the impact of the anti-discrimination law on credit
scoring, Section 4 looks into the importance of CRA information, and outlines the
national differences in data protection and credit referencing. Section 5 concludes.
The legislative impact on credit scoring has so far received very limited
attention in the European context, but there have been a number of studies addressing
this issue in the U.S. Thus, references to the US experience constitute the significant
part of this Chapter, and this seems to be justified by the following reasons:
The idea of the European integration was largely inspired by the example of the
United States. The expression 'United States of Europe' goes back to 1814, when
Henri Saint-Simon advanced the idea of the peace and unity through the
integration (Urwin (1995)). Since then explicit and implicit references to the
United States of America became common in the European context.
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The USA is also the country where credit scoring originated, and it is most
advanced in many areas related to credit. So it is appropriate to use the USA as a
'benchmark' in the credit scoring context.
In spite of some notable differences between the US and EU law, it will be
shown that there are certain parallels in how both legislative systems address
issues of discrimination and data protection. That allows for the conclusion that
the US experience is relevant in the European context.
The Chapter concludes with some considerations of the adequacy of the
existing legal framework for effective credit risk assessment.
2.2 The European Community and the Single Market
2.2.1 Principles of European Community law
The very idea of Pan-European scoring becomes relevant only in the context
of an integrated market with a free flow of financial services across national borders.
So first, it is necessary to review the current state of affairs in order to understand the
basic features of the environment that a European scoring model would operate
within.
The relationship between the European Community (EC) and its Member
States (MS) is unique in the context of international law. EC law constitutes a
completely new legal order, half way between international and domestic laws. It has
limited the sovereign rights of the MS, but they still enjoy a high degree of freedom,
and that is different from the legal order of federations or confederations. The
difference from the international treaties lies in the fact that the EC laws affect not
only MS but also their nationals.
The fundamental principles that regulate the complex relations between the
EC and its MS are those of supremacy and subsidiarity. The principle of supremacy
of EC law over national law implies that all national rules which conflict with the EC
law must be disabled and all national courts have an obligation to ensure that this
requirement is implemented in practice.
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However, the principle of subsidiarity was introduced as a political
compromise, a counter-measure against anticipated over-centralisation. It means that
the EC and MS share the competence in certain areas, including such areas as
economic and social cohesion and consumer protection.
Throughout this chapter it will be shown that there is no strict separation
between the powers of the EC and MS, and the EC law is essentially the law of a
compromise that tries to pursue integration and cohesion and at the same time to
retain the uniqueness of each MS.
2.2.2 Single Market in financial services
One of the main ideas behind the establishment of the European Community
was the creation of an integrated internal market. It is envisaged that the single
market based on principles of free movement of goods, persons, capital and services
will foster competition, thus consumers will benefit from wider choice and lower
prices.
The year of 2005 represents the deadline for the integrated market in retail
financial services as set by the Lisbon European Council.
The following legal measures represent the most important milestones on the way
to the single market in consumer credit:
Council Directive for the approximation of the laws concerning consumer credit
(87/102/EEC, Council of the EU (1987) amended by Directive 90/88/EEC,
Council of the EU (1990) and Directive 98/7/EC, European Parliament (1998)),
which aimed to achieve a certain level of convergence of the rules related to
lending and to ensure a high degree of consumer protection. The Directive laid
down the requirement of official authorisation (licensing) for credit-grantors.
Second Banking Co-ordination Directive (89/646/EEC, Council of the EU
(1989)), which formulated the principle of the single licence that allows banks
and other credit institutions to set up branches and offer services throughout the
Community.
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC, European Parliament (1995)), which will be
discussed in detail in Section 2.3.
15
European Parliament and Council Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive
(97/5/EC, European Parliament (1997)), aimed at the establishment of the
minimum information and performance requirements for cross-border credit
transfers so as to ensure that funds can be transferred from one part of the
Community to another rapidly, reliably and inexpensively.
E-commerce Legal Framework Directive (2000/31/EC, European Parliament
(2000)), aimed at ensuring the free flow of on-line services across the
Community.
These Community measures are meant to enable the unobstructed flow of
financial services across national borders and are based on three basic principles:
essential harmonisation in all Member States of the laws and practices governing
access to financial services,
home-country control, reinforced through co-operation between national
supervisory authorities,
mutual recognition by national supervisory authorities of the rules and
regulations in the countries of origin of the banks operating on their territory. It
means that providers of financial services that comply with the regulations of the
Member State of their registration, may operate in other MSs without any further
restrictions.
These principles imply that a lender holding a license in one MS can set up
branches and offer services throughout the Community, and the lender's activities
will be regulated by the legislative framework of its home state. However, in practice
this has not always worked for the following reasons.
First, the main legal instruments of harmonisation are Directives that
formulate the final target that should be achieved, but it is up to MSs to decide how
this target should be reached. This results in a certain divergence in transposition of
Directives. The situation is further aggravated by delays in implementing the
Community legislation by MSs. In May 2003 the Commission reported that 8.8% of
all Internal Market Directives have not yet been transposed by all MS (European
Commission (2003)).
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Second, it is recognised that the objective of harmonisation, or creating 'the
level playing field' for all traders throughout the EC, can result in a minority of states
with stricter rules being forced to bring their regimes down to a harmonised standard.
This made the Community adopt the 'minimum harmonisation' formula in many
cases. Rather than setting a single Community rule as both floor and ceiling, the
Community measure (Directive) acts as a floor.
An example of the application of this rationale is Directive 87/102/EEC
which specifically addressed 'the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit'. The
Directive had a very limited effect on actual harmonisation, due to the fact that
Article 15 (Minimum Clause) of this Directive gave the right to MSs to adopt more
stringent legal rules for consumer protection. As a result, most Member States have
systematically used this right and went beyond the provisions of the Directive. This
created a paradox: the Directive was initially designed to ensure harmonisation, but
achieved quite a modest harmonising impact.
Third, MSs have the right to derogate from the principle of mutual
recognition on the grounds of 'general good' that include:
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision,
the protection of public health,
the fairness of commercial transactions,
the defence of the consumer.
This means that lenders still have to consider some regulations of their host MS.
To summarise, the single market in retail financial services is not a reality
yet. In spite of numerous Directives, the level of harmonisation in consumer credit
markets is modest, and lenders still have to take into account some differences in the
regulations of the MSs they operate in.
The Commission has adopted the Financial Services Action Plan (European
Commission (1999b)), and one of the tasks listed there, is the amendment of the
Consumer Credit Directive (87/102/EEC). In September 2002 the proposal for a new
Directive was presented by the Commission, but it was not adopted yet (European
Commission (2002)).
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The new Directive was designed in recognition of the fact that diverse
national rules reduce cross-border transactions. It offers a comprehensive set of
common regulations and explicitly prevents MSs from adding new rules. The
proposal incorporates the concept of 'responsible lending' and places an obligation
on lenders to conscientiously assess the borrower's ability to repay the loan. So more
changes are anticipated in the very near future.
However, the proposal does not contain clarification on what information can
be used for credit risk assessment, so the information available for model building in
credit scoring is subject to restrictions following from the general provisions of the
anti-discrimination and data protection legislation. Although there are Community
measures in this field, it will be shown that national divergence is still quite
significant.
2.3 Anti-Discrimination Law and its affects on credit granting
decisions
2.3.1 Legal and economic definitions of discrimination
The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of
discrimination:
"Discriminate - a) to make a distinction; to perceive or note the difference;
to exercise discernment.
b) to discriminate against; to make an adverse distinction with
regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others." (The
Oxford English Dictionary (1933))
Clearly there are two different meanings of this word" and this is reflected in
the economic literature (Yinger (1997)). These two meanings are:
statistical (or economic) discrimination, which is objective;
taste-based (or non-economic) discrimination, which is subjective.
2
It should be noted that two different meanings of the word 'discrimination' do not exist in all
languages; 'discrimination' was borrowed from English by other languages bearing the negative
connotation only, its neutral meaning was dropped. So when 'discrimination' is used on the
international level, it implies 'adverse or unfair treatment.'
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It can be argued that any form of selection involves discrimination in one or
both of the senses above. Whether it is justified or not, can be decided on the basis of
reasons used to select these particular applicants and to reject the others. Where
human judgement is involved, discrimination arises from preferences or prejudices.
According to taste-based discrimination theory (Becker (1971); Peterson and
Peterson (1978)) the person who discriminates must pay extra in order to have the
privilege of not dealing with certain groups of people, but there will be a point
beyond which it becomes too expensive to discriminate.
This theory does not apply to credit scoring since there is no personal
judgement involved. But statistical discrimination (Avery (1981); Phelps (1972))
which arises from the lack of information necessary to calculate the degree of risk,
does apply to credit scoring. The estimate of risk of a particular individual is based
on the risk estimates of groups that this individual belongs to. Therefore the decision
is based upon the assumption that people with similar characteristics will behave in a
similar way. This is objective discrimination, since it is based on past experience. So
if in the past people of a certain gender or race proved to be poorer credit risks, this
gives grounds to believe that there is a higher probability of these persons not paying
back on time.
The lender might reasonably argue that this type of discrimination is
economically rational and hence market forces will not eliminate the discrimination.
It would constitute discrimination if members of a demographic group are more
likely to be rejected by the lender than those from other groups with similar
characteristics besides group membership (Yinger (1997)). Hence the membership
of the group is influencing the default probability.
Avery (1981) differentiates statistical discrimination into two types: the
'endowment' effect and the 'mean shift' effect. The endowment effect results from a
difference in the economic variables between the groups and hence it can be argued
that it does not constitute discrimination but a response from these differences. The
mean shift effect describes those cases where group membership provides
information about default beyond that supplied by the economic variables.
Practically, though, it is not always possible to differentiate between these two
effects since group membership is often correlated with economic measures.
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In contrast to the subjective/objective duality of economic theory, the legal
point of view is based on the principle of equal treatment and tries to identify
whether the selection process breaches this principle. Or in other words, would the
selection results be different e.g. if the person was of a different race other things
being equal.
The breach of the principle of equal treatment becomes illegal only when
'equal treatment' or 'non-discrimination' is linked to certain grounds, e.g. gender,
race, ethnic origin, disability, and when the certain areas of application are specified.
'For an action to be discriminatory in law, there must first be a
law, and this must define the prohibited grounds of action, the
persons protected by the law, and the circumstances in which
they are protected' (Banton (1994)).
The law also acknowledges the existence of different types of discrimination,
but its focus is centred on the distinction between 'purpose and effect'. So one type
of discrimination (most commonly referred to as direct discrimination) arises when
the selection process intentionally separates one group from the other. The second
type (indirect discrimination) arises when there is no apparent intentional separation,
but the results of the selection process disadvantage certain groups.
As we shall see views on what constitutes discrimination are influenced by
cultural traditions, so the perceptions of inadmissible grounds for discrimination can
vary from country to country which results in different interpretations of the
principle of equal treatment and what is justifiable.
2.3.2 EC anti-discrimination legislation
It was pointed out earlier that the non-discrimination law should specify the
grounds for equal treatment and areas of application. The grounds are derived from
the human rights enshrined in national constitutions and international treaties. There
are two stereotypical ways of formulating human rights: as an obligation for a
contracting party or as a right for an individual. The former involves the obligations
to create certain conditions or to pursue certain policies (sometimes they are called
'programmatic rights'), but individuals cannot rely on them before a national or
international court.
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The second category creates so-called 'legal' or 'justiciable' rights. These are
formulated in such a way that they can be invoked in court by individuals ('self-
executing' effect). One of the main conditions of self-executing treaty provisions is
that they be clear and unconditional and require no further government action.
Traditionally, civil and political rights were seen as justiciable, whereas economic
and social rights were generally regarded as 'programmatic'. (Banton (1994) refers
to the latter as 'the view that human rights begin after breakfast' and the former as
'the view that human rights begin in the police station').
However, there is no longer a precise distinction between the two categories,
and the European Community is (or was) mainly an economic organisation, which
makes the protection of social rights at least as relevant as the protection of civil
rights.
It should be noted that there is no such a thing as 'a right to credit'.
Nevertheless, the Council of the European Union acknowledges that 'credit is a
driving force of economic growth and the welfare of consumers'(Council of the EU
(2001)). It becomes subject to anti-discriminatory regulations, when the law includes
'access to services and goods' in the scope of application.
Initially the EC law directly addressed two issues:
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality;
equal treatment of men and women.
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the fundamental principles of
EC Law. Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ex. Article
6), as modified by the Amsterdam Treaty, explicitly prohibits discrimination on the
grounds of nationality: 'Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds
of nationality shall be prohibited.' (Treaty (2002)).
Since this principle is crucial for the functioning of the single market, it has
been given the strongest power possible: Article 12 is directly effective (i.e. no
further legal acts are required to enforce it) and it has both vertical and horizontal
effect (i.e. it is binding for the public authorities, private entities and individuals). It
should be noted, though, that Article 12 does not automatically create the prohibition
to use 'nationality' in credit scoring. It gives the right to the national authorities to
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take measures to eliminate national discrimination (if they believe that it is
occurring) and it also gives the right to an individual to rely on this Article in Court if
s/he believes that s/he was treated unjustly. So interpretation by a Court or national
authorities is important.
The EC Law also proclaimed the equality of men and women: '...the
Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between
men and women.' (Article 3 EC, Treaty (2002)).
However, apart from nationality and sex, the EC Law originally did not cover
equality on any other grounds, neither did it cover any other human rights, although
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) developed the formula that the protection of
human rights is enshrined in general principles of the EC Law2.
The situation changed after the emergence of the political union - the
European Union. The Amsterdam Treaty (Treaty (1997)) added Article 13 which
provides for a platform for expanded anti-discrimination policies. Its text reads: 'the
Council ... may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex,
• *3
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation '.
However, unlike the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality,
Article 13 does not have direct effect, so it has to be implemented by the specific
legal measures.
In legislative aspect Article 13 translated into two Directives:
- Directive 2000/43/EC of June 2000 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial and ethnic origin. The Directive
goes beyond the labour market, covering the 'access to and supply of goods and
services which are available to public' and distinguishes between 'direct' and
'indirect' discrimination. It has adopted the following definitions:
'Concept of discrimination
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal treatment shall
mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial
or ethnic origin.
2 General principles of law, which do not necessarily have to be written down, function as a standard
of good behaviour of, usually public authorities or governments, so that the human rights of
individuals are not endangered (Usher (1998)).
3 Bold added.
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2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated on grounds of
racial or ethnic origin;
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice is liable to affect adversely a person
or a group of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin, unless that
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim
which is unrelated to the racial or ethnic origin of a person or group of
persons and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary'.(Council of the EU (2000a)).
- A Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation (2000/78/EC), which expands the equality principles to the
grounds given above (Article 13) in addition to the earlier proclaimed (Articles 3
and 141) equality of men and women in labour markets (Council of the EU
(2000b)).
In addition, in the near future one may expect more changes in the anti¬
discrimination field. On 7 December 2000 the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice. The Charter
is not legally binding yet, since work is under way to incorporate it into the Treaty
establishing the Constitution for Europe, that will set out, in a single text for the first
time in European history, the whole range of civil, political, economic and social
rights of European citizens and all persons resident in the EU.
Of particular interest is Article 11-21 'Non-discrimination', which states:
'Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or
sexual orientation shall be prohibited.' (Draft Treaty (2003)).
This statement does not have a legal power yet, so in terms of access to goods
and services it is only discrimination on race and ethnic origin that is forbidden at the
EU level (following the implementation of Race Directive (2000/43/EC) in July
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2003). But in some MSs the anti-discriminatory regulations are more stringent or
cover a wider scope than the EU legislature. As can be seen from Table 2.1, Ireland,
the Netherlands and the UK already have legal acts that outlaw discrimination in
access to services and goods on grounds wider than race and ethnic origin.
For example, the UK has specific acts addressing discrimination on the
grounds of gender (Sex Discrimination Act, SDA (1975)), race (Race Relations Act,
RRA (1976), disability (Disability Discrimination Act, DDA (1995)) and religion
(Human Rights Act, HRA (1998)). And even the definition of 'racial grounds' have a
broader scope than the EU one: the UK 1976 Race Relations Act covers the grounds
of race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin. The Act
declares unlawful 'segregating a person from other persons on racial grounds' or
direct discrimination in other words. At the same time the Act states that even when
any requirement is applied equally to all persons, but 'the proportion of persons of
the same racial group as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller
than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it', this
also constitutes discrimination. So if some minority ethnic group has lower income,
shorter terms of living at the same address or working in the same job, compared to
other ethnic groups, and these variables are included into credit risk assessment, and
therefore, members of a disadvantaged group are granted less credit, then it also
constitutes discrimination, unless it can be shown that the requirement is 'justifiable'.
Such a requirement applies to 'colour' and 'nationality' (RRA (1976)).
In terms of race or racial/national origin, the recent amendment of the said
Act (Regulations (2003)) implementing the EU Race Directive, removes the
condition for ethnic group to be 'considerably smaller'. It states that even if the
requirement is applied equally to all persons, but members of a certain ethnic group
would be at a disadvantage, then it is necessary to show that this requirement
constitutes 'proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim'.
It seems that a general problem of the anti-discrimination provisions in
Europe is that they allow for several interpretations. For example, in the case of the
UK RRA, there is no indication of what is 'considerably smaller'. Equally, there is
no explanation of what provisions would be regarded as appropriate and legitimate in
credit risk assessment.
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This problem is partially resolved by the Guide to Credit Scoring (OFT
(2000)) compiled by the credit industry and approved by The Office of Fair Trading
and Department of Trade and Industry. Although this document lays down the
principles of appropriate standards for scorecard development and validation, it is not
legally binding. Section 2.4 of the Guide states that 'Credit Scoring will not
discriminate on the grounds of sex, race, religion, disability or colour.' It is not clear
whether the statement covers direct or indirect discrimination.
So the final decision about whether any particular action constitutes
discrimination, and what kind of discrimination, is left to the regulating authorities
and the Court. We are not aware of any Court cases on discrimination in credit
scoring in the UK.
However, there was a case in France, where the national data protection
authority - Commission National de l'lnformatique et des Libertes (CNIL) - has
explicitly prohibited the use of nationality in credit scoring models in 1998 (CNIL
(1998)). But subsequently this decision was overruled by the higher authority (Le
Conseil d'Etat (2001))6.
In France the final decision was achieved by balancing two objectives: the
necessity to achieve an accurate risk assessment and the necessity to protect human
rights. It is not straightforward which objective should be given a proirity. In this
context, questions about how the anti-discrimination measures affect borrowers and
lenders, and whether these measures actually achieve their intended purpose become
of fundamental importance. These questions have already been addressed in the
USA, where a considerable empirical evidence on the effects of the anti¬
discrimination law has been accumulated. The next section will outline the U.S.
regulations.
6 More details on this case are given in Section 2.4.2.3.
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2.3.3 Anti-Discrimination Law of the USA
Unlike Europe, where restrictions on information in credit scoring have to be
inferred from the general anti-discrimination regulations, the USA has a package of
legal acts that deal specifically with the area of credit (Table 2.2). This can be
accounted for by the large volumes of credit and the growing dependence of US
consumers on it, which resulted in the situation where the public would like to view
the access to credit as a right. (Lewis (1992b))
The most important US legal acts in the area of credit are outlined below,
except for the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA, 1970) that will be discussed in
detail in Section 2.4.3.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA (1976)) and its implementing
regulation (Regulation B) prohibit lending discrimination on the basis of race,
colour, national origin, age, gender, marital status, religion, receipt of public
assistance, or exercise of rights granted by consumer protection statutes. It
distinguishes between judgmental and statistical scoring systems, and allows the use
of age in the latter as long as its use does not disadvantage applicants over 62 years.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA (1975) requires financial
institutions to publicly disclose the number and dollar volume of home mortgage
loans they make in metropolitan areas. Amendments in 1989 put an obligation on the
lenders to collect and report data regarding race, gender and income characteristics of
borrowers and applicants for mortgage loans. Previously the law required disclosure
only of loans made, not applications. With the provision to disclose data not only on
loans granted but also on loans denied, the Act became a tool to aid enforcement of
the fair-lending laws. The section below on the Boston Federal Reserve Bank Study
(Section 2.3.3.2) gives an example of how it has been implemented in practice.
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA (1977)) encourages financial
institutions to help to meet the credit needs of the communities in which they
operate, including low- and moderate-income neighbourhoods, consistent with safe
and sound banking operations. The Act requires that each financial institution's
record in helping meet the credit needs of its entire community be evaluated
periodically. That record is taken into account in considering an institution's
application for deposit facilities, including mergers and acquisitions.
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2.3.3.1 Overt discrimination, disparate treatment and
disparate impact
In the US regulations the distinction is made between
- overt discrimination - explicit use of forbidden variables in scoring models,
- disparate treatment - judgmental or subjective discrimination, which may occur,
when the score derived from the statistical model is judgementally adjusted,
- and the disparate impact (Office of Comptroller of Currency (1997)).
The joint agency Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending (Office of
Comptroller of Currency (1994)) explains what constitutes disparate impact. Even if
a variable (characteristic) is not explicitly banned, if it leads to excessive rejection of
borrowers of a certain race or gender or with respect to some other prohibited
characteristic, the lender needs to show there is a 'business necessity' for using the
variable and there is no equally effective way of making the credit decision.
So in principle there are parallels between the US and European definitions:
overt discrimination and disparate treatment in the US correspond to direct
discrimination in Europe, and disparate impact is similar to indirect discrimination.
There is also no clear definition of what constitutes 'business necessity'. The
Bulletin 97-24 issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Office of
Comptroller of Currency (1997)) says that a variable used in a credit-scoring system
will essentially be assumed to meet the business necessity test if it is statistically
related to loan performance and has an 'understandable relationship' to the
applicant's creditworthiness.
There is still a lot of subjectivity involved in interpreting whether a
relationship is 'understandable' or not, and what level constitutes the right balance
between statistical association and disparate impact.
Nevertheless, Mester (1997) believes that it seems to be generally accepted
that a credit scoring model makes it easier than a judgmental decision-making for a
lender to document the business reason for using a variable that might have a
disproportionately negative effect on certain groups of applicants protected by law
from discrimination. The significance of each weight in the model gives a measure of
the marginal impact of each variable on the likely credit performance (given the
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other variables contained in the model). Also, a well-built model will include all
allowable factors that produce the most accurate prediction of credit performance, so
a lender using such a model might be able to argue that a similarly effective
alternative was not available.
Therefore, for some time US lenders believed that credit scoring gave them
the chance to fully comply with fair-lending legislature by removing subjectivity
from the credit granting process. But the Boston Federal Reserve Bank study
(Munnel et al. (1992); Munnel et al. (1996)) changed this complacency.
2.3.3.2 The Boston Federal Reserve study
The study analysed the data coming from loan applications for mortgages in
the Boston area. The sample included all applications submitted by blacks and
Hispanics and a random sample of white applicants. The characteristics were taken
from the data collected under the HMDA and included each applicant's race, gender,
income, and whether the application was accepted or denied. The denial rates
showed substantially higher denial rates for black and Hispanic applicants than for
white applicants. Both ordinary least squares and binomial logit techniques were
used to estimate the probability of being denied a mortgage. The 1992 study
concluded that minority applicants in the Boston area were three times more likely to
be denied a mortgage loan than whites, and both whites and minorities were more
likely to be rejected when the property was located in a minority neighbourhood, as
would be expected if discrimination and redlining were occurring.
A key methodological problem in estimating the importance of the race
coefficient arises, as pointed out by Yinger (1997), because many characteristics of
the applicants and neighbourhoods are correlated with race. In other words, minority
applicants tend to have poorer credit qualifications. Yinger believes that this
correlation is a problem because it implies that if some important characteristics are
missing this can result in serious omitted-variable bias in the coefficients of race
indicators. If income is negatively correlated with the probability of loan denial and
with race as well, the coefficient of race can be higher, if income is omitted from the
model. Because this coefficient is the estimate of discrimination and redlining, one
may conclude that there is discrimination or redlining when in fact there is none.
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Since the 1992 Boston Federal Reserve study was heavily criticised for this
omitted-variable bias, Munnel et al. (1996) improved on their earlier study by
including a more comprehensive list of applicant and property characteristics. These
38 additional variables were collected by surveying the lenders in Boston, and the
authors argued that they included all possible factors that lenders used for predicting
default.
The results of this study indicated that minority applicants, on average, did
have less wealth, weaker credit histories, and higher loan-to-value ratios than white
applicants, and these disadvantages did account for a large portion of the difference
in denial rates. Including the additional information on applicant and property
characteristics reduced the disparity between the minority and white denials from the
originally reported 18 percentage points to just 8.2 percentage points. It also reduced
a relative rejection ratio of 2.8 to 1 to a relative rejection ratio of roughly 1.8 to 1.
The improved study did not find any evidence for redlining on the basis of the racial
composition of the area.
Nevertheless, the conclusion was that there was still enough evidence to
suggest that the discrimination was occurring, although, on the other hand, the results
of the improved study could be interpreted as supporting the idea of the omitted-
variable bias. If the original disparity is reduced by including the additional
characteristics into the model, perhaps, it can be reduced further with the addition of
further variables.
Lewis (1992b) states that one can never predict with 100% certainty if any
particular person will default, and that credit scoring models are not causal models,
but associative ones. Since it is not known what causes a good or bad performance,
the attempts can be made only to find facts that are closely associated with it. So to
claim that all possible factors were collected that influence the credit performance is,
perhaps, too optimistic.
However, the problem of correlation pointed out by Yinger is not limited to
the omitted-variable bias, since race is correlated not only with omitted variables but
also with variables included into the model that is used to estimate the significance of
discrimination.
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It was shown by Bostic (1997) that the race indicator was significantly
correlated with all economic variables included in Munnell's analysis, although the
correlation was not large enough to suggest that multicollinearity should be a major
problem in estimation. Nevertheless, Bostic demonstrated that the minority and white
populations did differ demographically and in terms of economic and social status.
When the interaction terms between race and some of the financial variables were
included into the model, the race indicator lost its significance. Further analysis lead
Bostic to conclude that the claim that discrimination was a general phenomenon was
refuted, since the racial differences in probability of being accepted existed only for
'marginal' applicants, i.e. applicants with low economic indicators and poor credit
history. However, even for this group there was no evidence to claim that this
difference was occurring due to discrimination rather than due to economic factors.
Finally, it should be noted that the studies aimed at revealing discrimination
are trying to mimic the decision-making process of lenders. In this case it is not
enough just to assemble the information that is available for making a credit-granting
decision. There are different modelling approaches and techniques that may result in
completely different models being built on the same dataset. One cannot claim that
race is included into the decision-making process, without taking this into account.
Although this study was heavily criticized by economists (Brimelow and
Spencer (1993); Day and Liebowitz (1998); Harrison (1998); Liebowitz (1993);
Zandi (1993); Altman et al. (1981)), the policy-makers and public opinion supported
the conclusions of the Munnel report. The influence of the Munnel report can be
demonstrated by the following statements of Lawrence Lindsay, a member of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve at that time:
'I dismiss the view of conservative economists and bankers that ... there are
no racially based problems in mortgage lending... The study (Munnel et al.)
may be imperfect, but it remains a landmark study that sheds an important
light onto the issue of potential discrimination in lending.' (Liebowitz
(1993))
The Boston Fed Study highlighted the important problem: the prohibition of
certain grounds from credit scoring models does not eliminate the discrimination on
these grounds. And 'equal treatment' does not automatically create an equal world.
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A further aspect of the problem is that even if credit grantors do not
discriminate between minorities, when assessing creditworthiness, minorities may
believe they do. Crook (1999) found that some minorities, in particular blacks,
Hispanics and single females are more likely than other groups to be discouraged
from applying for credit, although they are not more likely to default. So eliminating
discrimination requires more than a ban on certain information. The next section will
discuss this issue further.
2.3.4. Impact on credit granting
Although the anti-discriminatory legislature can vary significantly from
country to country, it shares the same objective: to provide protection to
disadvantaged groups. In the context of consumer credit, this means to increase their
access to it. In the US environment Elliehausen and Durkin (1989) investigated
whether the ECOA achieved this goal.
While analysing the effects of the anti-discrimination legislature it is
important to answer the following questions:
1) whether the removal of the prohibited characteristics impacts the predictive
ability of credit scoring models;
2) whether the protected groups are poorer credit risks and require the protection;
3) whether the prohibition of certain characteristics increases the acceptance rates
for the protected groups.
As far as the first question is concerned, a study on the effect of limiting
information in credit scoring models was carried out by Shinkel (1980). He
developed eight discriminant models, from which seven models excluded variables
prohibited by the ECOA, and one model contained the prohibited variables. Each
model was used to classify applicants in a holdout sample. His results indicated that
exclusion of prohibited variables reduced the number of good loans accepted
(depending on the variable that was excluded the percent of reduction ranged from
0.3% to 2.3%) and increased the number of bad loans accepted (from 0 to 2.6%) with
a reduction in profitability of 2% to 16%.
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On the other hand, Elliehausen and Durkin (1989) refer to studies that
demonstrated the opposite result. Thus, Nevin and Churchill, Jr. (1979) and Shay and
Genderton (1979) concluded that there were no significant differences in predictive
ability with and without gender, marital status and age included. But such results can
be explained by the presence of variables strongly correlated with the excluded ones,
so that the variables remaining in the model 'proxy' the prohibited ones.
In the European context Platts and Howe (1997) attempted to develop a
single generic model for five EU countries that represented different regions in
Europe. In this way the authors wanted to apply one model to the whole of EU. Their
analysis showed that the predictive power of the model went down significantly
when no distinction was made between nationality or country of residence.
As for the creditworthiness of the protected groups, the evidence on
relationship between race and default is controversial. Avery (1982) found that black
applicants appeared less likely than other applicants to pay off their accounts as
scheduled, even after controlling for applicants' financial and credit characteristics.
Similarly, Boyes et al. (1978); Martin and Hill (2000) showed that racial minorities
were more likely than whites to default, other things equal. On the other hand, Van
Order et al. (1993) showed the contrary evidence for some parts of the USA.
But women and older borrowers were found to be less risky than other
borrowers (Altman et al. (1981); Avery (1982); Boyes et al. (1978); Chandler and
Ewert (1976) and Durand (1941)). So one can argue on the basis of these studies that
some protected classes are actually more creditworthy than some unprotected groups.
Further, there have been studies suggesting that the prohibition of certain
characteristics failed to increase acceptance rates for protected groups. The analysis
by Chandler and Ewert (1976) suggested that separate risk profiles for male and
female applicants could identify credit risk more precisely than a model which
ignored an applicant's gender or one which allowed for only limited differences in
male and female risk profiles. And what is more important, the acceptance rates for
females were higher when gender was included into the model as a variable and also
in segmented male/female models as compared to the model that did not distinguish
between sexes. So one can conclude that the ECOA appeared to disadvantage rather
than benefit female applicants.
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A more recent study by Banasik et al. (1996) investigated whether more
accurate discrimination, in the statistical sense, could be achieved if models were
built for separate subgroups within the population, and also looked at the rejection
rates for these subpopulations. One of their clearest results was that, all other things
being equal, subpopulation scorecards tended to reject fewer applicants than full
population scorecards. At the same time the study proved that subpopulation
scorecards did not always improve predictive accuracy - the subgroups needed to be
sufficiently different.
Such differences in acceptance rates depending on whether segmented/non-
segmented models are used, can be explained by a phenomenon referred to as the
Yule-Simpson's paradox (Yule (1903); Simpson (1951)) in statistics. The paradox
arises when the relationship between the outcome and predictor variables changes
depending on the value of a third variable. Examples of the Yule-Simpson's paradox
abound in medicine (Hand (1979); Hanley and Theriault (2000), Julious and Mullee
(1994), Baker and Kramer (2001)), when, for example, the effect of treatment may
appear unsuccessful for the whole population of patients, but successful if tested for
male and female segments of the same population separately.
To illustrate the Yule-Simpson's paradox when applied to consumer credit,
we consider the following example, which is totally hypothetical. Table 2.3 gives the
breakdown of accepted applications by sex, employment status and outcome. The
numbers in parenthesis are probabilities of being 'good' given employment status.










Full-time 130 (0.62) 80 30 (0.75) 10 160 (0.64) 90
Part-time 40 (0.57) 30 130 (0.72) 50 170 (0.68) 80
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Whereas both male and female applicants with full-time jobs are better credit
risks, the part-time status appears to be associated with more creditworthy behaviour,
if no distinction between sexes is made. This may be the case when the use of gender
is prohibited by legislation. So removing gender from the model will give misleading
results. Another conclusion that follows from this example is that although women
are better credit risks compared to men, they are not 'rewarded' for this in the
'sexless' scorecard.
Yule-Simpson's paradox arises because the combined probabilities are
averages weighted by the fraction of each gender. Since a greater proportion of those
with part-time status is women, more weight is given to women in the marginal
probability for part-time status. On the contrary, the full-time marginal probability
reflects the male dominance in this employment category. This situation can be
easily remedied either by segmentation or stratification, but if there are legal
restrictions on the use of sex in a scorecard, this does not appear possible.
Therefore, the inability to distinguish between different subgroups makes the
lenders apply one generalised scale to all applicants, which is detrimental to both
lenders and borrowers. Furthermore, if protected groups constitute the minority in the
overall population, they will be assessed on the white male scale simply because
their characteristics will be given less weight in the statistical analysis. It may sound
paradoxical, but in order to eliminate discrimination in the social sense, it is
necessary to discriminate in the statistical sense.
The problem of the legal interpretation of discrimination consists in trying to
eliminate both direct and indirect discrimination, whereas in application to credit
scoring these dual targets appear to be mutually exclusive. If the use of certain
characteristics (direct discrimination) is prohibited, the protected groups are exposed
to indirect discrimination. Since they are disadvantaged in comparison to other
groups in the sense of having values of characteristics associated with high default
probability, this state of the world is reflected in the outcome of the credit scoring
decision. If on the other hand, the law wishes to combat the unequal distribution of
credit (indirect discrimination), then the use of the relevant information should be
allowed.
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However, the legal argument (Banton (1994)) holds that the anti-
discriminatory legislation is a means of achieving the equal treatment of persons.
Using the prohibited information reinforces the distinction, which the law seeks to
eliminate. Nevertheless, in our understanding, the law should distinguish between
subjective and statistical discrimination, and in application to the latter, equal
treatment could be interpreted as the right to receive an equally accurate assessment.
Obviously, this would require the use of all relevant information, but this is regarded
'politically unpalatable' (Johnson (1992)).
Another possible solution was suggested by Hand (1998): by building
separate models for sub-populations and keeping the same proportions of rejected
applicants, one can ensure that credit is extended to 'protected' groups on an equal
basis. The problem with this approach, as pointed out by Martin and Hill (2000),
consists in general deterioration of credit quality in the long run, if more individuals
are accepted with a higher likelihood of default. The resultant increase in costs and
potential decrease in credit availability will have to be borne by all, including the
protected groups.
In general, we believe that there is a need to re-assess the interpretation of
'equal treatment' and its relation to 'responsible lending'. Retention of the
information, whilst unpalatable, may allow action to be taken to ensure that fairness
is achieved. This makes the decision a policy action, rather than an artefact of the
modelling. But until this action is taken, the existing anti-discriminatory legislation
will continue to work against lenders and borrowers.
2.4 Data protection and credit referencing
2.4.1 The right on information privacy
The first part of the chapter explored the protection of human rights and the
application of equality principles in the area of consumer credit. It has been shown
that the level of anti-discrimination requirements varies from country to country,
with the most stringent rules being imposed on U.S. lenders, while at the European
Community level human rights have not been addressed until recently. But in
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contrast to other fundamental rights, the right to privacy has received very special
attention both in the European Union and in the United States.
The distinction should be made between the concepts of privacy and data
protection. Bennet (1992) defines privacy as 'the exclusiveness of the physical space
around the individual, the autonomy of decision-making without outside interference,
and the right to control the circulation of personal information'.
According to this definition data protection constitutes only one component
of a broader term 'privacy' and can be regarded as equivalent to the concept of
'information privacy', the definition of which is given by Westin (1967): 'the claim
of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others'.
The need to protect information privacy was first recognised in the late 1960s
and was associated with the emergence of the 'post-industrial' or 'information
society'. According to Bennet (1992), one of the main characteristics of the post-
industrial society is the increasing value of information. Hence, the question of
ownership of information becomes crucial, because it becomes an important
resource, perhaps, more valuable than other resources, such as labour and capital.
Technological advances in data handling and communication bring more
complicated relationship between the individual and those that have information
about the individual. It is recognised that this information can give a certain power to
a 'data holder' and this power can be abused. So from the public and legal
perspective, it is necessary to re-assess relations between 'data subjects' and 'data
holders' and to impose certain safeguards and controls.
2.4.2 Data protection in the EU
2.4.2.1 The national provisions before the Data Protection Directive
The level of importance ascribed to data protection can be demonstrated by
the fact that even before the introduction of the European Directive on data
protection in 1995, the majority of EU countries already had some data protection
acts in place as shown in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4 The status of data protection legislature in the EU and the USA
(before the Directive 95/46)
Country Legislation or action Date of passage
United States Fair Credit Reporting Act 1970
Sweden Data Act 1974
Germany Data Protection Act 1977
France Law on Informatics & Liberties 1978
Denmark Private Registers Act 1978
Austria Data Protection Act 1978
Luxembourg Data Protection Act 1979
United Kingdom Data Protection Act 1984
Finland Personal Data File Act 1987
Ireland Data Protection Act 1988
The Netherlands Data Protection Act 1988
Belgium Law on Privacy Protection in relation to the
processing of Personal Data
1992
Portugal Constitutional provisions 1976
Italy No legislature in force
Greece No legislature in force
Spain Organic Law 5/1992 1992
Source: Bennett (1992) and European Commission, Directorate-General XV Internal
market and financial services,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/en/media/dataprot/studies/index.htm
Bennet (1992) discovered a remarkable level of similarity in the general
approach that MSs adopted in relation to data protection. Most MSs had statements
of fair information policy based on the same general principles:
Openness or transparency, which means that the very existence of record-keeping
systems should be publicly known;
The possibility for individual access and correction that generally allows the data
subjects to verify any information that is kept on them;
The principle of collection limitation that places some boundaries on the data
held in databases following from the purpose of data collection;
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The principle of use limitation, based on the notion of relevance: data can only be
used for the purpose it was collected for;
The principle of disclosure, data should not be communicated externally (to third
parties) without the consent of the data subject or legal authority;
The security safeguards principle, which implies that appropriate measures
should be taken to ensure confidentiality and to prevent destruction or
modification of data.
But in spite of the similarity in general approach, the scope, detail and status
of national laws differed considerably (Korff (1998)). In some countries the law
covered manual data as well as automated data (France), whereas in some countries
the law only covered the latter (the UK). Some made fundamental distinctions
between the rules for public and private sectors (Germany), while others did not
make such distinctions. As for the status of data protection, it ranged from the
countries with specific provisions enshrined in their constitutions (the Netherlands,
Portugal) to countries with no data protection legislation at all (Italy, Greece).
It was because of these divergences that the need for a directive arose, since it
was recognised that such divergences might impede the smooth operation of the
internal market.
2.4.2.2 The Data Protection Directive overview
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data (hereafter 'the Directive', European Parliament (1995))
was adopted on 24 October 1995 and required implementation not later than three
years after this date.
The main objective of the Directive was to provide a working balance
between the needs of data subjects and those of data holders by facilitating and
encouraging the free movement of personal data while at the same time strictly
protecting the privacy of the individual. This balancing approach can be traced
throughout the Directive.
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The Directive, similar to the other harmonisation measures, was based on the
principle of the minimum harmonisation which implies that the MSs are not allowed
to go below the specified threshold of privacy but they are given certain freedom in
going above it. However, in the case of data protection the threshold was set quite
high, which was inspired first, by the importance attached to information privacy and
data protection. And second, by the technological developments that enabled the free
flow of information across the borders but at the same time increased the danger of
the breach of privacy.
The Directive's scope of application is very wide; it applies without any
distinctions between the private and public sectors, between the format of data or the
technology on which it is stored or transmitted, and between automated and manually
structured data. Data processing is also defined very widely so that all data are
caught from collection to destruction. The Directive imposes the criterion of
legitimacy for processing, which follows from the balancing approach between the
interests of 'data subjects' and the interests of 'data users'. The processing of
personal data is considered to be legitimate either with the consent of the data
subject, or resulting from the necessity of some important public interest, or if a
balancing of the interests of data users and data subjects has shown that the interest
of the former should prevail.
The requirement of legitimate processing gives the data subject the right to
object to processing in some cases, including automated decision-making. However,
it does not apply to situations where it is the data subject who wishes to enter into a
contract. As might be expected, data subjects have rights of access to the data and a
right to know the reasons, when an automated decision has been made which is
unfavourable to them.
The Directive prohibits processing of sensitive information relating to such
issues as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade union membership and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.
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The Directive draws a distinction between the circumstances where the data
are and are not collected directly from the data subject. In both cases the data subject
should be informed of the purpose of the processing and given guarantees of fair
processing. When the disclosure to third parties is envisaged, the data subject should
be informed about it and the data subject has the right to refuse this use.
Member States must establish public authorities to be the supervisory bodies
for the administration of the Directive within the territory of each MS, but in
addition, a working party is established which includes a representative of the
Commission and representatives of the MSs.
Finally, the Directive prohibits data transfers to those countries outside the
EU which have an inadequate level of protection.
2.4.2.3 The implications for credit scoring.
On the surface, the Directive affected only the provisions of the credit
contract (e.g. reasons for denial), but not the credit scoring practices. The clause
concerning the sensitive data echoes, to a certain extent, the provisions of the anti¬
discrimination law. Such information - 'revealing the racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership,
health or sex life'7 -is not normally collected by lenders. However, special attention
should be given to the word 'revealing', which potentially gives grounds to include
some additional characteristics under the 'umbrella' of sensitive data.
At the national level the implementation of the Directive affected the
activities of CRA that came under scrutiny of the national data protection authorities
in some counties, e.g. Belgium, Greece and the UK. In the UK the Data Protection
Registrar (now the Information Commissioner) used the Directive as the legal basis
for resolving the long-standing dispute on the legitimacy of third party data in credit
reports. Among other things, the British CRAs collect so-called third party data
which includes:
people with the same name, or a very similar name, living at the same address;
other family members living at the same address;
7 The bold is added.
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people with the same name, or a very similar name, who have in the past lived at
the same address or the borrower's last address;
other people who have in the past lived at the same address or the borrower's last
address as part of the borrower's family;
names of other people who have been listed on the Electoral Roll at the same
address.
In September 2000 it was reported that the issue was resolved by the Working
Party that was specifically set up for this purpose by the Information Commissioner,
providing the Information Commissioner 'with a solution to her concerns, that also
enabled the industry to extend credit without undue risk to the consumer or the
lender' (Data Protection (2000a)). The solution involved the following measures:
A shared surname and address will no longer be taken as an indication of a
financial connection, e.g. parents and children are no longer automatically
assumed to be formally connected.
Customer requesting a copy of their credit file, will only see their own credit data
and not that of any financially connected 'third party'.
Individuals will be able to opt out of the automatic use of their financial partner's
data.
Household data will be used for fraud detection, and possibly, as a means of
assessing over-commitment within a financial unit. (Data Protection (2000b)).
In France it was credit scoring techniques that were revised by the national
authority. The significant number of complaints in the banking sector made the
Commission National de l'lnformatique et des Libertes (CNIL) carry out control
missions to check the conditions of using credit scoring. It has emerged that for equal
financial status, the criterion of nationality could enable lenders to discriminate
between French nationals and nationals of another European Union country, or
French nationals and nationals of a third country. This led the CNIL to issue a new
recommendation of a general nature concerning credit scoring techniques. Such
techniques should have no relation to the nationality of clients, as this would
constitute unacceptable discrimination. Apart from nationality, this prohibition also
affected the variable 'number of years at the last address', since it was considered to
be related to nationality (CNIL (1998)). But as was mentioned earlier (Section 2.3.2)
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the French credit industry managed to win back the right to use 'nationality' and
'years at address', because it was established there was no intention to disadvantage
other nationalities (Le Conseil d'Etat (2001)).
The Directive is very important, since it was the first Community measure
related to the credit risk assessment practices. One important implication that follows
from the Directive is that the lenders that are, in principle, subject to home country
control, have to comply with data protection regulations of the country where the
credit reference agency is established, if the lenders have to request the information
on their 'foreign' applicants.
Although designed as a really tight harmonisation measure, the Directive
suffers the same drawbacks of the harmonising measures that were outlined in
Section 2.2. In general, although the Directive led the national authorities to consider
privacy issues relating to credit referencing, the area of credit referencing still
remains largely not harmonised, as will be shown in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.3 US data protection legislature
Although the Directive related to the MS of the European Union, the USA
was affected by its provisions, because the Directive covered data transfers between
the EU and external countries.
The importance that is attached to credit in US society can be demonstrated
once again by the fact that Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970) was introduced earlier
than a more general Privacy Act (1974). The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA
(1970)) still remains the main legislative tool for regulating the activities of credit
reference agencies. The Act requires credit reference agencies to supply correct and
complete information to businesses to use when evaluating a borrower's application.
Under the FCRA consumers have the following rights:
1) to receive copies of their credit reports;
2) to dispute the information held in the credit report. Both the CRA and the
supplier of information are legally obligated to reinvestigate the dispute. If the
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dispute is not resolved to the customer's satisfaction, the customer has a right to
add a summary explanation to the credit report.
3) to know the name of anyone who received the credit report in the last year for
most purposes or in the last two years for employment purposes;
4) to know specific reasons for being declined credit and the name and address of
the CRA that supplied the credit report, provided the denial was based on
information given by the CRA;
5) to "opt out" of inclusion on direct marketing lists.
The information is kept for seven years (apart from some minor exceptions).
Particularly detailed reports, known as investigative reports, may be released only
with notice to the consumer. The FCRA also requires that measures be taken to limit
the dissemination of reports. Under the 1996 amendments to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, businesses can share certain consumer information with their
affiliates, but they must first give customers the choice of opting out of the sharing.
In 1999 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA (1999)), also known as the
Financial Services Modernisation Act was passed which complements the limits and
procedures on information-sharing already in place in the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
The new act extends the scope of legislation to any entity engaged in financial
activities and covers personally identifiable financial information about consumers.
The law requires that a lender should provide consumers with a notice of a privacy
policy and a chance to opt out of information-sharing with third parties.
It is difficult to say to what extent the new requirements set in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act were inspired by the EU data protection legislation, but after the
Data Protection Directive came into force, the level of data protection in the USA
was considered inadequate from the EU point of view. This launched negotiations
between the USA and EU that lasted for two years. The Commission argued that the
US took a sectoral approach to data protection which had produced 'a patchwork of
federal and state laws and self-regulatory programmes' (European Commission
(2000)). It assessed the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by the U.S. Fair
Credit Reporting Act, in line with Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC and concluded
that it was not adequate.
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However, in July 2000 The European Commission adopted a Decision
determining that an arrangement put in place by the US Department of Commerce
known as the 'safe harbor' provides adequate protection for personal data transferred
from the EU. Under the 'safe harbor', US companies can voluntarily adhere to a set
of data protection principles recognised by the Commission as providing adequate
protection and thus meet the requirements of the Directive as regards transfers of
data out of the EU. In many cases, for example under a specific statute such as the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, which covers a number of situations where financial loss
might occur (eg refusal of a loan), EU citizens will also have the option of taking the
US organisation to court in the US.
Although the sectoral approach has been considered as a drawback by EC
officials, the specific focus of US legislation on the particular area of application
provides for effective information-sharing between lenders throughout the whole US
territory. It will shown below that this is not the case in the EU.
2.4.4 Credit referencing
2.4.4.1 National differences in credit referencing
CRAs are important sources of information about the previous performance
of a borrower. In many countries lenders agree to exchange information about their
customers, this is done through credit reference agencies that act as information
brokers. We have seen that credit regulations in general and anti-discriminatory
legislation vary significantly from country to country. The same applies to the types
of credit reference agencies and the scope of information they hold.
Jappeli and Pagano (2000) surveyed credit reference agencies in 49 countries
and found that CRAs vary from country to country. In countries such as the USA,
UK, Ireland and Sweden, credit information is provided by firms acting on a purely
commercial basis (see Table 2.5). In other countries, the systems are managed by
professional bodies or private organisations which are generally non-profit.
Examples include the "Bureau Krediet Registratie" in the Netherlands, the "Schufa"
in Germany, and the Belgian "Mutuelle d'information de L'union Professionnelle du
credit". There are also countries where credit referencing is done by the Central
Banks.
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Table 2.5. Differences in types of CRA and information they hold
Country Type of CRA Starting Date Type of
Information
USA Private 1890 Black and white
UK Private 1960 Black and white
Austria Private/public 1860/1986 Black and white
Belgium Private/public 1987/1985 Black and white
Denmark Private 1971 Black
Finland Private 1900 Black
France Public 1989 Black
Germany Private/public 1927/1934 Black and white
Ireland Private 1963 Black and white
Italy Public 1990/1964 Black and white
Netherlands Private 1965 Black and white
Portugal Private/public 1977 Black and white
Spain Private/public 1994/1983 Black and white
Sweden Private 1890 Black and white
Source: Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Jentzsch (2003).
In countries with public CRAs there is a legal requirement for lenders to
supply the information on the performance of their customers to the CRA, while in
countries with private CRAs the exchange of information is done on a voluntary and
reciprocal basis.
As regards the kind of data collected, CRAs are even more varied. Both
o
'white' (positive) and 'black' (negative) information is collected in the Netherlands,
Germany, UK, USA, whereas France and Denmark have 'black' data only. The level
of detail also differs significantly from country to country. CRAs have the most
complete picture of the borrowers' performance in the USA, whereas in Europe the
most detailed CRA information is the UK.
8 'Black' data is usually understood as an account when three consecutive payments were missed
following the definition given in the minute of understanding between the British Bankers Association
and the Data Protection Registrar; 'white' data - all other information, including those accounts where
payments are up to date (Howells, 1995);
48
The US CRAs collect four basic types of information:
Identification and employment information - individual's name, birth date,
Social Security number, employer, spouse's name. The CRA also may provide
information about applicant's employment history, home ownership, income, and
previous address, if a creditor requests this type of information.
Payment history - accounts with different creditors, showing how much credit
has been extended and whether it has been repaid on time. Related events, such
as referral of an overdue account to a collection agency, may also be noted.
Inquiries - a record of all creditors who have asked for individual's credit history
within the past year, and a record of those persons or businesses requesting
his/her credit history for employment purposes for the past two years.
Public record information - bankruptcies, foreclosures, or tax liens.
In the US, apart from standard 'credit reports', CRAs hold so-called
'investigative consumer reports'. These are detailed reports that involve interviews
with consumer's neighbours or acquaintances about his or her lifestyle, character,
and reputation. These reports can be obtained only with the consent of the consumer
and may be used in connection with insurance and employment applications.
A UK credit report contains the following information:
electoral roll information that is used to check the borrower's address;
county court judgements (CCJ) and administration orders for borrowers who
failed to pay their debts on time, normally kept for 6 years;
bankruptcy information, also kept for 6 years;
data contributed by the lenders on the performance of individual accounts which
is shared on a reciprocal basis, including both 'black' and 'white' data;
a record of the searches or requests for the borrower's file from lenders;
the Council of Mortgage Lenders' Repossession Register available only to the
members of the Council of Mortgage Lenders, also kept for 6 years;
a report from CIFAS, a credit industry fraud avoidance system, showing a fraud
or an attempted fraud, available only to CIFAS members;
"gone away" marker made by GAIN (Gone Away Information Network) when
the borrower who is in arrears has moved without giving a new address;
'third party information' that was described earlier.
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The level of detail of CRA data is the subject of constant debate, resulting
from the need to balance the interests of different parties: data subjects' desire to
keep their privacy, and the need of society to promote the policy of 'responsible
lending', i.e. that credit should be given only to those that can repay it. There is a
growing concern about the problem of overindebtedness. Therefore, the balance
largely depends on the public perception of the benefits that follow from the use of
the credit reference data.
2.4.4.2 The importance of CRA information in lending
Japelli and Pagano (2000) suggest that information-sharing is important for
three main reasons:
- CRAs improve the lenders' knowledge of their customers and therefore improve
the prediction of their repayment performance;
- CRAs reduce the cost of obtaining the information that lenders could otherwise
pass onto their customers;
- CRA information provision is a borrower disciplining device.
Following their analysis of information-sharing in 49 counties, Jappeli and
Pagano concluded that information-sharing is positively correlated with the amount
of lending and negatively correlated with the default rate.
There is more empirical evidence to support the importance of CRAs in
lending in terms of the quality of prediction given by credit scoring models. Chandler
and Johnson (1992) tested the contribution of data contained in US credit reports
made to the predictive ability of scoring models. The relationship between the level
of predictive power and the level of CRA data was studied under four scenarios with
different levels of detail of CRA information. The predictive power of each model
was measured by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic that measures the ability of the
scoring model to separate "good" and "bad" customers. Figure 2.1 presents the
predictive power for different levels of CRA data that are compared on a percentage
basis, with the highest Kolmogorov-Smirnov score scaled to 100 percent.
50
Their results suggested that the more detailed the CRA data, the better is
prediction, the more likely it is that good customers will receive credit and that bad
customers will be denied the use of credit. They concluded that placing limits on data
retained and communicated by CRAs are 'anti-consumer'.
Figure 2.1 Predictive power of credit scoring models depending on
the level of CRA report detail (Source: Chandler and Johnson (1992)).
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App + standard CRA





Percent ofmaximum predictive power
Since the level of the detail and the amount of data held by CRAs varies
from country to country, the significance of CRA data in credit scoring models will
also be different. In countries with less detailed CRA information, the contribution of
application information to predictive power would be expected to be greater than in
countries with more detailed CRA information. Such asymmetries create additional
difficulties in credit risk assessment on the European level.
Although, the Data Protection Directive has, to a certain extent, reduced the
variations in data protection policies of the MS, credit referencing remains extremely
diverse in terms of the legal status of the CRAs and the scope of information they
hold. If the quality of prediction depends on the level of detail of CRA information,
the applicants from counties with less detailed CRA will loose against others.
There is a number of practical questions on how the credit referencing should
be carried out, when people apply for credit across national borders. Consider the
situation when a Belgian national living in the Netherlands applies for a loan in
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Germany. Should the German bank request the credit report from Belgium or the
Netherlands or both? Where should the subsequent performance be reported to, if
this customer is accepted? How will the level of detail of a credit report affect the
chances of the Belgian national being accepted by the German bank? Will it be
viewed as discrimination if his/her creditworthiness is assessed on a different basis as
compared to the German national?
The proposal for a new EU Directive on consumer credit (European
Commission (2002)) contains a section on 'central databases', and the MS will be
obliged to set up and maintain 'negative' databases with the right to hold also
'positive' information on the financial performance of individuals. The Directive also
intends to improve the mechanisms of credit report circulation between the MS. So
hopefully, the questions above will be addressed shortly.
2.5 Conclusions
This Chapter has investigated the current state of integration of the European
credit markets and provided the most detailed and comprehensive review of the
restrictions on the use of information in credit scoring in the USA and EU. Such
review has not appeared in previous studies.
It has been shown that in spite of the impressive progress towards the creation
of an integrated market in financial services, the scale of divergence in national
regulations affecting credit scoring remains significant. It means that even when the
cross-border payments become cheap and efficient, the free flow of consumer credit
across borders may be still obstructed, since the existing legal framework does not
provide the basis for effective credit risk assessment across countries. But the EU
authorities recognize the situation and work is in process to remedy it.
Still credit scoring techniques and, most important, the scope of information
that can be used in credit scoring, are not specifically addressed either by existing or
by proposed harmonisation measures. Thus in Europe information available for
credit scoring becomes subject to general provisions of anti-discrimination and data
protection law that cover a range of areas, not only consumer credit.
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It has been demonstrated that Member States have significant freedom in
interpretation and implementation of the EC law. Therefore, national anti¬
discrimination and data protection rules remain diverse. This may have the following
implications for the lender's ability to assess the creditworthiness of a mixed
population consisting of residents of several European countries.
First, it is not possible to obtain the same information for residents of
different countries due to different anti-discrimination regulations and different
levels of solvency data held by the national CRAs. Previous research has found that
CRA information enhances the predictive power of credit scoring models and that
the level of detail of CRA records is directly related to the quality of credit risk
assessment. So residents of countries with less detailed CRA data will be subject to
less accurate risk assessment.
Second, the principle of equal treatment can be interpreted in such a way that
no distinction could be made between people of different nationalities. Since the law
does not distinguish between subjective and objective discrimination, the prohibitive
approach which is generally used in combating judgmental discrimination can be
applied to credit scoring and therefore, the use of certain information may be
regarded as illegal.
The analysis of previous studies has demonstrated that prohibition on
information related to the probability of default impairs the predictive ability of
credit scoring models and is detrimental for both lenders and borrowers. But until
some clarification on equal treatment in credit scoring is given at the EU level, the
danger remains that generic models may be regarded as the only legally acceptable
ones.
The next two Chapters will investigate how much reduction in the predictive
power of models can be expected if nationality cannot be used in credit risk
modelling.
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Chapter 3. Literature review on generic models in credit
scoring
3.1 Introduction
The aim of credit scoring is to construct a classification rule that distinguishes
between 'good' and 'bad' credit risks according to some pre-determined definition.
This rule should classify the entire population of applicants for any particular credit
product with maximum accuracy. However, the accuracy of classification may be
affected when the overall population comprises heterogeneous subgroups. It is not
uncommon in credit scoring to develop separate models for each subgroup.
With European integration in progress and developments in Internet banking,
the scope of the target population is changing from the credit applicants of any given
country to credit applicants of the EU or several European countries. The
introduction of the Euro in 12 countries has removed the exchange rate risk faced by
credit applicants, so one would expect more inter-country applicants for credit.
According to Eurostat, the estimated population of the EU will be nearly 380 million
people in 2005 (Table 3.1 gives the breakdown by country). Potentially this offers an
extremely attractive possibility of market expansion for creditors, provided they can
score not only the residents of their own country, but also applicants from the
neighbouring Member States.
Several questions arise. First, how accurate will the classification be if the
entire population of European applicants is scored with one model, and second, could
the classification be improved by segmentation, i.e. by building individual models
for different nations?
These questions follow from the legislative provisions underlying the EU
harmonisation. Whilst segmentation can be valid from the statistical point of view, it
may not necessarily be legal. As it was shown in Chapter 2, the use of 'nationality' in
credit scoring models is open to interpretation by national authorities. If
segmentation is not legal, it would be of interest to examine how much classification
accuracy is lost if a generic rather than a national model is estimated.
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Table 3.1. The EU population estimates in 2005
(Source: Eurostat (2003)).

















In a wider context this is a comparison of performance between generic
models and customised ones. Thomas (2000) defines generic models as models
developed on one or several populations or portfolios and applied to score a
geographically or socio-economically different population/ populations. In contrast
to this, customised models are developed on, and applied to, only one population.
This chapter presents a review of the previous research on generic models/
segmentation in credit scoring. Section 2 describes the existing approaches to
modelling the changing environment, which is the case when creating one model for
several countries. Section 3 investigates the conditions when linear models are
insensitive to variations in coefficients, the so-called 'flat maximum effect'. Section
4 reviews the previous research on segmenting the populations in credit scoring.
Sections 5 relates to the problem of multicollinearity which is a common feature in
credit scoring datasets and one of the conditions for the flat maximum effect to hold.
Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Concept drift and population drift
The question of selecting between generic and customised models depends on
the level of the homogeneity / heterogeneity of the target population, which can
evolve in time and space. We therefore start the discussion of generic models with
some considerations of the underlying phenomenon - changes or differences in the
population distribution - which may actually influence the performance of the
generic model.
In recent years significant attention has been given to one aspect of the
problem of varying credit risk patterns - population drift or changes in the
characteristics of borrowers over time. In the machine-learning literature population
drift is viewed as part of a more general phenomenon - concept drift, which may be
caused by 'continuous change of the world and environment, or it may occur when
the variables or the concepts depend on a certain (possibly unknown) context. The
location can be seen as the context in which the data is collected - knowledge of the
context (or a change of context) will aid the knowledge discovery process' (Taylor
and Nakhaeizadeh (1997)). Concept drift can also refer to other changes, e.g.
changes in the definitions of classes (good/bad) in supervised classification problems
(Kelly et al. (1999)).
Two main problems arise when dealing with classification problems in a
changing environment:
1) how to detect any difference or change;
2) how to react to identified differences. There are three ways of reacting: do
nothing, develop a new scoring system, try to adjust the existing one.
The main methods of detecting and tracking changes are summarised by
Taylor and Nakhaeizadeh (1997):
Statistical Process Control (SPC) methods to detect changes and adapt or
modify rules (Nakhaeizadeh et al. (1997)). The methodology assumes that
the data are grouped into batches which are monitored over time;
Machine-learning and statistical methods to detect contextual clues and
react accordingly (Widmer (1997));
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Using a 'forgetting factor' whereby the rule is constantly updated using
the most recently available observations (Nakhaeizadeh et al. (1996));
Incremental (or on-line) learning with flexible 'forgetting operators'
(Widmer and Kubat (1993), Widmer (1994))Widmer (1997).
The focus of the machine-learning approach is on the development of
adaptive models with sequential estimation, where the classification rule changes
each time a new observation or batches of observations are added to the data.
However, it is admitted that there is no general framework that would provide
reliable guidelines for dealing with dynamic aspects and further research is required
to develop some ideas presented in Nakhaeizadeh et al. (1997), Widmer (1997) and
Mannila (1995) in order to produce simple and efficient solutions for robust
modeling in a changing environment.
Countries can be considered as the varying context to react to. But in the area
of credit scoring the investigation of concept drift is predominantly focused on the
problems of population drift over time (Lucas (1992), Crook and Thomas (1992),
Kelly et al. (1999)).
It is observed that the classification accuracy of credit scoring models
deteriorates with time. The most common approach to the problem has been to adjust
the cut-off and when this is no longer helpful, then re-develop the model.
Crook and Thomas (1992) investigated the effects of changing the cut-off.
Two models for two different time periods were developed. It was found that the
overall default rate, i.e. the prior probabilities of group membership differed between
the time periods, and that default rates for each attribute of the predictor
characteristics, were different as well. This resulted in changes in posterior
probabilities of group membership, conditional on the attributes of the person, and
was reflected in the outcome of classification - different proportions of applicants
would have been accepted in different time periods. Even when the reject rate was
held constant, the differences in proportions remained, suggesting that the decision
for one and the same person might not be the same in different time periods. So the
paper demonstrated that there were differences between classification rules
developed in different time periods and that the cut-off changes do not guarantee the
same decision for all applicants.
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Lucas (1992) presented a method of monitoring population drift based on the
difference between the actual and predicted good rate for all variables in the model.
Confidence intervals were used to measuring the difference. The actual adjustment
was done by manual modification of the predicted good rate for the poor performing
attribute to match the actual good rate. Then the coefficients were re-estimated by
c = (X)1g,
where c = coefficients vector,
X = conditional probabilities matrix: invariable a | variable b),
g = good rates vector.
The formula can be applied to the variables that are not in the model to check
if the model performance is consistent with their good rates. But this approach
cannot be applied for comparison of models with different variable definitions,
which may be the case when dealing with different countries.
Kelly et al. (1999) provide a formulation of a dynamic model which is
capable of adjusting the parameters each time a new observation is added to a
dataset. They distinguish the following types of changes in a population:
1. changes in class (good/bad) priors, p(i), i.e. probability of belonging to class i;
2. changes in the class conditional distributions p(x\i), i.e. the probability of having
characteristic x given membership of class i,
3. changes in the posterior distributions of class membership p(i\x), i.e. the
probability of belonging to class i given the value of characteristic x (or in other
words, the priors estimated by using the knowledge about x).
Kelly et al. (1999) argue that the classification accuracy is affected only by
the third type of change, i.e. there should be no increase in error rate if the proportion
of bads increases in the population, but the changes in an applicant's characteristics
do not affect the classes differentially. However, they warn that this only holds for
true distributions, so due to inaccuracies in estimation the classification performance
may still be affected, if there are changes in class priors.
Furthermore, according to Kelly et al. (1999) the posterior probabilities
remain unaltered when the class conditional distributions change only if x includes
all variables influencing the class membership. But in real life this is seldom the
case, and so all three types of changes may have an effect on classification accuracy.
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The above studies approached the problem by attempting to trace the subtle
differences that evolve over time. Contrary to this, generic scoring tries to capture the
most salient features that are stable both in space and time. So it can be a possible
solution for population drift in time as well as in space.
3.3 Flat maximum effect and generic models
The possibility of constructing a generic model for several different
populations - or populations of different countries in our case - without significant
loss in the quality of prediction follows from the 'curse of insensitivity' (Rapoport
(1975), von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1982)) or flat maximum effect (Lovie and
Lovie (1986)) which implies that when there is a large number of predictor variables,
the predictive ability of linear models is insensitive to relatively large variations in
regression weights. It follows that seemingly different linear models can give the
same level of classification accuracy.
Lovie and Lovie (1986) specify the following conditions for the flat
maximum effect to hold:
1. Predictor variables in the model should have the highest degree of association
with the outcome variable - 'dominant' in Lovie and Lovie's notation.
2. The optimal subset of the predictor variables should be chosen to produce the
best performance.
3. Predictor variables should be collinear.
4. The predictor variables should be coded in the same direction, preferably
positive, in relation to the criterion variable (known outcome).
5. The criterion variable should be dichotomous to maximise the discrimination
power of the model.
The empirical test of Lovie and Lovie's proposition was undertaken by
Overstreet et al. (1992) who used ten credit-scoring models developed for different
Southeastern US credit unions. A generic model was built by using the weighted
average of coefficients from five models, and its predictive power was tested against
the five remaining individual models.
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It was found that the generic model performed relatively well, although the
performance depended on the cut-off levels. E.g., for a cut-off of 300 (on a 1000-
point scale) the generic model correctly identified 41.72% of bads in the validation
sample whilst the customised models correctly predicted 58.22% of bads, whereas
for a cut-off of 700, the corresponding percentages were 88.70% against 90.40%.
Overall customised classification models were superior in absolute terms, but this
was partially attributed to sample bias - the performance of the customised
scorecards was tested on their development samples. So the researchers concluded
the generic model performance was relatively good, and this together with benefits of
lower development costs could make it a preferred option compared to customised
models.
Further analysis was undertaken in Overstreet and Bradley (1996) on a more
complete and updated dataset. Instead of averaging the coefficients, the development
samples for customised models were pooled, and the model refitted. Due to a wider
range of variables used in the estimation (CRA variables were included) the new
generic model outperformed its 1992 counterpart. However, customised systems still
demonstrated more accurate classification. In order to assess the relative benefits of
the generic model, costs were assigned to misclassifications. The cost-benefit
analysis favoured the customised models again.
Nevertheless, when the generic model was tested on the sample of loans not
included into model training, its performance was comparable and in certain aspects
o
(e.g. correct prediction of bankruptcies ) even superior to the in-house customised
model which the Credit Union was using at that time. This was attributed to fact the
Credit Union had expanded its customer base. Since these new segments of
population had not been included into the training sample of the in-house model, it
could not classify them correctly. However, the generic model performed well, in
spite of the fact that it had not been developed on this particular population either. It
was found that the predictive power of generic models was more robust over time
compared to customised ones, thus probably, making the former more attractive in a
long term perspective.
8 Overstreet and Bradley (1996) distinguished between bankruptcies and charge-offs within 'bad'
loans
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3.4 Populations and subpopulations
There seems to be a general agreement that customised models outperform
the generic ones in terms of classification accuracy (Overstreet et al. (1992),
Overstreet and Bradley (1996); Chandler (1998); Makuch (1998); Platts and Howe
(1997)) although this loss in accuracy may be compensated for by some other
benefits, such as lower costs. On the other hand, Chandler (1998) argues that the
predictive power of the CRA generic models is significant, and comparable to that of
customised ones. However, these models are, in fact, systems of generic scorecards
that often contain multiple models for different segments of customers.
Traditionally scorecards are built on the population of potential borrowers as
a whole. However, there are situations when lenders would like to score different
groups of customers within the population separately: e.g. new customers as opposed
to the existing ones or young people (Wilkinson (1992)).
Banasik et al. (1996) investigated the feasibility of creating separate
scorecards for different subpopulations, e.g. married / not married, have children / no
children, retired/ not retired, 4 years or less at present address / 5 years or more,
homeowner / tenant / other, etc.
The performance of the model built on the total sample was compared to
models built on samples split into 2 or 3 segments and using different approaches to
setting the cut-off levels. Creating separate scorecards is equivalent to estimating one
equation with interactions of the segmented variable with all other variables in the
model. E.g., for marital status the equation is
F= b0 +bjM + b2XM + b3XS,
where Y = predicted score,
M = {1 if married, 0 otherwise},
XM = {X if M-1; 0 otherwise},
XS = {X ifM-0; 0 otherwise}.
This can be rewritten as two separate equations:
Y -bj - b0+biXM for married
Y = bo +b3XS for not married.
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It follows that each population segment will require a different cut-off level. The
cut-offs were set in a following way:
according to the rate of misclassification of goods. First, the error of classifying
goods as bads was fixed at 10% for all scorecards. Second, a 10% error rate was
applied to the whole population, but the subpopulation cut-offs were set so that
the error rate was the same as in the full population scorecard for this population
segment. Third, the sub-population cut-off matched the reject rate for this
population segment in the full population scorecard when it misclassified 10% of
the goods.
according to the probability of default in the logistic regression,
according to marginal good/bad ratios (3:1 and 5:1).
Overall, splits on 12 variables that gave 27 population segments were
investigated and it was found that segmentation was not necessarily going to give the
better classification accuracy. This was attributed to several reasons:
1) the necessity to have a separate cut-off for each segment with the danger
of setting cut-off levels optimal for subpopulations which may not be
optimal for the whole population;
2) a subpopulation represents a smaller sample compared to the whole
population, which leads to higher variance, and therefore, less accurate
estimation and prediction.
The overall conclusion of the paper is that the subpopulations need to be
'sufficiently different' to justify the development of separate scorecards. Wilkinson
(1992) also warns against 'mixing dissimilar populations'. To gain benefits from
separate scorecards, interaction of the segmented variable with other variables should
be sufficiently significant, so that omitting interactions would result in a poorly-fitted
model.
On the other hand, Makuch (1998) argues that a sample constructed in a
comprehensive heterogeneous fashion (i.e. a sample should represent the population
segments adequately) can produce a model that will apply to populations beyond
those on which it was developed. This feature is referred to as 'cross-applicability'.
An example is the FICO (Fair Isaac Credit Score) model which was developed
originally to score credit cards, but then was successfully applied to mortgage
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scoring. The reason is that the posterior probabilities of class membership in the
FICO development population hold for the mortgage applicants, which leads to
'cross-applicability'. However, if the unique relations captured by the model exist in
the data, and those relationships are not shared by other populations then cross-
applicability will not work.
The potential problems of generic cards were investigated by Staten (1999),
Avery et al. (2000) and Barron et al. (2000). In the United States the majority of
CRA data and delinquency survey data are reported for the whole country,
sometimes (not always) with a breakdown for separate states, and very seldom for
counties. Staten (1999) showed that there was a wide divergence in loan performance
across states and counties and suggested that segmenting the data by states and
counties would improve discrimination between good and bad loans.
The later paper by Avery et al. (2000) investigated this issue further and
compared the predictive performance of models with county-level data to models
with state-level data. The latter turned out to be less accurate than the former ones.
Barron et al. (2000) also argued for the incorporation of local economic data
into credit-scoring models, as local factors showed significant correlations with
credit scores, which is to be expected, since the applicants from the same location
experience same local economic conditions. Lenders, while using CRA scores that
are available from nation-wide CRAs, do not make adjustments for local conditions.
It was shown that this may lead to unanticipated levels of risk in certain parts of the
country.
Another set of problems which has been investigated by Barron et al (2000) is
completeness of information and the representativeness of the sample that is used for
developing the CRA scores. The analysis was conducted on a nation-wide sample of
3.4 million individuals that was stratified according to ZIP-code, and the variation on
the ZIP-code level was then investigated.
Although this analysis relates to the US CRA generic models and the
importance of incorporating regional/local information into CRA scores, the results
of the analysis have implications for application models as well. The authors
emphasised the fact that generic models may not necessarily perform equally well for
all subgroups in the population.
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This can result from:
1) Omitted variables bias: some of the variables not included into the
analysis may have differential effects for different subgroups in the
population;
2) Underrepresentation of certain subgroups in the sample which is used to
develop a scorecard.
The authors concluded that CRA scores are affected by regional information
and if this information is omitted this can lead to the distortion of results across
different regions. They suggested two potential responses to the problem:
developing subpopulation scorecards;
adjusting scores according to the economic and regional context.
They also found that an adequate representation of different population
segments in the development sample has an impact on the quality of prediction for
these segments in the population. But the scale of the impact depends on how
different their repayment behaviour is, compared to the population at large.
The only attempt to built a generic scorecard in the European context (Platts
and Howe (1997)) also demonstrated the superiority of customised models. The
analysis was conducted on retail credit databases for 5 countries that represented
different European regions: UK, Germany (Northern Europe), Greece (emerging
markets), Belgium (France/Belgium) and Italy (Southern Europe).
Three levels of models were built: one European scorecard, 5 country
scorecards and 5 regional portfolio scorecards. The European model was built on
'around 20' global characteristics that were common to all 5 countries. For each
attribute of a characteristic weights of evidence were calculated, that served as a
basis for grouping attributes within a characteristic.
The country scorecards were developed on the same common characteristics,
but the grouping and weighting of attributes was done separately for each country, so
the resulting variables in the model and their estimated coefficients differed from
country to country and from the European scorecard. Finally the portfolio scorecards
that incorporated all available information for a particular portfolio were also
included into the analysis.
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The performance was measured by comparing the percentages of predicted
bad debt achieved by each type of model, keeping the same acceptance rate. Both
regional portfolio and country models proved to be superior to the Eurocard. The
comparison to regional portfolio cards favoured the latter, since they incorporated
more information than was available for the Eurocard development, but the country
scorecards were developed on the same characteristics by re-classifying and re-
weighting the Eurocard variables.
For all countries there was a marked difference in the bad debt improvement
made by the country scorecard compared to the Eurocard. In the UK the difference
was most pronounced: re-classifying and re-weighting gave a 12.5% improvement.
Even in Belgium, where the country model was closest to the Euro model an
improvement of 3.38% compared to the Eurocard was achieved.
The results obtained from the comparison of the Eurocard to country
scorecards were explained by the authors as resulting from the following factors:
1) there were significant differences in applicant profiles across countries;
2) the predictive patterns in the data were significantly different in each
country.
It was noted that differences that were present in the country models were
averaged in the generic model, and that lead to inferior predictive performance.
The problem of mixing heterogeneous populations has been already referred
to in Section 2.3.4 when the Yule-Simpson paradox was discussed. In the case of
generic models the paradox will arise if there is a strong relationship between a
country indicator and other predictor variables in the model. If there are only a few
such variables the situation can be remedied by including the interaction terms
between the country indicator and the affected variables. If there are too many such
variables, then segmentation makes more sense. In any case the relations between




Multicollinearity can be generally defined as the situation when there are
strong linear dependencies among the predictor variables. According to Belsley et al.
(1980), multicollinearity exists if there is a high multiple correlation when one of the
predictor variables is linearly regressed on the others.
The collinear variables do not provide much extra information above that
already contained in the others. As a result it is difficult to infer the separate effect of
such predictor variables on the response variable. The coefficients are unbiased, but
they become less stable. Coefficient standard errors get large, so confidence intervals
for parameter estimates are broad, reflecting the imprecision of estimation. Variables
that seem to have weak separate effects, may have a strong combined effect. But this
applies only to those variables in the model that are collinear.
In prediction problems, more interest is attached to the estimation of the
combined effect of the variables rather than to the estimates of individual parameters.
It was shown by Theil (1971) that specific linear combinations of estimated
regression coefficients may be well determined even if this is not the case for
individual coefficients. That is why multicollinearity is not often regarded as a
problem in credit scoring, but there seems to be a general belief that one is better off
without it. In the context of research, when interpretation of parameters is desirable,
e.g. when comparing different countries, multicollinearity may present a problem.
Various methods of assessing multicollinearity have been proposed. One
method is to examine pairwise measures of association - a correlation matrix for
numerical data and j2 or Cramer's V for categorical data. However, this may not be
sufficient, since it does not reveal dependencies between more than two variables.
A more useful approach is to examine variance inflation factors, V7F„ which
are the diagonal elements of the inverse correlation matrix R~', where i is predictor
variable i. Their diagnostic value follows from the relation
where Rf is the multiple correlation coefficient of A, regressed on the remaining
predictor variables (Belsley et al. (1980)). Alternatively, one can look at tolerance
which is the reciprocal of VIF.
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Although, Belsley et al. (1980) argue that VIF cannot distinguish between
several coexisting dependencies, and there is a lack of a meaningful boundary
between what can be considered as high and low values, other authors (Allison
(1999); Fox (1991)) believe that the performance of this diagnostic approach is quite
satisfactory.
Belsley et al. (1980) suggest a condition index approach that is based on
principal component analysis (PCA). PCA involves linear transformations that lead
to a set of new uncorrelated variables. Although these new variables are not
particularly useful for interpretation or prediction, they aid the understanding of the
pattern of multicollinearity. The variances of components are eigenvalues. A
condition index is the square root of the largest to the smallest eigenvalue. The value
of 30 is often quoted as signalling serious multicolliearity (Freund and Littel (2000)).
If the presence of multicollinearity is established, a really serious problem is
what to do about it. Multicollinearity is a property of specific characteristics of the
data matrix X, and not of the statistical model. Since it is a data problem, and not a
statistical one, the ideal solution (Belsley et al. (1980); Fox (1991)) would be to
collect new data in such a way that a problem is avoided. Whilst this approach can be
helpful in experimental studies, in credit scoring it is of no practical value.
Other approaches include model respecification, variable selection, biased
estimation and using prior information about the model parameters (Fox (1991)).
Model respecification involves combining several predictor variables into an
index. One of the ways of achieving this would be to include interaction terms for
collinear variables. Or alternatively to develop several models for each level of the
collinear variable, which is essentially the same as including interaction terms.
In variable selection the number of predictor variables in the model is
reduced to a less correlated set by means of some procedure, most commonly
forward or backward stepwise procedures, which add or delete variables one at a
time on the basis of the specified significance level. Some authors (Fox (1991);
Freund and Littel (2000)) believe that the stepwise selection methods may fail to
return the optimal subset of predictor variables, so the best subsets technique is
recommended as the more appropriate one. The latter technique examines all
possible subsets of predictors and finds a specified number of models for all possible
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model sizes. However, in spite of the considerable advances in computer power, this
procedure can be time-consuming and often not plausible with a large number of
potential predictors. It also may suffer from overfitting by getting the best fit for the
set of data used for training. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) argue that stepwise
selection procedures are useful and effective data analysis tools capable of producing
models equivalent to models with purposeful selection of variables.
Biased estimation consists of using techniques like ridge regression, where a
small amount of bias in parameter estimates is traded for a significant reduction in
parameter variance. However, ridge regression involves the selection of an arbitrary
"ridge constant". When it is large, the bias is large and the variance is small. To
select a reasonably good constant one needs to have some knowledge about the
unknown parameters that are being estimated. So the procedure should be applied
with great caution.
Biased estimation can be viewed as part of the next approach - introduction
of prior information about the parameters. There are several other ways to do this,
including the formal Bayesian analysis (Belsley et al. (1980); Theil (1971)). But the
basic idea can be demonstrated by the following example derived from the
illustration offered by Fox (1991).
Suppose we would like to estimate the parameters in the model
log(^—) = /30 + p1*1 + P2X21 -p
where p is the posterior probability of being good, xj is the applicant's age and x2 is
the spouse's age, the variables that are normally highly correlated. If we have reasons
to believe that = /?2, we can denote the common quantity as /T and fit the model
iog(—^—) = A) + ^*(*1 + xl)
1 -p
The approaches presented here generally overlap, but none offers an ideal
solution. Judgement and thought are required when dealing with multicollinearity.
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3.6 Conclusions
This Chapter provided a review of the previous research on modelling
changing environment and generic models. A number of studies in credit scoring
have investigated the problem of population drift or changes in population over time.
This problem has been addressed by adapting the models to capture subtle
differences that evolve over time. Differences presented by credit applicants from
several countries can be viewed as a manifestation of population drift across space.
Generic scoring addresses this type of population drift by modelling the most salient
features of a population which makes generic models more stable than customised
ones, not only in space, but in time also.
Generic models utilise a property of linear models - flat maximum effect. It
implies that relatively large variations in coefficients have little effect on the quality
of prediction. Such robustness of linear models is especially evident when major
predictors are included into analysis and with collinear data. Collinearity may present
a problem when interpretation of parameter estimates is required.
The majority of previous studies on generic models show that although
generic models have an advantage of lower costs of developing and maintaining, the
predictive accuracy of generic models is inferior to that of customised/segmented
ones. But it has been also shown that segmentation will only enhance the predictive
ability of models when the segments in overall population are significantly different
and relatively large in size. Otherwise the segmented model may demonstrate
increased variability.
An appropriate representation of different population segments in a sample
used for training a generic model is an important requirement ensuring that the model
works well for all subpopulations. To be applicable to a wider range of different
portfolios, the development population has to be diverse.
The next Chapter will present a comparison of the performance of customised
models built for three European countries (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) to
that of the generic model.
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Chapter 4. Generic scoring using logistic regression
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this Chapter is to test the proposition that the 'flat maximum
effect' can compensate for the differences in heterogeneous datasets, and a generic
model can produce the classification performance comparable to the customised
models.
A logistic regression model was fitted to three datasets from different
countries (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) separately. Then the generic model
was built on the same three datasets aggregated in one, and its predictive
performance was compared to that of national models. It was found that the
predictive accuracy of the generic model is close to that of national ones. This is
attributed to the 'flat maximum effect' and the socio-economic proximity of the
countries used in the analysis. The four models described above were developed on a
set of variables that was common to all three countries.
In addition, three models were developed on a full set of characteristics that
was available for each country. The resulting improvement in predictive performance
compared to the generic model depended on the scope of additional information but
was significant for all three counties.
This suggests that generic scoring is possible, at least for some regions of
Europe, and that the current limitations of its application stem from discrepancies in
data collection rather than from the loss of predictive accuracy due to re-weighting of
variables in national models.
The analysis described in this Chapter is limited to application characteristics.
The decision to look at application characteristics only can be justified by the
following considerations. The application characteristics are mainly demographic
ones, and the variables themselves and their measurement scales are similar across
the countries. So it was possible to select a reasonable set of variables that was
common to all three countries.
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It may be, though, that the commonality disguises the difference contained
within these measures. Differences in applicants' characteristics may be due to the
concepts they are meant to measure. This variation is influenced by the complex
blend of social, economic and cultural factors, and is beyond the creditor's control.
The CRA variables, on the contrary, appear to be very different for each
country. Their distinctiveness stems, however, from the differences in measurement
scales rather than in the concepts themselves. This means they can be harmonised,
i.e. they can be measured with one common scale, like in the USA, where the CRA
characteristics are harmonised, and generic models can cover the whole country
(Chandler (1998)).
The attempt, though, to achieve harmonisation would take considerable time
and effort. The European Commission has been considering it for a number of years,
and so far has not achieved consensus. It would be inappropriate within the context
of the current research to try to guess the outcome of the EC's deliberations. Any
selection may subsequently be regarded as arbitrary in the light of the final result of
the EC's harmonisation.
For similar reasons (Section 4.2 will outline some problems with harmonised
statistical data at the European level) the inclusion of economic variables was not
pursued in this analysis. Besides, the length of time (25 months) represented by the
data in the analysis is too short to investigate the impact of the changing economy on
the customer's behaviour.
The next section provides some background information about the countries
used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the development and performance of the
national models, including data description, definitions of good/bad, model
specification and prediction results. Section 4 covers the aspects of development of
the generic model and compares its performance to the national ones. Differences
between applications accepted by different models are also investigated. Then the
importance of additional information is examined. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 Background information on countries used in the analysis
The countries used in the analysis (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany) are
neighbours, they are the EC founding members and have joined the Euro from the
moment it was introduced in 2002. Tables 4.1 - 4.3 present some basic demographic
and economic indicators that show some similarities and differences between the
countries.
Table 4.1 Population and demographics. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany














EU-15 100 103 5.1 1.9 16








Belgium 2.7 102.5 4.4 2.6 17
The
Netherlands
4.2 105.7 5.5 2.2 14
Germany 21.8 103 5.1 2.4 16
In terms of population Germany is the largest EU country, whereas Belgium
is the second smallest. The Netherlands is the sixth largest country in EU, and with a
land area only slightly bigger than Belgium, the Netherlands is the most densely
populated EU country. The populations of Belgium and Germany increased at the
average EU rate, the increase in the Netherlands was more rapid. This is in line with
the proportion of older people: in the Netherlands it is lower than in the other two
countries. The marriage rate is the lowest in Belgium, and highest in the Netherlands,
with Germany being exactly at the EU-15 average. As for divorces, all three country
are above the European mean, with lowest number being in the Netherlands and
highest in Belgium. It looks like Belgium has a problematic situation with
demographics, being quite small, it has in addition a low rate of population increase
and low number of marriages, coupled with a high number of divorces and a large
proportion of older people.
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In terms of Gross Domestic Product (Table 4.2) all three countries have quite
high GDP per capita, above the EU average, with the highest being in Netherlands
and the lowest in Germany. However, the GDP growth rate is below the European
mean, but the Netherlands shows higher growth compared to the other two countries.
This indicates that all three countries have well-developed mature economies that do
not grow at a very fast rate. The Netherlands also has the lowest unemployment rate
in Europe, but one of the highest inflation rates. The Dutch top the EU list of the
percentage of part-time jobs, it is twice as much as in Belgium or Germany. Overall,
it is possible to conclude that the Netherlands stands somewhat apart from Germany
and Belgium in terms of economic indicators.
















% of all jobs





2.4 (NL) 1.2 (UK) 4 (Greece)
Max 197.4 (Lux) 5.7 (Ireland) 10.6
(Spain)
5.1 (NL) 42.2 (NL)
Belgium 106.5 0.8 6.6 2.4 18.4
The
Netherlands
112.3 1.3 2.4 5.1 42.2
Germany 104.1 0.6 7.7 2.4 20.3
In terms of strength of credit institutions all three countries show relatively
high indicators (Table 4.3). Credit institutions in Germany have the largest balance
sheet totals in the EU, as well the as the highest volume of interest receivable.
Belgium and the Netherlands show more modest results.
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With the same numbers recalculated per inhabitant, the EU average is not
particularly informative, since Luxembourg clearly represents an outlier. For balance
sheet totals per inhabitant the Netherlands show a median result, with Belgium and
Germany being above it. For the volume of interest receivable per inhabitant, all
three countries are above the median, with the Netherlands showing the lowest
number (out of three countries) and Belgium - the highest.
Table 4.3 Credit institutions. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany (2001).
Source: Eurostat (2003)
Balance sheet total, Min EUR Interest receivable and
similar income, Min EUR
EU-15 (average) 1,562,172 84,685
Min 139,939 (Finland) 6,466 (Finland)
Max 7,037,504 (Germany) 358,962 (Germany)
Belgium 738,123 69,908
The Netherlands 1,018,788 54,689
Germany 7,037,504 358,962





EU-15 (average) 929,774 50,403
Min 13,942 (Greece) 1,151 (Greece)
Median 63,726 (Netherlands) 3,392 (Austria)
Max 1,475,510 (Luxembourg) 113,651 (Luxembourg)
Belgium 71,921 6,812
The Netherlands 63,726 3,421
Germany 85,552 4,364
Unfortunately, harmonised statistical information on consumer credit in
Europe is limited and patchy. This reflects the level of integration in retail financial
services, demonstrating that consumer lending markets are still fragmented. Eurostat
does not publish data on consumer credit. The OECD provides some data on the
household debt but not for all European countries. The IMF does not have a separate
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consumer credit category. The Centre for European Policy Studies and the European
Parliamentary Financial Services Forum publications contain some statistics, but
mainly the EU aggregates with occasional country break-down, and again not for all
EU countries. The European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) has published a report
on consumer credit statistics (Krastanova (2003)), but not all statistics cover all EU
countries. Problems with data on consumer credit were noted by ECRI (Guardia
(2000)) and by the European Commission itself (European Commission (1995)).
Le Codran de COFIDIS, a survey of the consumer credit market in Europe,
published by the European telephone credit company (COFIDIS (2003)) is probably
the most detailed free source of comparable cross-country information, but only for
eight countries that include Belgium and Germany, but unfortunately not the
Netherlands.
According to Le Codran de COFIDIS (COFIDIS (2003)) in 2002 the total
consumer credit outstanding for the eight countries (France, UK, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Greece) amounted to 725.9 billion EUR against 688.8
billion a year earlier. This represents a 5.4% increase, which is one point less than
that recorded in 2001.
COFIDIS distinguishes between three different types in the European credit
market:
- The markets of Northern Europe (France, Germany and Belgium), highly
developed and mature. With consumer credit having expanded significantly over
the last ten years, these markets now develop at a more modest rate and do not
offer the same growth prospects.
- The markets of Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Greece), which have
developed more slowly, but now appear to be more dynamic. They currently
offer greater growth potential than the markets of Northern Europe.
- The UK market, that is classified as 'atypical'. Already highly developed and
unparalleled in Europe, it continues to post growth rates similar to those seen in
Southern Europe.
75
Table 4.4 Outstanding consumer credit.
Source: COFIDIS and De Nederlandsche Bank.
Total ou tstanding consumer credit, bin EUR
Germany Belgium Nether¬
lands
France UK Italy Greece Portu
gal
Spain
1993 176.9 10 8.6 58.7 83.5 16.8 0.5 _ 30.8
1994 186.1 9 9.0 60.2 90.9 17.4 0.7 _ 32
1995 189.5 9.3 9.4 63.8 106.7 18.3 1.4 _ 36.7
1996 198.8 9.6 9.9 69.3 121.2 20.4 1.9 _ 38.6
1997 204.3 10.2 10.9 74.9 138 23.8 2.1 5 42.4
1998 216.7 11.1 12.3 80.8 159.8 28.5 3 6.2 52.3
1999 215.7 11.9 12.8 89.5 185.2 32.3 3.9 6.8 54.6
2000 222.6 12.2 13.8 97.8 186.2 38.5 5.5 8.3 58.6
2001 222.4 13.2 13.9 103 221.8 41 7.9 8 62.4
2002 224.3 13.5 15.0 105.7 252.9 45.2 9.8 7.9 66.7
Total outstanc ing consumer credit per inhabitant, EUR
Germany Belgium Nether¬
lands
France UK Italy Greece Portu
gal
Spain
1993 2,175 990 562 1,020 1,432 294 48 - 785
1994 2,282 888 585 1,042 1,554 304 66 _ 814
1995 2,316 917 604 1,101 1,818 319 131 _ 932
1996 2,424 944 636 1,192 2,058 355 177 _ 978
1997 2,490 1,001 694 1,285 2,335 413 194 495 1,071
1998 2,641 1,087 778 1,381 2,691 495 276 611 1,317
1999 2,625 1,162 810 1,523 3,106 560 358 667 1,366
2000 2,706 1,189 865 1,656 3,110 666 503 809 1,451
2001 2,698 1,280 863 1,736 3,750 719 719 774 1,528
2002 2,718 1,304 924 1,773 4,263 789 889 759 1,605
The market is dominated by the countries of Northern Europe. The three large
countries of Northern Europe (France, UK and Germany) represent more than 80%
of total outstanding debt. The UK continues to be the number 1 market for consumer
credit. If the UK figures are excluded, the growth of the credit market in 2002 drops
to 3.3% (COFIDIS (2003)).
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Table 4.4 and Figures 4.1-4.2 provide some statistics on consumer credit
drawn from COFIDIS (2003) and De Nederlandsche Bank (2003). As for the total
outstanding consumer credit (Table 4.4), the Netherlands follows quite closely the
pattern presented by Belgium. Both countries are among the smallest in terms of the
absolute credit volume. On the contrary, Germany is the second largest market in
Europe after the UK, both in terms of the total volume and in terms of credit per
inhabitant. As for credit per inhabitant, Belgium approaches the level of France, the
Netherlands appears to be on the borderline between mature economies of Northern
Europe and developing markets of Southern Europe. However, one should not forget
that the Netherlands is the most densely populated country in Europe.
Figure 4.1 Annual growth rate of the total outstanding consumer credit. %








But the annual growth rate (Figure 4.1) for Belgium, Netherlands and
Germany is notably lower than in the UK and Italy, which represents Southern
Europe in this Figure, so that the comparison can be made between three market
segments according to COFIDIS classification. In spite of dominating the market in
terms of volume, Germany shows the lowest growth rate, but together with the
Netherlands it indicates an upward trend in the end, although obviously it cannot be
taken as an indication that this upward trend will continue into the future.
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The average amount of credit per person (Figure 4.2) is the second largest for
Germany, but the year-to-year change is modest, indicating the market maturity.
Belgium and the Netherlands show a similar pattern, although the amount of credit is
nearly half the value of Germany. Overall, the information presented above gives
grounds to conclude that the Netherlands can be classified as a country of 'Northern
Europe' according to COFEDIS market segmentation.
Figure 4.3 Consumer credit as a percentage of household disposable
income (2001-2002). Source: ECRI
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Figure 4.3 gives the breakdown by the type of loans as a percentage of the
household's disposable income. It is notable that the Dutch spend more money on
mortgages than probably any other European country. The Dutch Office of Statistics
also reported a significant increase in mortgages in 2001-2003 due to the low interest
rate, which was 4.5 percent in 2003, its lowest level since the mid-fifties (CBS
(2003)). However, the Dutch spend a far smaller proportion of their money on
consumer credit in comparison to Belgians and Germans.
In general, it is possible to conclude that the level of similarity/difference
between the three countries analysed in this thesis depends on the perspective. If
taken on their own they show some significant differences, if placed against the other
European countries, then similarities become more evident. The Netherlands in a
number of ways appears to differ from Belgium and Germany. But overall the three
countries have enough in common to allow for a successful development of a generic
model.
4.3. National models
4.3.1. Data description and definitions
The data for analysis was provided by a major international credit scoring
consultancy and relate to the same retail card issue to applicants from 3 European
countries: Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The card was managed by one
bank and was offered through a range of participating stores to buy 'white' durable
goods. A complete list of items that could be bought is given in Appendix, Table
A10. Each account was given a credit limit, thus several purchases could be made.
The populations of card-applicants differed in size and the period of time for which
the performance was recorded. This is shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Populations of card applicants in three countries
Belgium The Netherlands Germany












Characteristics 43 85 56
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The acceptance period of 14 months was selected to cover the period from
November 1998 until December 1999 for all three countries. The applications
received during this period only were considered. Then their performance was
observed until November 2000. The observation period, during which the
performance was recorded, ranged from 12 months (for accounts that joined in
December 1999) to 25 months (for applications received in November 1998). The
applications received during the year of 2000 were not included in the analysis, since
the credit type is revolving and the borrowers need to stay on the books at least for
10 months before any judgements about their creditworthiness could be made (Lewis
(1992)). The applicants that were accepted by the creditor, but did not take up the
offer were dropped as well. This group was small for all three countries.
The definition of bad was chosen to be 'at least 2 months in arrears' at any
time during the observation period. The more traditional definition of bads of being
'at least 3 months in arrears' did not give sufficient numbers of bads to allow for
effective classification. The remaining accounts were treated as goods9. The resulting
samples were as shown in Table 4.6. The rejected applications were not used in the
analysis for reasons outlined in Section 1.2.
Table 4.6 Samples used in the analysis.
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Bad 3090 6.98% 11213 8.55% 8909 6.50%
Good 23200 52.42% 71024 54.13% 66939 48.81%
Rejected 17966 40.60% 48953 37.32% 61288 44.69%





9 For a number of accounts it was difficult to decide whether they should be classified as
good or bad, e.g. the accounts that remained 'Good' throughout the observation period, but showed
'Nil balance' or '1 month in arrears' in the last month. Such indeterminate accounts were removed
from the samples. This is a standard practice in credit scoring to improve the separation between good
and bad. (Lewis (1992); Thomas et al. (2002))
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All three samples of accepted applications were split randomly into training
(70%) and holdout (30%) datasets.
The list of characteristics collected in each country was different, they are
given in Table A1 in Appendix. Those available are marked with 'X'. It was possible
to select 16 characteristics that were collected for all three countries (Table 4.7) and
they were used in modelling (given in bold in Table Al).
Table 4.7 Characteristics used in analysis
No Characteristic No Characteristic
1 Home telephone 9 Employer's phone
2 Residential status 10 Card insurance
3 Marital status 11 Credit insurance
4 Occupation (Full-time, part-time,
self-employed, etc.)
12 Number of dependants
5 Age 13 Spouse age
6 Time at address since 18 years old 14 Goods code
7 Time in employment 15 Goods price




For each attribute of categorical variables the weights of evidence (WOE)
were calculated:
Wij = log (gijB/bijGj),
where gy (by ) are the corresponding numbers of goods and bads within the
attribute i of characteristic j, Gj (Bj) are total numbers of good/bad in characteristic j
in the sample.
The attributes with similar weights of evidence were grouped together into
one variable, which is the standard practice in the industry and called coarse-
classification. Judgements about similarity were done subjectively on the basis of
visual inspections of plots of WOE, histograms and prior knowledge, where
applicable. E.g., characteristic 'Goods code' originally was split into a lot of
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attributes, some of them contained very few observations. Such small categories
were grouped with a larger category of a similar meaning, for example, 'Ladies
boutique' and 'Ladies shoes' were grouped together with 'Ladies clothes'. In other
cases grouping was possible only on the basis of WOE, since there was not enough
explanation of the meaning available, e.g. different types of 'Benefit' of
characteristic 'Business type' in the Netherlands.
The same approach was applied to continuous variables that were first
divided into 5%-percentiles, which were then grouped together according to the
weights of evidence.
Figures 4.4-4.5 show examples of the weights of evidence for two
characteristics for each country, and the groupings that were chosen. Tables A3 to
A16 in the Appendix present WOE by country for the remaining 14 characteristics
that were used in the analysis.
The differences that were identified at that stage:
For categorical characteristics in some countries there existed attributes
that were not present in other countries (e.g. 'Living Together Registered'
was a separate category of 'Marital Status' for the Netherlands but did not
exist for Belgium or Germany; or 'Living on Boat' was available for the
Netherlands but not for the other two in 'Residential Status').
The distributions of good rate differed across the characteristics between
the countries, which resulted in different coarse-classifications of
attributes.
In other words, the differences were observed in
1) prior distributions of class membership p(i), although this referred only to the
Netherlands (from Table 4.6 - probability of being good is 0.88 for Belgium and
Germany, and 0.80 for the Netherlands);
2) posterior distributions p(i\x) (Figures 4.4-4.5).
Therefore according to the argument by Kelly et al. (1999), section 3.2, there
was evidence of population 'drift' (albeit between countries rather than over time)
and one might expect that differences in prior/posterior distributions will affect the
classification accuracy of the models.
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At the same time although the weights of evidence for the majority of
attributes did differ across the countries, it was possible to observe some general
patterns that would hold irrespective of the country. For example, for all three
countries married and widowed applicants were the best categories, single applicants
- the worst, and divorced / living together appeared in the middle. In terms of age,
older applicants were better credit risks than young people, although in Germany the
youngest age group is relatively riskier than in the other two countries.
Longer times at address and in employment were also associated with better
repayment behaviour. Homeowners showed less delinquencies than people in rented
accommodation. Those that did not give their home telephone numbers were more
likely to default than applicants who indicated their telephones. Self-employed
borrowers seemed to be quite a risky category in all three countries, in contrast to
retired people and housewives.
Nevertheless, at this stage it was difficult to decide whether the observed
similarities were strong enough to compensate for the observed differences.
4.3.3 Performance of national models
The following model was fitted to each of the three national datasets:
Pii
l0g[— ] = (Xj + 0nXijx + Pj2xij2 + -+ Pjk xijk
Pij
where pij is the probability of being good for i individual, j country and k
predictor variables.
Several logistic regression models were developed for each country, in order
then to select the one with the best predictive performance. First of all, two different
approaches to variable coding were tried: dummy binary variables and weights of
evidence. The former converts all n coarse-classes or bands of the characteristics into
n-1 dummy binary variables. The latter assigns some numerical value to each coarse-
class, in this case - weights of evidence that were calculated as described in the
previous section.
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The advantage of binary coding comes from the fact that the resulting
coefficient estimates are free from any relationship apart from the one that comes
from the estimation algorithm. But this approach leads to a large number of
variables. The weights of evidence (WOE) approach reduces the number of variables
in the model by giving the attributes an ordering related to the odds of goods to bads
in the development sample. But WOE give a value to each attribute which depends
only on that characteristic, they fail to account for relations between characteristics.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 summarise the classification accuracy of the models,
which was measured by the area under the ROC curve and the percentage of
incorrectly classified observations, when the models were applied to the randomly
selected hold-out samples. Models with binary coding slightly outperformed the
WOE models for all three countries. Therefore only binary coding was used in the
subsequent stages of analysis. The details of binary variable coding for the three
countries and the generic model are given in the Appendix, A17 - A20.
The straightforward way to compare the models across the countries would
be to force the same characteristics into the model. That was done using binary
coding. The predictive performance of the models differed across the countries in
spite of the fact that models contained the same characteristics. Judging by the area
under the ROC curve (Table 4.8. row 2) the set of common characteristics predicted
best of all for the Netherlands, slightly worse for Germany, and worst of all for
Belgium. The error rate (Table 4.9) cannot be used for direct comparison between
countries, since it depends on a chosen acceptance rate. The rate was fixed to equal
the proportion of actual goods in each of the national datasets. Since the Netherlands
have slightly lower good rate, it has a lower cut-off compared to Belgium and
Germany. However, the error rate can be used for comparing different models within
one country.
It would be interesting to compare the coefficients for the same
characteristics across the countries, but checks for multicollinearity (tolerance/VIF)
revealed that the coefficients in the models were unstable. VIF above 3.6 was
considered to signal 'serious' collinearity. Whilst it was not relevant for prediction, it
meant that the straightforward comparison of model coefficients was not possible.
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Binary Stepwise 0.7074 0.7804 0.7394
Forced 0.7129 0.7814 0.7417
Weights of
evidence
Stepwise 0.6951 0.7625 0.733












Binary Stepwise 0.6929 0.7807 0.7372









Binary Stepwise 16.96% 16.50% 15.74%
Forced 16.92% 16.50% 15.74%
Weights of
evidence
Stepwise 17.38% 17.50% 16.08%












Binary Stepwise 17.40% 16.50% 15.72%
87
In order to reduce collinearity and develop models with meaningful
coefficients, the stepwise procedure of variable selection was applied both for binary
and WOE coding. The stepwise selection procedure adds variables to the model one
at each step if those variables meet the specified level of significance and at the same
time removes variables from the model if they fail to meet the specified level of
significance for staying in the model. The level of significance for entry into the
model and remaining there was set at 0.05.
Whilst the coefficients in binary stepwise models for Belgium and Germany
showed acceptable VIF, the model for the Netherlands still showed significant
collinearity. Model respecification was chosen as a method of coping with
collinearity. Two approaches were tried. First, in order to account for the possible
relationships between the predictor variables, two-level interactions were included
into the models. With the WOE coding, adding interactions was not a problem. All
possible combinations of products of variables were generated, and the stepwise
logistic regression selected the most predictive ones.
However, the same approach with binary coding would have led to a huge
number of variables (e.g. 1240 for Belgium) and the logistic regression may not have
converged. The number of variables for interactions was reduced in two ways
(marked as interactions (1) and interactions (2) in the Tables 4.8 and 4.9).
Interactions (1) were selected on the basis of bivariate analysis of association,
Cramer's V statistic was chosen as a measure of the strength of association:
V = I Z
\ (N)Min(r — 1,c — 1)
Interactions (2) were restricted to cover only the variables selected by
stepwise procedure in 'main effects/ binary' model.
So for each country there are six models:
1- Main effects/ Binary/ Stepwise
2- Main effects/ Binary/ Forced
3- Main effects/Weights of evidence/Stepwise
4- Interactions/ Weights of evidence/Stepwise
5- Interactions (1) / Binary / Stepwise
6- Interactions (2) / Binary /Stepwise.
88
Judging by the area under the ROC curve the best performing models for all
three countries were 'Main Effects/Binary/Forced'. Error rate favoured the 'Main
Effects/Binary/Forced' for Belgium, 'lnteractions(l)' for the Netherlands, and
'Interactions (2)' for Germany. However, it is believed that in the context of the
current analysis the ROC-curve is a preferred measure, since it is independent of the
cut-off level.
The models giving the best prediction were 'Main Effects/Binary/Forced'.
However, as mentioned before, it would be desirable to have models with
meaningful coefficients plus the fact that they can predict well. The next best
predicting models with coefficients showing acceptable VIF were 'Main
Effects/Binary/Stepwise' for Belgium and Germany, and 'Interactions (1)' for the
Netherlands (Parameter estimates for these models are given in A21 and VIF is given
in A22 of the Appendix).
The tests for significance of differences between areas under ROC-curves as
described in section 1.3 conducted at 0.05 level (Table 4.10) were not significant for
'Forced' and 'Stepwise' models for Belgium, and for 'Forced' and 'Interactions (1)'
for the Netherlands. But for Germany the difference between 'Forced' and
'Stepwise' was significant at the 0.05 level. Still it was decided to sacrifice a little bit
of predictive accuracy in favour of the possibility to interpret the coefficients.
Table 4.10. Tests of significance for AUROC















Not significant Significant Significant
Interactions (1)/ Binary Not significant Not significant Significant
Interactions (2)/ Binary Significant Not significant Significant
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So the models for comparison between the countries were 'Main
Effects/Binary/Stepwise' for Belgium, and 'Interactions (1) / Binary' for the
Netherlands. For Germany 'Main Effects/Binary/Stepwise' and Interactions (1) /
Binary' showed equally good performance. Since 'Main Effects/Binary/Stepwise'
was a more parsimonious model, it was preferred to the model with interactions.
Table 4.11 presents the characteristics in the 'best' model for each country
ranked in the order of significance. The rankings were obtained by calculating the
distance between the highest parameter and the lowest one (including the reference
group) of binary variables representing categories of one characteristic. E.g, from
Table A21 in the Appendix for Belgium the highest parameter for age is 0.21
(AGE5), the lowest is -0.28 (AGE1). The distance of 0.49 is used as measure of
separation between categories of AGE. The greater distance is interpreted as an
indication of better discriminating power, and therefore, higher significance.
The models do look very different, e.g. 'Marital status' is not in the Belgian
model at all, and for the variables that appear in all three models, the ranks are not
the same. Although 'Business type' is the most predictive characteristic for both
Germany and the Netherlands.
Table 4.11. Ranks of variables in national models
Rank Belgium The Netherlands Germany
1 Occupation Business type Business type
2 Number of dependants Telephone Occupation
3 Time at address Goods code*Payment
date
Spouse age
4 Residential status Marital status Applicant's age
5 Goods code Applicant's age Telephone
6 Payment date Occupation Time on job
7 Goods price Residential status Goods code
8 Telephone Number of dependants Number of dependants
9 Time on job Time at address Time at address
10 Spouse age Credit insurance Card insurance
11 Business type Goods price Residential status
12 Applicant's age Time on job Payment date
13 Credit insurance Spouse age Marital status
14 Employer's phone
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These models differ between the countries:
1) in attributes for each characteristic and in coarse-classing the attributes;
2) in characteristics selected by the stepwise routine;
3) different WOE and (3-values for any common attributes or coarse-classes.
So it is possible to conclude, judging on univariate analysis and regression
analysis, that changes in population (population drift, see Section 3.2) occur in these
samples between the countries. These changes manifest through differences in:
1) in class (good/bad) priors, p(i) (Table 4.6),
2) in the posterior distributions of class membership p(i\x) (Table 4.9).
4.4 Generic model vs national models
4.4.1 Model specification and predictive performance
In this section the predictive performance of a model which is generic to all
three countries is compared with the performance of the 'best' national models. The
definition of good/bad used in the generic model was the same as in the country-
specific analysis. Three national samples were used for the development and
validation of the generic model. The whole of the Belgian sample was taken, since it
was the smallest one. Proportional stratified samples were taken from the Dutch and
German samples to keep roughly the same proportions of 'good', 'bad' and rejected
applicants in the subsamples as in each of the samples. Although proportional
stratification is not required when the logistic regression is used for modelling
(Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)), it was carried out so that cut-offs for the confusion
matrix were not distorted by the subsampling process.
The number of accepted applicants was chosen to be almost the same as in
the Belgian dataset, so that no country would dominate in the analysis. The
frequency of classes by country in the resulting subsamples is given in Table 4.12.
The numbers in brackets show the percent of the category in the overall generic
sample. The proportions of good/bad/rejected and accepted are not exactly as
desired, since it was impossible to make the random sampling procedure to return
exactly the same proportions. The aggregated dataset was randomly split into a
training set (70%) and a hold-out validation sample.
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The characteristics were coarse-classified according to the procedure
described in Section 4.3.2 but without any reference to the country. The generic
model was first estimated without any variables to indicate which country the case
was a member of, and subsequently, the country indicator variables were included
into the analysis. Based on the arguments of Chapter 2, one cannot say definitively
whether the use of such indicator variables is legally acceptable. They were included
into the analysis in order to test if the country indicators were statistically significant
and if they had any impact on the predictive ability. Although the country indicators
demonstrated significance at 5% level (see A21 in Appendix), their impact on the
predictive accuracy was minor (Tables 4.13-4.14). It should be noted though that the
inclusion of these variables changes the relative ranking of applicants from different
countries and therefore changes acceptance rates for different nationalities.
The predictive ability of the model was measured by the area under the ROC
curve, when applying the model to the hold-out sample of the aggregated dataset and
calculating the percentage of incorrectly classified applicants. The cut-off was
chosen so that the actual number of bads equalled the predicted number of bads in
the hold-out sample. The generic model was also applied to each of the national
hold-out samples separately in order to compare the predictive performance of the
generic model to each of the national models.
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Table 4.13 Generic model performance -Stepwise. AUROC and error rate
Hold-out
sample




Generic Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
0.745
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
0.746
National Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
0.701 0.777 0.731
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
0.705 0.778 0.729
National 0.707 0.780 0.739
ERROR RATE
Generic Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
16.54%
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
16.72%
National Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
17.00% 16.58% 16.04%
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
16.92% 16.56% 16.24%
National 16.96% 16.48% 15.74%
The rationale for selecting the model for comparison was the same as in
country-specific analysis: select the models that give the best prediction and at the
same time with coefficients not inflated by collinearity. Table 4.13 presents the area
under the ROC-curve and error rate for national and generic models that satisfy the
conditions given above. The variables with parameter estimates are given in A21 in
the Appendix. Table 4.14 presents the performance of models with all binary
variables forced to enter. The difference in prediction between models with stepwise
selection and models with all variables is minimal.
The results demonstrate that, in general, the performance of the generic
model is very close and comparable to that of the national ones. The tests on national
hold-out samples do favour the national models slightly, but the difference is
marginal. In fact, significance tests at 0.05 level (Table 4.18) show that there is a
significant difference between generic and national models only for Germany. For
Belgium and the Netherlands the difference is not significant at 0.05 level.
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Table 4.14 Generic model performance- Forced. AUROC and error rate
Hold-out
sample




Generic Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
0.746
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
0.748
National Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
0.703 0.779 0.732
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
0.705 0.780 0.732
National 0.713 0.781 0.742
ERROR RATE
Generic Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
16.48
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
16.58
National Generic - no 'country'
dummy variable
17.02 16.68 16.16
Generic - 'country' dummy
variable included
16.90 16.60 16.16
National 16.92 16.50 15.74
4.4.2. Differences between applications accepted by different models
Although the percentage of applications classified incorrectly by different
models was roughly the same, meaning that there might be little difference for the
lenders as to which model to use, the rejected applications were different in each
case.
For each country hold-out sample the proportions of applicants accepted by
the generic model but rejected by the national model and vice versa were calculated.
For Belgium these proportions constituted 3.83% each from the total hold-out
sample, for the Netherlands 2.75%, and for Germany 2.82%. In other words, the
decision whether to grant credit or not would be identical (irrespective of whether the
generic or national decision rule is used) for 92.34% of Belgian applicants, 94.50%
of the Dutch, and 94.36% of German applicants.
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However, it would be of interest to investigate what characteristics
distinguish between the two groups:
1. the applicants predicted 'Good' (and therefore accepted) by the generic
model and predicted 'Bad' (and rejected) by the country model;
2. the applicants predicted 'Good' by the country model and 'Bad' by the
generic model.
So for each country the two groups were cross-examined by looking at
frequency distributions for categorical characteristics, and means and medians10 for
continuous characteristics.
Tables 4.15 - 4.17 present the characteristics that showed the most striking
differences. For categorical characteristics only some attributes are selected for the
purpose of illustration, that is why the percentages within one characteristic do not
always sum to 100%. As a benchmark, the frequency distributions, means and
medians are also reported for the total hold-out sample.
For all countries applicants accepted by the generic model, but rejected by the
national one would be slightly older than those accepted by the national model, but
rejected by the generic one: a median age for former would be 29 years for both
Belgium and the Netherlands versus 25 and 23 respectively. For Germany the
corresponding median ages would be 25 and 22 years old.
In Belgium those applicants accepted by the generic model, but rejected by
the national one, would have a significantly higher percentage of those working in
the industry, divorced and renting a flat, while the percentage of those working in the
service sector would be much lower. Applicants with the card insurance would
clearly prefer to be scored by the national model rather than by the generic one, since
the former accepted more applicants with the insurance.
In the Netherlands the generic model accepted a higher percentage of
officials, those using their cards for 'card applications' and widowed, as compared to
the national model, that accepted higher percentages of applicants working in
catering, construction and those buying TV-sets.
10 Most distributions were skewed due to high incidence of 0 values
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Table 4.15a). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but
rejected by another one. Belgium: categorical characteristics









Business type Industry 18.56% 28.24% 15.61%
Service prof 7.54% 2.99% 14.29%
Card Insurance No Insurance 82.77% 85.71% 73.09%
Insurance 17.18% 14.29% 26.91%
Goods code Phones 11.54% 17.61% 29.90%
Marital Status Single 27.09% 45.18% 64.12%
Divorced 12.54% 16.61% 6.98%
Occupation Part-Time 5.10% 8.31% 2.66%
Self-Employed 3.96% 6.64% 11.96%
Telephone Given 89.01% 92.03% 73.09%
Employer's phone Not given 45.75% 37.54% 48.17%
Given 54.20% 62.46% 51.83%




Table 4.15b). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but
rejected by another one. Belgium : continuous characteristics
Mean Median















Age 38 31 28 37 29 25
Spouse age 38 30 30 37 29 27




7yr 9m 2yr 2m 4yr 5m 7yr lm 2yr 10m 6yr 8m
Time on job 7yr 9m 2yr 3m 2yr 7 m 5yr 8m lyr 6m lyr 8m
Goods price 646.93 835.46 485.24 421.17 818.00 507.77
(Euro)
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Table 4.16a). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but
rejected by another one. The Netherlands: categorical characteristics









Business type Catering 3.16% 1.79% 11.76%
Construction 2.38% 0.45% 7.14%
Officials 3.52% 5.80% 0.15%
Credit
Insurance
No Insurance 70.50% 72.02% 61.61%
Goods code Card Applications 6.71% 20.98% 0.60%
HIFI Radio 5.94% 4.17% 23.21%
TV 8.78% 2.23% 14.14%
Mopeds 3.21% 1.19% 12.50%
Marital Status Single 33.97% 59.52% 65.03%
Widowed 11.65% 11.46% 6.25%
Occupation Benefit 16.68% 11.76% 15.92%
Telephone Mobile 7.36% 29.76% 14.58%
Given 87.98% 58.93% 73.21%
Residential
Status
Living with parents 8.88% 18.60% 26.79%
Table 4.16b). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but




















Age 37 31 30 36 29 23
Spouse age 38 34 38 37 32 36
No of children 0.74 0.13 1.17 0 0 1
Time at address 5yr 10m 4yr 7m 2yr lm 3yr 7m 2yr lyr
Time on job 7yr lm 5yr 2yr 11m 4yr 6m 2yr 5m lyr 2m
Goods price
(Euro)
903.60 571.23 916.62 687.25 308.12 793.21
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Table 4.17a). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but
rejected by another one. Germany: categorical characteristics











Business type Services 29.31% 30.50% 40.00%
Construction 14.47% 8.33% 6.92%
Shop Employee 6.76% 10.22% 6.15%
Card Insurance No Insurance 90.48% 92.92% 73.11%
Insurance 9.52% 7.08% 26.89%
Goods code HEFI Radio 13.35% 33.18% 18.87%
Marital Status Married 52.36% 17.92% 12.42%
Single 32.96% 75.31% 77.04%
Occupation Full-Time 82.72% 82.23% 91.82%
Self-Employed 4.15% 12.74% 2.83%
Telephone Not given 5.76% 12.58% 15.72%
Residential
Status
Living with parents 11.88% 22.96% 39.78%
Table 4.17b). Differences between the applicants accepted by one model but




















Age 37 28 25 36 25 22
Spouse age 17 13 12 0 0 18
Number of
children
0.72 0.47 0.22 0 0 0
Time at address 6yr 9m 2yr 9m lyr 8m 4yr 2yr 6m lyr 9m
Time on job 5yr10 m 2yr 7m lyr 4m 4yr 4m 2yr 3m ly 3m
Goods price
(Euro)
794.45 761.09 554.22 715.30 715.81 459.65
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The German applicants favoured by the generic model, but rejected by the
country-specific model would have higher percentage of shop employees, self-
employed and married. On the contrary, the national model accepted more people
with card insurance, in full-time employment and living with parents.
So for the consumer it does make a difference which model is applied.
4.4.3. Effect of incorporating additional information
The comparison of generic models with national models would be incomplete
without incorporating full information that was available for each country into the
analysis. Therefore, a third type of model was built - national models were
developed on a full set of characteristics, both application and CRA.
Binary coding was used as in the case of national and generic models
developed on a set of common characteristics, and a stepwise selection procedure
was applied in order to get the most predictive variables. The performance of 'full
information' models was compared to 'best' national and generic (no 'country'
indicator variable) models and is summarised in Table 4.19 and Figure 4.6.
Tests of significance at 0.05 level (Table 4.18) showed that for Belgium and
the Netherlands there was a significant difference between the 'full information' and
the other two models, but not between the generic and national models developed on
a set of common characteristics. For Germany all three models were significantly
different.
Table 4.18. Generic model performance. Significance tests on AUROC,
0.05 level.
National models
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Generic model,
no country indicator
Not significant Not significant Significant
'Full information' models Significant Significant Significant
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The new variables that entered the model are summarised in Table 4.20, more
details on 'full information' models are given in Appendix, A23.
Table 4.20 Additional characteristics entering 'full information' models
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
1 Credit card type Negative CRA record Credit card type
2 Time at bank Number of live fixed
term accounts
Time at bank
3 Previous employment Number of live Total amount of live
Given/ Not given revolving accounts credit
4 Initial instalment Instalment paid Initial instalment
5 Retailer Dealer Section/Dealer
6 Spouse's occupation Loan amount Spouse marker Yes/No
7 Type ofagreement Type ofagreement Type ofagreement
8 Total addresses given Time since last bad 'A'
account
Time at CRA 1
9 Time since last bad
'A+' account
Time at CRA 2




12 Bank code Bank sort code
13 Nationality Nationality




18 East/ West Germany
indicator
19 Worst CRA credit
20 CRA quantity 1
21 CRA quantity 3
22 CRA quantity 4
23 Type of bank account
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Overall, it is possible to conclude that incorporating additional information
into the models does increase their predictive ability, which is especially evident for
Germany, where 23 new variables, including 8 CRA characteristics, entered into the
model. The improvement compared to national models ranges from 0.015 (Belgium)
to 0.050 (Germany) in terms of AUROC, and as for error rate the improvement
ranges from 0.24% (Belgium) to 1.06% (Germany).
It is notable that quite a few characteristics (marked in italics in Table 4.20)
are available for 2 countries. Therefore, there is a significant potential for expansion
for generic models, provided the data collection practices are harmonised across the
countries.
'Nationality' turned out to be significant for Germany and the Netherlands.
Whilst the inclusion of the variable was appropriate at the time when the analysis
was done, the implementation of the Race Equality Directive (Council of the EU
(2000)) changed the situation. In the Netherlands 'nationality' is interpreted as being
part of 'race', so the use of this information can be regarded as discrimination
(Koopman (1999), Zwamborn (2003)). In Germany the Directive is not transposed
into the national legislation yet, so the current legal status of nationality is not clear
(Mahlman (2003)).
It is obvious that the difference between generic and national models built on
the same list of characteristics is less pronounced. It can be attributed to the flat
maximum effect, which can compensate for differences in grouping and weighting of
similar characteristics. The difference between generic and national models ranges
from 0.003 (the Netherlands) to 0.008 (Germany) for AUROC, and from 0.04%
(Belgium) to 0.3% (Germany) for error rate. But even in the case of Germany where
the gap between the models is largest, it can be argued that the difference is only
marginal. Thus generic scoring is potentially a viable option.
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4.5 Conclusions
This Chapter presented an investigation of risk patterns in three European
countries and compared the performance of the generic model to that of models built
for each country separately. The combination of countries analysed in this Chapter
was not explored in previous studies.
In contrast to previous findings, the generic model built for different
populations of three European countries showed an adequate performance
comparable to that of the national models. This can be attributed to the relative
similarity of the countries used in the analysis. This meant that it was possible to
select a set of characteristics that could be harmonised across three countries. This
set contained enough information to allow for good classification. Although there
were differences in distributions of good/bad classes across the countries, there were
general patterns that could be observed and the differences were compensated by the
flat maximum effect. In addition, a generic model was developed on a heterogeneous
sample, in which all three populations were appropriately represented.
Nevertheless, whilst the generic model showed an acceptable level of
predictive performance, the applicants accepted with the generic decision-rule
differed from those accepted with the country-specific rule on a number of
characteristics.
This gives some support to the argument that legislative restrictions on data
used in credit scoring would harm consumers. Whereas certain characteristics (in this
case country of residence) are not available, the lenders may still achieve the same
level of classification accuracy, but the absence of the relevant information may have
a differential and/or adversarial effect for certain groups of applicants.
Additional information increases the predictive ability of models, whilst the
difference between generic and national models developed on the same set of
common characteristics is marginal. This emphasises the value of information and
the need for harmonisation of data across Europe. One may expect that further
European harmonisation will increase the potential scope of application of generic
models.
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Chapter 5. European generic scoring using survival analysis
5.1. Introduction
Traditionally credit scoring has been concerned with the estimation of the
probability of default, i.e. the level of risk presented by the credit applicant.
However, it has been shown by Hopper and Lewis (1992) and Leonard (1997) that
the level of risk is not necessarily a good indicator of the level of profit the applicant
will generate. Some high risk applicants can generate a significant profit if they use
the credit product actively and pay interest and charges long enough before going
into default. On the contrary, low risk applicants may pay the full balance every
month, thus keeping the revenues from such 'good' accounts low. These revenues
may not be enough to cover the costs associated with maintaining the accounts.
In recent years the focus of credit risk modelling shifted from risk to profit
(Thomas et al. (2002)). In terms of profitability of an account, one of the most
important aspects is its lifetime, i.e. how long the credit applicant uses the account.
Modelling lifetime is the domain of survival analysis. Whilst survival analysis is a
well-established technique in medical research, reliability and engineering (Collett
(1994), Ansell and Phillips (1994)), there have been only a few applications in credit
scoring (Narain (1992), Banasik et al. (1999), Stepanova and Thomas (2001), Hand
and Kelly (2001), Till (2001), Baesens (2003)). When compared to logistic
regression, survival analysis methods showed superior performance in certain
applications in credit scoring (Narain (1992), Hand and Kelly (2001))and inferior
performance in some other applications, depending on the length of time used to
measure the classification accuracy and the nature of the problem being modelled
(Banasik et al. (1999), Stepanova and Thomas (2001), Baesens (2003)).
The studies conducted so far, investigated fixed term loans and populations
coming from one country. In this Chapter the data on a revolving type of credit is
analysed with the aim to predict the time to default. Continuing the work started by
previous research projects that focused on some specific approach within survival
analysis, this Chapter investigates a range of distributions for accelerated lifetime /
failure time models and a semi-parametric proportional hazards model. These are
benchmarked against logistic regression.
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Apart from the comparison of different approaches within the survival
analysis, there is a second objective: to investigate the sensitivity of the predictive
ability of survival models, as compared to logistic regression, to the presence of
heterogeneous subpopulations, i.e. applicants from three different European
countries.
The Chapter is structured in the following way. Section 5.2 presents an
overview of the basic concepts and methods used in lifetime modelling. Section 5.3
surveys previous applications of survival analysis to credit scoring problems. Section
5.4 compares the national survival patterns and estimates the difference in predictive
accuracy of national models versus the generic model. It also investigates the
performance of generic models that incorporate stratification and time-dependency.
Section 5.5 concludes.
It is concluded that for the dataset used in this thesis, survival analysis
provides at least as good classification accuracy as logistic regression, whilst offering
some additional benefits. Different survival analysis methods are very close to each
other in predictive performance. And the difference in predictive accuracy of generic
and national survival models is marginal, in line with the results from Chapter 4.
5.2. Survival analysis concepts and methods
5.2.1. Describing lifetime distributions
In the previous chapters the analysis focused on estimating the probability of
the event occurring, the event being defined as '2 consecutive months in arrears
within the observation period (12-25 months)'. Survival analysis estimates the time
to an event, which is termed as a lifetime or survival time, and is assumed to be a
realisation of some random process. There are four standard ways to describe T, the
event time:
1. Cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.), which indicates the probability that the
event will occur before any time, t, chosen (including t)\
F(t) = Pr{T< tj.
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It is more common to use the related function, the survivor function
S(t) = Pr{T >t}=l-F(t),
which gives the probability of the event not occurring before the specified time t or
the probability of surviving beyond t.
2. Probability density function, p.d.f.
P{t <T <t + At)
fit) = P{t<T <t + A/} = hm (5,1)A/—>0 At v '
which gives the probability of event occurring within the time interval (t, t+At). It




— . . P{t < T < t + At \ T > t)h{t) = hm —- 1 - (5.3)
Ar-^o At
which is the probability of the event occurring within the time interval (t,t+At),
provided the event has not occurred so far. The hazard function is interpreted as an
instantaneous failure rate and is often referred to as the conditional density or
intensity function. It can be also expressed as:
„(,)= ,im(f(» +AO-F(Oj 1 =/gj = _^|log($(0)) (5.4)at—>0 [_ At ) S(t) Sit) dt
3. Cumulative or integrated hazard function
H(t) = hiu)du = -log( 5(0) (5.5)
and alternatively, the survival function can be expressed as
S(t) = exp(-H(t)) (5.6)
All these functions are essentially equivalent ways to describe a lifetime
distribution and if one is given, the others can be derived, as shown above.
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5.2.2. Censoring and competing risks
One of the advantages of survival analysis is its ability to handle censored
cases, i.e. the cases for which the event of interest was never observed. Censoring
comes in several forms. Right censoring occurs when T is greater than some value c,
which typically happens because the observation period is terminated before the
event is observed. Left censoring refers to situations when the process starts prior to
the start of the observation so that the latter part of the lifetime is seen. The
combination of both right and left censoring is defined as interval censoring.
Within right censored cases it is possible to distinguish Type I, Type II and
random censoring. Type I occurs when the observation period is terminated at a
particular point in time. Type II occurs when the observation period is terminated
after a prespecified number of events have occurred. Random censoring occurs when
the observation period is terminated due to the reasons beyond the control of the
researcher. With random censoring, it is important to be sure that it is non-
informative, i.e. that the censored time is independent of the unobserved event time,
otherwise, it can lead to severe biases.
Another important advantage of survival analysis is that it allows the
researcher to discriminate between different reasons for an event. This approach is
called the competing risks. In application to revolving credit one may want to predict
not only the default, but also the possibility of closing an account too early, e.g. the
instances when only one purchase is made on the card, and then the card is never
used again.
In this case the analysis is done separately for each event type. When
predicting default, the accounts that have not experienced default, are considered
censored. When predicting early closure, all the open accounts, including the
delinquent ones, are considered censored.
However, the competing risk approach is not pursued in this thesis. It will be
shown in Section 5.4.1 that there are some accounts that have been recorded to be
closed before the end of the observation period. It will also be shown in Chapter 6
that an open account does not necessarily imply it is being used. So 'early closure' in
the context of the data being analysed is not straightforward to define. Chapter 6 will
discuss this issue in more detail.
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5.2.3. Some common lifetime distributions
There are several distributions of survival times that are frequently used in
medical studies (Collett (1994)) and engineering (Ansell and Phillips (1994)).
The exponential model assumes that the hazard is constant over time: h(t)= 2;
the survivor function is then S(t)-e'M, and the implied p.d.f. of survival times is
f(t) - Ae'M for 0<t <°°.
An important property of the exponential distribution is the lack of memory,
i.e. the distribution of additional survival times is not affected by the knowledge that
an individual has survived for a certain length of time.




f(t) - Ayt^1 exp(-/ltY) for 0<t <°°.
The shape of the hazard function depends on y, which is known as a shape
parameter, while A is a scale parameter. When y= 1, the distribution becomes
exponential.
The log-normal model implies a non-monotonic hazard function. It rises from
0 to a peak then declines towards 0 as t goes to infinity. Survival time T is said to
have a log-normal distribution with parameters ju and a if logT has a normal
distribution with mean ju and variance cr. The p.d.f. of T is given by
f(t)=—7===4-1 exp( ^ogt ^ ) for 0<t<°°.
oV(2n) 2(7
The survivor and hazard functions can be expressed in terms of incomplete
normal integrals (Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) provide details). In the presence of
censoring, estimation becomes complicated, so very often the log-logistic model is
used instead of the log-normal. The log-normal is often appropriate for modelling
repeatable events.
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The log-logistic distribution can be used as an approximation to log-normal to
model a non-monotonic hazard function with a single mode:
eektk~l




(1 + eetk )2
All distributions considered so far (apart from log-logistic) are special cases
of the generalised gamma model, which can take a wide variety of shapes, including
the bathtub ones. It can also represent hazard functions that have more than one
peak. The flexibility of this model comes at a cost of increased complexity of
estimation, and with some convergence problems. The hazard function for the








Collett (1994) states that the Weibull and gamma distributions will normally
give very similar results. Still fitting a generalised gamma model may be useful for
making comparisons of the goodness-of-fit between different models, since they can
be considered as nested within gamma.
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5.2.4. Non-parametric estimation of survivor and hazard functions
The most common non-parametric approach to estimating the survivor
function, also known as the survival curve, is the Kaplan-Meier (KM) or product-
limit estimator.
S(tj) = ri [1- —] (5-7)
7 = 1 n j
where dj is the number of events at time j and iij is the number at risk at time j. The
quantity in brackets can be interpreted as the conditional probability of surviving to
time tj+i, provided one has survived to time tj. It was shown by Kaplan and Meier
(1958) that the product-limit was in fact, a maximum likelihood estimator.
There are two useful transformations of survival curves that provide
information about the shape of the underlying hazard function:
1. A plot of negative log of the survivor function against time, a LS plot, indicates
whether the hazard is constant, increasing or decreasing with time. A constant
hazard corresponds to a straight line with an origin at 0. A LS plot is in fact, a
plot of the cumulative hazard function (5.5). If h(t) is some constant A, H(t)=At,
this correspondents to the exponential distribution.
2. A plot of log[-logS(t)J versus log t, a LLS plot, shows whether survival times
decrease or increase monotonically with time. So a straight line with a slope not
equal to unity would suggest that a Weibull distribution is suitable for modelling.
(Parmar and Machin (1995)).




Estimating and plotting the survival curves and hazard functions is a powerful
tool for initial data exploration, which can provide an indication of the distribution of
the hazard function and thus aid in selecting the subsequent methods of analysis.
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If there exist sub-populations then it may be desirable to explore whether
there are differences in the survivor functions between the sub-populations. The most
commonly used tests for the equality of the survival curves are Log-rank and
Wilcoxon tests (Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)).
The Log-rank test involves calculating deviations of the observed number of
events from the expected numbers. For any group in the population the Log-rank
statistic is
£ (dy ~ etj)
y'=i
where dy and e,y are observed and estimated numbers of events occurring in group i at
time j, and r is the unique event time in the population. The test of equality of the k
survival curves is based on the $\-i distribution for the squared values of the log-
rank statistic divided by estimated variance.
The Wilcoxon test is very similar to the procedure described above. The only
difference lies in the fact that the Wilcoxon test calculates the weighted sum of
deviations of observed numbers of events from expected numbers:
£ nj {dtj - etj)
]=i
where iij is the total number at risk at each time point.
It follows that the log-rank test is more suitable for detecting proportional
differences between k survival curves Si(t)-[S2(t)]r, where yis some positive number
not equal to 1. The Wilcoxon test is more suitable when event times follow log-
normal distributions - it gives more weight to earlier times. However, both methods
fail to give reliable results when survival curves cross (Allison (1995)).
5.2.5 Estimating regression models
The methods of the previous section can be used to test for heterogeneity in
the population, but with a large number of variables that can potentially influence the
survival time, the analysis becomes cumbersome. Regression analysis provides a
more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the survival time and
various covariates, so that the predictions could be made about the length of the
survival or the probability of survival to a specified time based on the observed
covariates.
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There are two standard ways to relate time T to predictor variables or
covariates: proportional hazards (PH) model and accelerated lifetime/ failure time
(AFT) models. The choice of a model will depend on whether it is believed that the
covariates act multiplicatively on survival time T, or that they act multiplicatively on
the hazard rate h. In the former case an accelerated failure time (AFT) model would
be considered suitable, in the latter, a proportional hazards (PH) model. The Weibull
family of distributions can be both AFT and PH. However, the PH approach has an
advantage in that this model does not require specification of the underlying
distribution.
5.2.5.1. Accelerated failure time models
The general form of the AFT models is given by
where ho are baseline hazard functions, x is the vector of covariates and /? is the
vector of parameters that need to be estimated. This model specifies that the
covariates act multiplicatively on T, so the effect of covariates is to increase or
decrease the hazard rate with time. It also implies that the baseline hazard function
exists and has some specific distribution.
The AFT models can also be expressed as log-linear models:
log T - P'x+ge or y - P'x+oe,
where e is an error term, and a is the parameter which changes the distribution of e,
thus acting as a switch between different distributions of T. The relationship between
the distributions is as follows:
h(t) = h0(tep'x)e^'x (5.10)
Distribution of e Distribution of T
extreme value (1 parameter) exponential









In the case of no censoring, the log likelihood L can be written as
L = S log(f(Wi)/o)), where Wi=(yt - J3'xi)/a:
With the right-censored observations, the log likelihood becomes
L = Z log(f(wO/o) + Z logfSfw,^ ,
where the first sum is over uncensored observations and the second sum is over
right-censored observations.
The log-likelihood function is maximised by means of some numerical
method. In this thesis a ridge stabilised version of the Newton-Raphson algorithm as
implemented in SAS is used.
5.2.5.2. Cox proportional hazards model
In the proportional hazard model the covariates act multiplicatively on the
hazard rate:
h(t)=ho(t)exp(/3'x)
The baseline hazard function ho(t) can be regarded as the hazard function
when all covariates are equal to 0. Taking logarithms of both sides leads to
log li(t)=a(t)+ p'x,
if a(t)= a, it is the exponential model;
if a(t)= a log t, it is the Weibull model.
However, the main attraction of the PH model is that there is no need to
specify the distribution. Under the assumption of proportionality, the hazard for any
individual i is a fixed proportion of the hazard for any other individual j:
TLUT = exp {pXxi-Xj)}.
hj{t)
This is an important result implying that the baseline hazard ho(t) can be
omitted from estimation of /? by using a partial likelihood function, which can be
maximised. The likelihood function is 'partial', because it considers only cases with
an observed event, and because it conditions out the time element. To construct a
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partial likelihood function it is necessary to have only the ranks of the event times,
not their numerical values. So for the set of individuals at risk, R(ti), with ordered
failure times, t] < < ••• < h, the partial likelihood is given by
k exp( P'x:)pl = ri — —
i exp(/?*;)•
The difficulty with this expression arises when the data contain tied failure
times, i.e. failures that occur in one and the same period. This is the usual case in
credit scoring, where account status is recorded on a monthly basis, so normally there
is no information for rank ordering of the defaults that happened within one month.
There are several approaches to handle this problem. In the first, the 'exact'
approach, Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) suggest that since the exact ordering of
events is not known, all the possibilities should be included into the estimation, or n!
orderings for n tied events. Whilst this approach provides the most accurate
estimation, the computation becomes complicated with a large number of ties.
Two approximations were proposed. The Breslow approximation (Breslow
(1974)) assumes that the ties occurred simultaneously and replaces n different
orderings in the exact method by n\ times the same ordering. The Efron
approximation (Efron (1974)) assumes failures are sequential, but the orderings are
not considered. Instead, a correction is made so that the first individual fails out of
the full risk set, but each subsequent failure occurs from the risk set which excludes
the average of all preceding failures plus this particular failure. Allison (1995)
believes that the Efron approximation gives estimates closer to 'exact' values than
the Breslow approximation.
Cox proposed to replace a continuous proportional hazards model with a
discrete logistic model (Cox (1972)). It can be an appropriate approach for credit
scoring when the monthly payments are to be made on the same date. This leads to a
linear log-odds model:
1 "it
where Pit is the conditional probability that individual i has event at time t, provided
that the individual has not yet experienced the event and (% is a set of constants that
can vary between time periods.
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To estimate this model, it is necessary to consider the probability that for any
period of time with n events and k numbers at risk, events happened to these
particular n individuals out of a possible set of k. It means one has to incorporate
k!/n!(k-n)! possibilities.
The following table gives estimation time in seconds that four different
methods require for increasing sample sizes:
Table 5.1 Estimation time (sec) for different methods of handling the tied
event times
Sample size
100 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Breslow 3 3 3 3 4 5 5
Efron 3 3 3 3 4 5 5
Exact 4 6 18 38 70 129 204
Discrete 3 4 6 9 12 19 26
Source: Al ison (1995)
Stepanova (2001) found that there was almost no difference in the parameter
estimates and no difference in the predictive ability between the discrete method and
the Breslow approximation, although the log-likelihood statistic indicated a better fit
for the discrete model. Following this result, the Breslow approximation is used in
the cmrent analysis.
Whilst the parametric AFT models provide more efficient estimation, PH has
an advantage of robustness and flexibility. There are two important properties that
follow from an arbitrary nature of the baseline hazard ho(t). First, ho(t) can be
allowed to vary between different groups in the population. Second, it is possible to
allow the covariates x to be time-dependent. The strength of association of a
covariate with the default may vary with time, and the PH model can be extended to
model time-dependency (Cox (1972); Stablein et al. (1981)).
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5.3. Applications in credit scoring
The first attempt to apply survival analysis ideas to credit scoring was
undertaken by Narain (1992). It was shown that estimates of the lifetime of a loan
obtained from the exponential model can significantly improve the credit-granting
decisions. Banasik et al. (1999) explored the issue further. Three models
(exponential, Weibull and unspecified baseline proportional hazard) were compared
to a standard logistic regression approach. The models were fitted to the fixed-term
personal loan data and their performance was compared using two measures:
1) the ability to predict the probability of default in the first 12 months of the loan
term;
2) the ability to predict the probability of default in the subsequent 12 months for
the loans that survived through the first year.
For the first year the best performance was demonstrated by a non-parametric
Cox model, followed closely by logistic regression and parametric proportional
hazard models. For the second year the survival analysis methods performed worse
than logistic regression, but this could be due to the fact that there were too few
defaulters remaining in the risk set. The study applied the idea of competing risks in
the credit scoring context, the competing risk was defined as early repayment of a
loan. The proportional hazards models outperformed the logistic regression in
predicting early repayments for the first year, but for the second year, logistic
regression was the leader. It was suggested that the poor performance of the PH
models in the second year was due to the fact that the ordering of risk of the event
did not change with time. It was suggested that incorporating time-dependency might
improve the results.
Stepanova and Thomas (2001); Stepanova and Thomas (2002); Stepanova
(2001) give the most comprehensive investigation of all aspects associated with the
application of the PH model in credit scoring. A new coarse-classing technique was
proposed that was based on the PH approach and did not use any arbitrary time
horizon. Methods of model diagnostics and tests for time-dependency were
investigated and discussed in detail.
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It was demonstrated that incorporating time-by-characteristic interactions
improves the predictive ability of the model. Competing risks were incorporated into
analysis, and methods were proposed to improve the prediction of early repayment.
Finally, PH behavioural scoring techniques were developed that allowed the analyst
to estimate the expected profit from the loans. It was shown that survival analysis is
competitive with logistic regression in terms of predictive ability, and in addition, it
offers advantages of providing estimates for profit scoring. Specifically, in terms of
coarse-classification, the standard log-odds approach outperformed the PH method
when the definition of bad was chosen to be 'early repayment before the end of a
loan', i.e. the statistics measuring the separation between classes was based on the
whole observed period. However, when the definition was changed to 'early
repayment in the first 12 months', the PH approach showed better results than the
log-odds one.
The performance of models was measured under the same two criteria as in
Banasik et al. (1999). LR outperformed PH, with the PH model loosing a lot of
power in the second year. Segmentation by the Loan Term significantly improved the
performance of PH model for the second year, but still the LR was slightly better.
When predicting default, segmented PH performed best of all for the first year, but
segmentation did not improve the LR model. Non-segmented models showed similar
performance. For the second year, LR was slightly better than PH, both with and
without segmentation.
Behavioural scores were built for each month, predicting default in the
remaining time period and incorporating the changing transactional information. The
performance was measured again using two definitions of bad, but this time
definition 2 was chosen to be ' default before the end of the loan', definition 1 was
still 'default in the first 12 months'. The results for both definitions were very
similar. LRB (Logistic Regression Behavioural) model performed better during the
first year, while PHAB (Proportional Hazards Behavioural) model performance
improved with time and after 2 years it was better than LRB.
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Hand and Kelly (2001) used the idea of behavioural models based on a
survival analysis approach in application to new products, when there are no
historical data to develop a model on. The time to default was assumed to have an
exponential distribution, which implied a constant hazard rate. At each time period,
as new information on the performance of the accounts became available, the model
was recalculated. It was shown that the survival analysis approach was superior to
the logistic regression method, i.e. the former accepted less bads consistently
throughout the whole period of observation. This was attributed to that fact that the
logistic model tends to underestimate the true proportion of bads, since it assumes
that the accounts which have not experienced default by a certain time point, are
good. This may not be true because a certain number of these accounts will go bad
later. The survival approach, however, assumes that all applicants will default
eventually. Although this assumption seems to be unrealistic, for the purposes of
modelling fixed term loans, it is possible to treat those who are predicted to default
after the end of the loan term, as 'never going to be bad'.
All the above described research was based on fixed term credit products. In
contrast, Till (2001) looked at the possibility of modelling delinquency in relation to
revolving credit. However, the use of survival analysis in this study was limited to
modelling the duration of stay in each delinquency state. Survival analysis was found
to give similar results to a stationary Markov chain in estimating the mean duration
spent in each state. The study also provided an investigation of the distribution form
underlying the transactions. It was shown that the number of transactions up to time t
can be modelled by a Negative Binomial, and times between transactions follow a
Weibull distribution.
Baesens (2003) examined the application of neural networks for survival
analysis modelling in credit scoring. Time to default and time to early repayment was
considered. It was found that in predicting early repayment the neural networks
outperformed the PH model, whilst in predicting default the superiority of the
proposed approach was less evident.
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5.4. Survival analysis applied to national and generic models
5.4.1. Data description.
Exactly the same national and generic samples were used as in Chapter 4 to
allow for comparison of survival analysis models with logistic regression. The
application data from Chapter 4 were merged with behavioural characteristics, which
included the delinquency status, outstanding balance and credit limit, recorded on a
monthly basis. The observation period was 25 months from November 1998 until
December 2000. Exactly the same allocation into training and hold-out datasets was
kept.
Survival analysis predicts the time until a certain event. For the purpose of
this analysis, the event was defined as 'first time 2 months in arrears'. The accounts
that did not experience the event were considered censored. The life of the account
was measured from the month it was opened until the event or until the account was
closed. In the latter case, the account was considered to be censored. All other cases
were censored at the end of observation period.
The data used in the analysis in this study contains right-censored
observations. As Table 5.2 indicates, the majority of cases have right censoring
because they did not get into the default category and kept the card account open up
to and including November 2000, which was the last period when the account status
was recorded. These cases, however, can be considered as randomly censored since
although the observation ended at a fixed time point, the start of the process was not
the same time point for all accounts, so the actual survival times can be considered
random. There are some customers that have closed the account before the last
recorded period. However, there are no reasons to suspect that this can be related to
the likelihood of the default, so it can be assumed that it is random censoring.








Germany 8909 2982 63957
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5.4.2. Survival patterns by country
Before modelling the relationship between application characteristics and
survival times, some exploration of survival patterns was done for each country. This
involved:
1) fitting KM estimates of the survival curves, as described in Section 5.2.4.
(Figure 5.1);
2) examining the negative log-survival (LS) plots (Figure 5.2) and a plot of
log[-logS(t)] versus log t (LLS) (Figure 5.3);
3) examining the hazard rate plot, with estimates of the hazard function obtained as
described in Section 5.2.4. Figure 5.4 presents the 95% confidence intervals for
the hazard rate for each country.
The SDF plots (Figure 5.1) overlap for Belgium and Germany, with SDF for
the Netherlands decreasing faster and the difference getting larger with time. The
Log-rank test and Wilcoxon test showed that survival curves were significantly
different for the three countries (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3. Test ol equality of SDF between 3 countries
Test Chi-Square Degrees
freedom
of Pr > Chi-Square
Log-Rank 131.2216 2 0.0001
Wilcoxon 97.8208 2 0.0001
To check whether the hazard is constant over time -log (S) is plotted against
the time (Figure 5.2). The behaviour between 2-5 months is different between the
countries. Germany follows nearly a straight line. For Belgium the chances of
survival decrease at a faster rate until month 3 before levelling out. The Netherlands
shows a smooth (but not constant) decline in survival probability. After month 5, the
graphs seem to follow approximately a straight line, which implies a constant hazard
(see Section 5.2.4) and suggests that exponential distribution can be a suitable fit,
although a slight downward curvature can be observed. As in the previous graph,
whilst for Belgium and Germany the graphs overlap, the Netherlands exhibits the
lower chances of survival.
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Figure 5.2 Negative log SDF against time by country
Figure 5.3 Log (-Log(SDF)) against log T by country
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A plot of log[-logS(t)J versus log t (LLS) shows whether the hazard rate is
changing monotonically (Figure 5.3). A downward curve is observed for the
Netherlands. It is possible to distinguish two parts with approximately straight lines
for Germany, and three parts for Belgium. Overall, the investigation of the plot
suggests that the hazard rate is not changing monotonically, but for Germany and
Belgium it is possible to split the total observation period into parts with monotonic
hazard rate.
The hazard plots (Figure 5.4) for all three countries increase rapidly in the
first months of the account life and then decrease towards an asymptote. This
supports a conventional wisdom - 'if they go bad, they go bad early' (Banasik et al.
(1999)), and is in line with results for fixed term loans (see Stepanova (2001)).
However, 'early' means 2 months for Belgium and Germany, and 5 months for the
Netherlands. The height of peaks also differs between the countries, with Germany
being the least risky in terms of early defaulters and the Netherlands being the most
risky. After 9 months the confidence intervals overlap, but the Netherlands remains
slightly higher and shows a slight increase at the end of the observation period.
However, this increase could be due to the increased variability, as indicated by a
wider confidence interval, because the risk set becomes small.
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The difference in behaviour between accounts from the Netherlands and the
other two nations may in part be due to a higher proportion of accounts with deferred
payment schemes in the Netherlands. Table 5.4 gives the breakdown by types of
contract for each country. For Belgium deferred options constitute only 2.16% of the
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accepted accounts. In Germany this percentage is 10.52%. Still it is possible to say
that for Belgium and Germany the populations are fairly homogeneous in terms of
contract terms, with nearly 90% falling into 'Budget type of agreement, customer
contacted by phone' type. In contrast to them, the proportion of deferred payment
schemes in the Netherlands is 41.76% and constitutes the largest group of contract
terms.
Table 5.4 Percen tage breakdown of dil ferent agreement types by country




Total Deferred 2.30% 2.14% 0.66% 2.16% 1.55%
Total Budget 88.32% 88.18% 96.48% 88.19% 91.56%
Total Other 9.39% 9.68% 2.87% 9.65% 6.90%
Germany
Total Deferred 12.20% 10.30% 9.34% 10.52% 9.99%
Total Budget 85.57% 88.10% 89.31% 87.80% 88.48%
Total Other 2.23% 1.60% 1.35% 1.68% 1.53%
The Nelherlands
Total Deferred 48.61% 40.68% 36.16% 41.76% 39.67%
Total Budget 29.87% 29.17% 37.66% 29.27% 32.40%
Total Other 21.52% 30.14% 26.18% 28.97% 27.93%
Figure 5.5 gives hazard plots for deferred and non-deferred options by
country. For the Netherlands deferred options are riskier than non-deferred and cause
the peak at month 5. Non-deferred options have an almost constant hazard rate, and
contribute towards the slight increase in the hazard rate in the end of the observation
period.
In Germany and Belgium the deferred options are also riskier than non-
deferred although the difference is not as striking as in the Netherlands. Such a
difference between the countries may be explained by the number of deferred
accounts. In the Netherlands the number of these accounts is large enough to
accommodate probably, the majority of applicants with financial problems, who
would obviously prefer to pay later. In Germany and Belgium such applicants have
to choose some other options, and hence they are more evenly split between different
agreement types.
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The hazard plot with deferred options removed is given in Figure 5.6. The
patterns for Belgium and Germany remain unchanged, which is to be expected, since
the proportion of deferred schemes is not large in these countries. For the
Netherlands, it is obvious that the relatively large peak at month 5 is due to deferred
accounts.
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The analysis proceeded with accounts of all agreement types included for the
Netherlands, because it is a significant proportion of data and removing it will
eliminate a lot of information. However, the agreement type was not included into
the set of predictor variables, since there was a large number of unique types for the
Netherlands. Including these types as a covariate would be equivalent to including a
country indicator variable, so the model would be not exactly 'generic'. This creates
an unobserved heterogeneity situation, but the conditions remain equal for all
different methods of survival analysis and LR used in the analysis, so the comparison
is still valid.
Tests of equality over countries with deferred schemes removed (Table 5.5)
still showed significant values, although the chi-square statistics became less in
magnitude.
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Table 5.5 Test of equality between countries (non-deferred payment
schemes)
Test Chi-Square Degrees of freedom Pr > Chi-Square
Log-Rank 27.1494 2 0.0001
Wilcoxon 17.5926 2 0.0002
Overall, Figures 5.1-5.6 suggest that apart from the first 3 months, the
exponential distribution can be a suitable approximation, while with the first 3
months log-normal or log-logistic seems to be more appropriate.
5.4.3. Coarse-classification using the log-odds and survival analysis
techniques
Before fitting regression models to the data, the attributes were grouped
together to form binary variables like in Chapter 4. But the rationale for grouping the
attributes was different and was based on the approach proposed by Stepanova
(2001):
1. The continuous characteristics were fine-classed into 20 groups, each group
containing 5% of data. Attributes of discrete characteristics were fine-classed on
the basis of their meaning. For example, for the 'Goods code', attributes
'Bedroom furniture' and 'Living-room furniture' were combined into 'Furniture'
group. For discrete characteristics with a small number of attributes, no fine-
classing was made.
2. Then proportional hazards model was fitted to fine classes, and the parameter
estimates were plotted.
3. Fine classes with similar parameter values were combined into coarse classes.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8. show examples of coarse-classification based on
proportional hazards and on the log-odds approach from Chapter 4. Both approaches
suggest identical groupings. This is different from the results reported by Stepanova
(2001). This can be attributed to the fact that here the data relates to revolving credit
as opposed to fixed term personal loans and there is no pronounced time structure, as
was shown in exploratory analysis, apart from early peaks in defaults.
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Since there was no difference between the log-odds and survival analysis
coarse-classes, the binary variables obtained in Chapter 4 were used in the
subsequent analysis. So in cases when there is no pronounced time dependency the
coarse-classification can be done using weights of evidence. It may be an advantage
with some computer packages that do not convert categorical variables into binary
ones automatically.
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5.4.4. Survival analysis compared to logistic regression
The preliminary exploration of data (hazard plots) suggested a number of
possible approaches: log-normal and log-logistic distributions seemed to be most
suitable for modelling the delinquency data, although one should not discard the
Weibull family distributions. At the same time the country plots looked roughly
proportional, suggesting that PH models would be appropriate.
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So exponential, Weibull, log-normal, log-logistic distributions for parametric
models were tried and Cox proportional hazards model with unspecified baseline
hazard function. The model fit was measured by -LogLikelihood, with lower
magnitude values indicating the better fit. This measure indicates how well the model
describes the data but in relative, not absolute terms. It is used to compare nested
models. Models are nested if one is a special case of another, in our case the
exponential, Weibull, log-normal models are nested within the generalised gamma.
This allows one to make tests of significance for the difference in model fit. Log-
logistic, Logistic and Cox proportional hazards model cannot be compared directly
on the basis of this measure, since they are different, not nested models. However,
the judgements can be made based on the predictive ability of models, which was
measured by the area under the ROC curve and error rate.
The predictive ability of the models was measured on hold-out samples. The
score produced by the model provided estimates of log T. From this the estimates of
the 'survival' time were obtained or estimates of time that the customer is going to
use the card without going into default. This time was rank-ordered, the shorter times
were considered to be 'bad'. The cut-off was chosen to match the number of actual
bads in the hold-out sample, as in Chapter 4. An alternative way would be to obtain
the probability of 'surviving' until some specified period, which is equivalent to the
way predictions are generated from logistic regression. However, the advantage of
survival analysis consists in its ability to produce predictions for several time periods
from the same model, which logistic regression cannot do. For PH models the
estimate of the hazard was used as a score.
The results from different survival analysis models and logistic regression are
reported in Table 5.6. AFT models should be compared with proportional hazards
and logistic full models (not stepwise), since there is no variable selection procedures
incorporated in SAS for AFT models.
The differences in model fit were highly significant (Table 5.7). In terms of
model fit, the leader was the gamma distribution followed by the log-normal for all
three countries. However, this did not translate into superior prediction results. In
fact, gamma gives the worst prediction, which proves a well-known fact that better
fit does not necessarily mean better prediction (Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)).
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Table 5. 6. Survival analysis and logistic regression models by country
Model Log L AUROC Error rate
Belgium
Exponential -7842 0.7121 16.74%
Weibull -7811 0.7119 16.78%
Loglogistic -7780 0.7123 16.74%
Lognormal -7708 0.7122 16.90%
Gamma -7690 0.7116 16.90%
PH -20093 0.7122 16.72%
PH stepwise -20480 0.7071 16.74%
Logistic -5935 0.7129 16.92%
Logistic stepwise -5990 0.7074 16.96%
The Netherlands
Exponential -24656 0.7802 16.50%
Weibull -24185 0.7797 16.50%
Loglogistic -23870 0.7800 16.50%
Lognormal -23700 0.7801 16.54%
Gamma -23693 0.7801 16.54%
PH -79429 0.7802 16.50%
PH stepwise -79435 0.7798 16.56%
Logistic -19229 0.7814 16.50%
Logistic stepwise -19216 0.7804 16.50%
Germany
Exponential -22531 0.7408 15.78%
Weibull -22380 0.7405 15.78%
Loglogistic -22269 0.7406 15.78%
Lognormal -22062 0.7406 15.86%
Gamma -22016 0.7404 15.88%
PH -65386 0.7412 15.76%
PH stepwise -38588 0.7395 15.78%
Logistic -17389 0.7417 15.74%
Logistic stepwise -17421 0.7394 15.74%
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Table 5.7 Model fit test of significance based on Log Likelihood
Chi-sq df p>0
Belgium
Exponential vs Weibull 44 1 2.76018E-11
Weibull vs Gamma 429 1 2.4511E-95
Lognormal vs Gamma 143 1 4.61618E-33
Exponential vs Gamma 473 2 1.5012E-103
The Netherlands
Exponential vs Weibull 941 1 1.4026E-206
Webull vs Gamma 985 1 3.5089E-216
Lognormal vs Gamma 13 1 0.000280096
Exponential vs Gamma 1926 2 0
Germany
Exponential vs Weibull 49 1 3.00302E-12
Webull vs Gamma 1177 1 6.7201E-258
Lognormal vs Gamma 335 1 7.43031E-75
Exponential vs Gamma 1225 2 7.7443E-267
Nevertheless, all distributions are amazingly close in predictive accuracy. So
given the preference for a more parsimonious and therefore robust model, the
exponential distribution would be most suitable from parametric models. At the same
time proportional hazards and logistic regression models give identical results. Since
there is no or little difference in predictive accuracy, the decision as to which
approach to use should be based on additional properties that a certain method can
provide.
One can argue that there may be periods within 25 months when certain
models give superior prediction. This argument would apply to AFT survival models
since they allow for modelling the changing hazard rates between different groups
over time, and therefore will produce different ranking of borrowers over time. To
test this proposition the survival models were applied to two alternative definitions of
bad. First, those that defaulted within the first six months were considered to be bad,
and the rest were treated as good. Second, those that defaulted within first twelve
months were classified as bad, the remaining customers in the hold-out sample were
considered good.
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The results are given in Table 5.8. It is possible to say that log-logistic, log-
normal and gamma models give slightly superior prediction for Belgium and the
Netherlands and especially for 'Default in 6 months'. This is in line with hazard plots
(Figure 5.4) when the peaks in hazards during the first 6 months were observed, so if
one would expect some difference in results that would be during the first months.
The hazard peak for Germany was least pronounced, and hence there is no marked
difference between the predictive ability of survival models. It should be noted
though that even for Belgium and the Netherlands the differences are marginal and
do not give enough grounds to conclude that log-logistic, log-normal or gamma
should be preferred to more robust exponential and PH models. Perhaps, the
superiority of AFT models may be more visible in different credit scoring
applications (e.g. insurance) where there is a more pronounced time structure.
Table 5.8 Survival models tested for alternative definitions of default
Model Default n 6 months Default in 12 months
AUROC Error rate AUROC Error rate
Belgium
Exponential 0.7225 8.30% 0.7225 13.20%
Weibull 0.7224 8.26% 0.7225 13.26%
Loglogistic 0.7232 8.30% 0.7229 13.26%
Lognormal 0.7235 8.22% 0.7223 13.40%
Gamma 0.7234 8.12% 0.7218 13.44%
PH 0.7226 8.32% 0.7224 13.26%
The Netherlands
Exponential 0.8241 7.36% 0.8036 12.24%
Weibull 0.8249 7.38% 0.8037 12.20%
Loglogistic 0.8255 7.24% 0.8046 12.22%
Lognormal 0.8262 7.26% 0.8052 12.24%
Gamma 0.8263 7.26% 0.8053 12.26%
PH 0.8242 7.26% 0.8036 12.22%
Germany
Exponential 0.7649 7.02% 0.7483 12.56%
Weibull 0.7639 7.02% 0.7482 12.54%
Loglogistic 0.7639 7.00% 0.7483 12.56%
Lognormal 0.7637 7.00% 0.7482 12.52%
Gamma 0.7635 6.98% 0.7480 12.50%
PH 0.7642 7.04% 0.7484 12.58%
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5.4.5 Performance of generic models
Three basic types of models were selected for comparison between different
modelling approaches in building generic models: the exponential model to represent
the family of parametric models, the PH non-parametric model and logistic
regression. In this section only full models (containing all common variables with all
categories, both significant and insignificant) are considered, so that comparison
could be made with the exponential AFT model.
The generic models were applied to four hold-out samples: a generic one that
consists of residents of the three countries, and three national samples, the predictive
performance was measured by AUROC (Table 5.9a) and error rate (Table 5.9b). The
national LR models are used as a benchmark for comparison of performance of
generic models on the corresponding national hold-out sample. The best predicting
generic model is marked in bold.
Table 5.9a) Predictive performance of generic models. AUROC
Model Hold-out sample
Belgium The Netherlands Germany Generic
National LR 0.7129 0.7814 0.7417 N/A
Generic models, no country indicators
Generic LR 0.7027 0.7790 0.7316 0.7465
Generic EXP 0.7029 0.7777 0.7315 0.7464
Generic PH 0.7031 0.7777 0.7315 0.7463
Generic models, country indicators
Generic LR 0.7047 0.7799 0.7316 0.7477
Generic EXP 0.7047 0.7785 0.7315 0.7475
Generic PH 0.7048 0.7785 0.7315 0.7475
Generic PH models, stratification / baseline
Stratified PH, no
baseline
0.7048 0.7786 0.7314 0.7438
Stratified PH,
baseline
0.7048 0.7786 0.7314 0.7469
Generic PH,
baseline
0.7031 0.7777 0.7315 0.7473
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Table 5.9b) Predictive performance of generic models. Error rate
Model Hold-out sample
Belgium The Netherlands Germany Generic
National LR 16.92% 16.50% 15.74% N/A
Generic models, no country indicators
Generic LR 17.02% 16.68% 16.16% 16.48%
Generic EXP 17.06% 16.68% 16.16% 16.54%
Generic PH 17.08% 16.68% 16.16% 16.54%
Generic models, country indicators
Generic LR 16.90% 16.60% 16.16% 16.58%
Generic EXP 16.80% 16.62% 16.18% 16.62%
Generic PH 16.72% 16.62% 16.18% 16.64%
Generic PH mode s, stratification / country baseline
Stratified PH, no
baseline
16.74% 16.62% 16.18% 16.50%
Stratified PH,
baseline
16.74% 16.62% 16.18% 16.64%
Generic PH,
baseline
17.08% 16.68% 16.16% 16.66%
The customized national models still give slightly better prediction, while
three generic models (LR,EXP, PH) demonstrate an amazingly close performance.
One can argue that logistic regression is slightly superior, but again the difference is
marginal. The inclusion of the country indicator leads to a very modest improvement
in predictive ability of models, if any at all. The error rate for the generic hold-out
sample even demonstrates a slight loss in the discriminating power.
An important property of the PH model is its ability to take into account
different subpopulations that may exist within the data, while producing a single set
of parameter estimates that does not include a subpopulation indicator. This process
is called stratification and is commonly used for subpopulations that violate the
proportionality assumption. It should be noted, though, that in order to use this
property one needs to know the applicant's country of residence. Still it will be
useful in situations when 'nationality' is not legally forbidden, and lenders can
replace several national models with a generic one that accounts for different
subpopulations due to stratification.
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The following model is fitted to data:
log h(t)=cy(t) + p'x ,
where z is a subpopulation indicator. In this way the hazard function is allowed to
vary between specified groups. The separate partial likelihood functions are
constructed for each level of z- The functions are multiplied together, and then the
values of are estimated that maximise the combined PL function. This method
presents a half way option between generic and customised models: to estimate the
parameters the country indicator is required, but the subsequent scoring of new
accounts can be done without making a distinction between the countries.
The stratified PH model has been fitted to the aggregated generic dataset (see
Table 5.9). AUROC shows no improvement on the generic hold-out sample, but
when tested separately on the national samples, there is some increase in AUROC for
Belgium and the Netherlands, although not a dramatic one. Error rate demonstrates
some superiority of the stratified approach if compared to other models, including the
logistic regression. For Belgium the stratified model shows the error rate even lower
than the national LR model.
Further, although a baseline hazard function cancels out of the PH partial
likelihood model for ft, as was shown in Section 5.2.5.2, a baseline survivor function
can be obtained by non-parametric methods taking into account the estimates of /?
from a fitted PH model, see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
The PH model can be written as:
S(t)=[S0(t)] exK/7'v;
where So(t) is a baseline survivor function. With the baseline survivor function
estimate it is possible to generate probabilities of surviving to time T, and to use
different country baseline hazard functions when scoring the new applications.
When the country baseline estimates were raised to the power of the generic
stratified and non-stratified PH scores, this showed some improvement in AUROC,
but on the other hand, deterioration in error rate. The national measures remained
unchanged since this monotonic transformation does not change the ranking of
applications.
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In general, one can conclude that stratification brings some benefit but not a
convincing one. Such modest improvements can be attributed to the fact that the
hazards between the countries are roughly proportionate, so there is little scope for
stratification to enhance the predictive performance. Overall, generic models, as
given in Table 5.9, do not demonstrate a notable difference in predictive accuracy,
which is further confirmed by inconsistencies between two measures: AUROC and
error rate.
5.4.6 Predicting early defaulters
The examination of the hazard functions in Figure 5.4 shows that the hazard
is the highest at the early stages of the credit life. It would be of interest to
investigate whether any of the generic models developed in the previous section are
superior in predicting 'early' defaulters, the group of applicants which is, probably,
least wanted by credit grantors.
We defined an 'early' period as the time period of the first 8 months because:
1) after month 8 the hazard curves remain roughly constant;
2) nearly 50% of bad credits that were observed during 25 months, defaulted
within the first 8 months.
So the cardholders that missed two consecutive payments during 8 months
were classified as 'bad', and survival analysis and logistic regression generic models
were tested for their ability to predict this category of applicants. For the survival
analysis methods a change of the definition of 'bad' did not present a problem, since
both AFT and PH models developed in the previous section could be used to predict
the probability of survival to any specific time period. The logistic regression model
could only generate a probability of defaulting in 25 months, so a different LR model
was estimated that modelled the probability of defaulting in 8 months. However, the
'25 months' models were also included in the experiment, since one can argue that
applicants with higher probability of default in 25 months will default earlier than
those with lower chances of default in 25 months.
The results are given in Table 5.10.
136
Table 5.10a) Predicting 'early' defaulters. AUROC
Model Hold-out sample
Belgium The Netherlands Germany Generic
Generic models, no country indicators, Section 5.4.6
LR (25m) 0.7050 0.8105 0.7499 0.7620
EXP 0.7062 0.8096 0.7503 0.7625
PH 0.7064 0.8095 0.7503 0.7623
Generic models, re-estimated
LR (8m) 0.7009 0.8120 0.7493 0.7603
Time-dependent
PH (25m)
0.7054 0.8101 0.7503 0.7621
Time-dependent
PH (8m)
0.7016 0.8101 0.7491 0.7598
Table 5.10b) Predicting 'early' defaulters. Error rate
Model Hold-out sample
Belgium The Netherlands Germany Generic
Generic models, no country indicators, Section 5.4.6
LR (25m) 10.00% 9.36% 9.34% 9.66%
EXP 10.06% 9.38% 9.34% 9.66%
PH 10.06% 9.38% 9.34% 9.66%
Generic models, re-estimated
LR (8m) 9.98% 9.18% 9.26% 9.48%
Time-dependent
PH (25m)
10.02% 9.26% 9.36% 9.60%
Time-dependent
PH (8m)
9.92% 9.22% 9.30% 9.50%
The PH model can be extended to model time-dependency (Cox (1972),
Stablein et al. (1981)), and this is another common way to handle the variables that
show the non-proportionate behaviour. If the effect of the variables changes with
time, this can be included into the model as a variable-by-time interaction:
log h (t)=az(t) + (Vx +/xt, or log h (t)=Oz(t) + (/?' +/t)x .
So if y is positive, the effect of a variable increases linearly with time, if it is
negative, the effect decreases with time. First, t was allowed to take values from 1 to
25 months, this is marked in Table 5.10 as PH (25m). With this specification the
estimate of y shows how much the effect increases/decreases every month. The
parameter estimates are given in Appendix, A24.
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To evaluate the chances of the borrowers to be bad in the first 8 months, the
following score was used:
(/?' +/t)x , where t = 8.
Second, the time variable was dichotomised, with t = 1 representing months
from 1 to 8, this is marked as PH (8m) in Table 5.10. As can be seen from Table 5.10
incorporating time-dependency has a limited effect on prediction. This can be
explained by weak time effects. In fact, as the output in Appendix A24 shows, there
are only 6 variable-by-time interactions that are significant at 5% level. This also
explains why the exponential model with its 'lack of memory' predicts well on this
dataset.
Overall, there is no evidence that any of the models tested consistently
outperformed the others.
5.4 Conclusions
This Chapter presented the first cross-country comparison of survival analysis
applied to modelling time to default. Besides, the analysis was conducted on a
revolving credit product, which is different from previous studies that analysed fixed
term loans. In addition, different approaches within survival analysis were
investigated.
The analysis of this Chapter supports the previous findings that survival
analysis is competitive with the logistic regression in application to credit scoring.
The comparison of several approaches within survival analysis showed that there was
little difference in classification accuracy between the parametric AFT, non-
parametric Cox proportional hazards models and logistic regression.
So from the point of view of prediction, any of the tested approaches can be
used. However, survival analysis offers a number of benefits that potentially makes it
superior if compared to logistic regression. First, predictions can be generated that
give the probability of 'survival' in specific time period, without the necessity of re-
estimating the model to fit this time period, as is the case with logistic regression.
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Second, by means of stratification it is possible to account for differences
between subgroups in the population without including the subgroup indicator
explicitly into the model. And third, it is possible to incorporate the variable effects
that change with time.
It has been shown in this Chapter that countries used in analysis demonstrate
different survival patterns, with Belgium and Germany being close to each other,
whilst the Netherlands exhibiting the higher chances to default. The examination of
the negative log-survival curves (Figure 5.2) suggests that the exponential model is a
suitable approximation for all three countries.
But in spite of the observed differences, generic models demonstrate only a
very slight loss in predictive power as compared to national models, in line with
results of Chapter 4. Again there is practically no difference between generic logistic
regression, exponential AFT and semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards models.
Because the hazard functions are roughly proportionate between the countries,
stratification has a very limited effect. So does the inclusion of variable-by-time
interactions, which can be explained by weak time effects.
Weak time effects together with the fact that the exponential model with its
'lack of memory' property fits the data well suggest that revolving credit may be
different from the fixed term loans in that it may have a more random character.
However, this proposition needs to be tested on other datasets.
It has been shown that survival analysis is suitable for building generic
models for predicting default. The next Chapter will investigate the possibility of
using survival analysis to predict time to the next purchase in generic models.
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Chapter 6. Predicting time to the second purchase
6.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter it was shown that national and generic survival
analysis models are competitive with the logistic regression models in predicting
default. Whilst predictive accuracy of these models is very similar, survival analysis
offers an additional advantage of having a time perspective, thus laying the
foundation for profit scoring.
However, in the context of revolving credit it is also important to consider the
usage of the credit product - a retail card in this case- when trying to estimate profit.
For example, there may be a good customer that never goes into arrears, but at the
same time makes only one purchase, repays it quickly and never uses the card again.
On the contrary, a bad customer (according to the traditional definition) may fall
behind with payments, but then may repay everything subsequently and make several
new purchases on the card. The first customer, though presenting a lower risk of
default, would also yield less profit than the second customer.
The objective of this Chapter is to explore the possibility of predicting the
future usage of the card. Usage can be described in a number of ways: one may
consider a binary outcome, whether a customer uses the card after the first purchase
again or not; or one may try to predict the number or total value of purchases.
With fierce competition in both the lending and retailing sectors, it is the time
component that becomes of extreme importance. Knowledge of projected time to the
next purchase can be helpful in deciding how quickly the lender's intervention is
required in order to retain a potentially profitable customer. That is why this Chapter
considers the time to the second purchase, in order to provide insight into an
appropriate time scale for the actions that have to be taken by the lender. This
investigation is complemented by an exploration of national differences in
purchasing behaviour and the possibility of accommodating these differences by a
single generic model.
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The analysis presented in this Chapter investigates the incremental roles of
information which becomes available at various stages of the credit management
process in explaining the time taken until the borrower makes a second purchase. It is
established that the best prediction can be achieved by using a combination of
application and behavioural variables and that characteristics of the first purchase
and the remaining credit available are the most powerful predictors. The significance
of behavioural data increases with time, whereas the application characteristics
gradually loose some of their discriminating power. So behavioural scoring
considerably enhances the ability to predict when a second purchase will be made.
Lenders could use this kind of 'purchase scoring' to assess the chances of the
purchase in the next month, and therefore forecast their cash flow and adjust
customers' credit limits.
The Chapter is structured in the following way: Section 2 summarises
previous research on the prediction of usage, Section 3 describes the approach taken
and the data available for analysis. Section 4 presents the results on the country basis
and investigates the value of different levels of information in explaining time to the
next purchase: personal characteristics, characteristics of the first product purchased
and transactional behavioural data. Section 5 reports on the predictive performance
of the national models. Section 6 investigates the differences in the purchasing
behaviour of the customers who go into delinquency and those that do not. Section 7
compares the predictive performance of the generic models to the national
alternatives. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
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6.2. Literature review on predicting usage
Whilst predicting default is a well-established technique in credit scoring,
estimation of usage is far less common. However, estimated usage can be extremely
important in selecting an appropriate credit limit and this will have a significant
effect on the customer's spending behaviour. Normally the credit limit is initially
assigned on the basis of the applicant's risk score and income (Thomas et al. (2002)).
The credit limit is then reviewed in one year's time on the basis of a behavioural
score, which is as a rule risk oriented (Oxley (2003)).
The number of studies that have investigated the propensity to use a credit
product is relatively limited. Research has concentrated predominantly on
discrimination between users and non-users of credit cards (Lindley et al. (1989),
Crook et al. (1992), White (1975), Carow and Staten (1999)) or on predicting
different levels of usage (Volker (1982), Hirschman (1982), Banasik et al. (2001)).
It was found that the following determinants of the customer's propensity to
repeatedly use a revolving credit product were most important:
age (Crook et al. (1992), White (1975), Carow and Staten (1999), Volker (1982)),
race (Lindley et al. (1989), White (1975)),
marital status (White (1975), Banasik et al. (2001)),
gender (White (1975)),
education (Carow and Staten (1999)),
skilled/unskilled indicator (Volker (1982)),
customer's views and attitude to different payment methods (Hirschman (1982)),
residential status (Crook et al. (1992), Banasik et al. (2001)),
number of residents in the household (Lindley et al. (1989)),
postcode (Crook et al. (1992)),
years at address (Crook et al. (1992)),
income (Lindley et al. (1989), Crook et al. (1992), Banasik et al. (2001)),
spouse's income (Banasik et al. (2001)),
number of cards held (Carow and Staten (1999)),
length of holding the card / years at bank (Lindley et al. (1989), White (1975),
Crook et al. (1992)),
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the highest outstanding credit card debt (White (1975)),
current outstanding balance (White (1975)),
size of the transaction (White (1975)),
outgoings (Banasik et al. (2001)).
The techniques used involved binary and multinomial logit, a probit
regression. Banasik et al. (2001) looked at the 'desired' usage of the card holders as
opposed to the observed usage, incorporating the credit-constrained aspect into the
analysis and thus correcting for the sample selection bias. Only a few studies have
investigated the time between purchases/ transactions. Till (2001) provided an
investigation of the form of the distribution underlying the time between transactions
for a store card. It was shown that the number of transactions up to time T can be
modelled by a Negative Binomial, and that the times between transactions follow a
Weibull distribution.
Ansell et al. (2001) examined the purchasing behaviour of the customers of
an insurance company with the aim of deciding on the marketing strategy. The
customers were segmented into defined groups, and the behaviour of these groups
was explored. The major determinants were found to be age and financial
sophistication. Younger and less sophisticated customers tended to make further
purchases quickly or not to make them at all. The response from older and more
sophisticated customers was more extended in time and it was not possible to
determine the point beyond which they would not be expected to come back.
Thomas et al. (2003) also found age and financial status variables to be
powerful predictors of the propensity to purchase financial products from an
insurance company. In addition, economic variables (the consumer confidence index,
changes in FTSE ALL Share index, House Price Index, average earning index and
bank interest rate) had a strong and significant effect on the purchase behaviour. The
study compared an analysis of multiple purchases to a separate purchase event
analysis, and found that the magnitude and significance of most coefficients were
similar, indicating relative insensitivity of results to segmentation on the number of
purchases. This result justifies the decision to limit the scope of investigation of the
current research to the second purchase only.
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One of the most important issues is combining the results of estimating usage
with the probability to default. Segmentation appears to be a standard approach. The
common strategy for reviewing the credit limit is described in Thomas et al. (2002)
when a measure of risk, a behavioural score, is split into a number bands and is
tabulated against some measure of return, e.g. a monthly credit turnover, that is also
categorised into bands. A credit limit is assigned to each cross-section between
behavioural scores bands and credit turnover bands. It is noted though, that limits are
chosen subjectively in the majority of cases. Banasik et al. (2001) showed that
segmentation based on card usage improved the prediction of the customer's
repayment performance. Oxley (2003) also reported a significant improvement in a
portfolio's profitability from setting the credit limit by segmenting the customers on
the basis of predicted usage and the likelihood of default, as compared to
segmentation when usage was not taken into account.
6.3 Approach taken and data description
The data relates to a store card used in three different European countries, the
same store card that was considered in previous chapters. The card is offered by a
major international bank through a range of stores selling 'white' durable goods. The
store card is normally taken out at the time of a first purchase under different
agreement types: budget, deferred. Thus apart from selling some piece of
merchandise at this initial point, the store receives the opportunity to develop a
relationship with the customer with a view of further potential purchases. The lender
is also interested in developing this relationship into profitable active usage of the
card. In planning a retention strategy, it is necessary to know which individuals are
going the make a subsequent purchase and when they are going to make it.
Figure 6.1 represents three routes that the customer can follow when s/he
enters the system of revolving credit after making the first purchase:
1) go into delinquency, which will be manifested by increase in balance because of
the missed monthly payments;
2) make the second purchase, which will also lead to balance increase;
3) repay the cost of the first purchased product without going into delinquency or
making the second purchase, thus the balance will decrease or stay at 0.
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It is assumed that the customer cannot make the purchase and miss the
monthly payment simultaneously - there is at least one time period (month)
separating these two events. The customer can leave the system either by closing the
account after having repaid the cost of the purchase or by going into default so that
the cost is eventually written off by the lender.
The interest of the current study focuses on the customer's propensity to take
the two routes that will lead to the balance increase as represented in Figure 6.1. The
previous chapter investigated the customer's propensity to default and looked at how
quickly this can happen. This chapter investigates the propensity for further
purchase. No desire to use the card further is difficult to observe. Whilst there is a
special marker for closed accounts, only a small proportion of accounts have it
(Table 5.2, 'Randomly right-censored' category). At the same time quite a significant
number of accounts do not make the second purchase, although the account is not
closed.
Figure 6.1 Potential Behaviour of the Customer
Figure 6.2 displays the behaviour of five typical customers. Customer A
makes the second purchase within the study period and then continues on potentially
to make further purchases. Customer B goes into delinquency and may or may not
continue. Customer C does not make a further purchase within the study period.
Customer C could either be one who will eventually make a second purchase or an
individual who has no intention to make a second purchase. Customer D defaults (i.e.
misses 2 consecutive payments, according to the definition of default adopted in
previous chapters), but then makes repayments and so can make a further purchase
before the end of the study period. Customer E makes a second purchase and defaults
afterwards.
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Figure 6.2. Different types of the observed behaviour
Time of the first End of Study
purchase
As a starting point, time to the second purchase is considered ignoring the
impact of default. In this formulation all the customers that do not make a second
purchase are censored at the end of the observation period. Another possible
approach would be the competing risks model. However, this model assumes that the
customer, after experiencing the event (increase in balance due to the purchase or
missed payment), leaves the risk set, which is not the case in the context of the data.
Under the competing risk formulation Customer D would be censored at the point of
default and the subsequent purchase would be discarded from the analysis.
The time was measured from the point of the first purchase until the second
purchase or until the end of the observation period. The period of observation ranged
from 12 months to 25 months, the time to the second purchase could be from 2
months to 25 months.
Chapter 5 considered AFT and PH approaches within survival analysis. It
was shown that AFT and PH models were very close in predictive accuracy, hence
the choice of the model can be based on the additional benefits the approach can
offer. The analysis in this chapter is based on the proportional hazards model because
of its ability to handle time-dependent covariates. This feature is extremely useful in
entering the behavioural data, as will be shown below. In order to retain only
significant variables in the model, a stepwise selection procedure was applied.
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The basic model to be estimated is
h(t)=ho(t)efj'x,
where ho is an unspecified baseline hazard function, * is the vector of covariates and
P is the vector of parameters that need to be estimated.
Information that can be used to predict the purchase can be grouped into 3
major categories:
information about the applicant (personal data),
information about the first intended purchase (purchase data),
transactional information after the credit has been granted (behavioural data).
It is of interest to investigate the value of each information level in predicting
time to the next purchase. A list of the characteristics used is presented in Table 6.1.
Their values/levels were coarse-classified according to similarity in pj where pj
denotes the probability that those cases within a coarse category, j, make a second
purchase, and transformed into binary dummy variables, see Thomas et al. (2002).
Table 6.1 Variables used in the analysis




Occupation (Full-time, part-time, self-employed, etc.)
Age
Time at address since 18 years old
Time in employment










Behavioural Difference between the outstanding balance and credit
limit at period
Delinquency status at period t,-
Percent of outstanding balance repaid at period t.
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So for each of the three countries the proportional hazard models were fitted
using all levels of information. The added value of each level of information was
measured by the difference in Log Likelihood, which shows how much variation in
data is accounted for by the model. The improvement in the model predictive power
was measured by AUROC and error rate.
The transactional behavioural data changes every time period and two related
ways of entering it into the model were examined:
1. by incorporating all information available for 25 months,
h(t)=eP'x + y'z<-ihQ(t),
where z is a vector of time-varying behavioural variables and x is a vector of static
application variables.
2. by entering the information which is only available at a certain period of
time, an approach suggested by Stepanova (2001), Stepanova and Thomas
(2001). The model which was estimated can be written as
h'(t) = ell'<s>x+T'"*-hl(t),
where s indicates the number of time periods elapsed since the first purchase.
With both approaches the parameters for time-dependent variables are re-
estimated at each period of time. But the first approach produces parameter estimates
aggregated over the whole period of observation, thus uses the most complete
information available. The second approach explicitly breaks down the partial
likelihood estimation for each time period, tailoring the parameters to a given point
in time, and although it uses a limited amount of historical information, this
information is the most recent and probably, most relevant information.
We investigated the value of historical behavioural information. The initial
assumption was that all information needed to predict the next purchase is the most
recent one. However, inclusion of lagged variables improved the model fit (see
Section 6.4.3.3), and it is likely that adding more lagged variables would improve the
model fit further. Nevertheless, the decision was taken not to continue the
exploration in this direction, since it was shown by Stepanova (2001) that
incorporating all behavioural information accumulated to date resulted in high
collinearity among the model parameters with a very modest increase in predictive
accuracy.
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6.4 National patterns in describing time to the next purchase
Table 6.2 provides the size of the samples used in the analysis. Each dataset
was randomly split into 70% (training sample) and 30% (hold-out). The hold-out
sample was reserved for testing the predictive ability of the models.
Table 6.2 shows that the most active buyers are the Dutch card-holders, and
Germans are the least active ones. There is also a notable difference in the percentage
of censored observations between good and bad payers for all three countries.
Table 6.2 Samples used in modelling time to the second purchase.
Performance Total 2-nd purchase Censored %Censored
Belgium
Good 22708 16648 6060 26.69%
Bad 3084 1634 1450 47.02%
Total 25792 18282 7510 29.12%
The Netherlands
Good 24520 19515 5005 20.41%
Bad 7589 4141 3448 45.43%
Total 32109 23656 8453 26.33%
Germany
Good 66939 45217 21722 32.45%
Bad 8909 4529 4380 49.16%
Total 75848 49746 26102 34.41%
The samples selected in this Chapter do not match exactly the samples used
previously. Some agreement types in the Dutch dataset showed very low chances of
making the second purchase. It was decided to remove these observations from the
analysis, because most likely it was the condition of the agreement that prevented the
second purchase. Further, it was decided to limit the analysis of the time to the
second purchase to agreement types common to all three countries. Otherwise the
samples were as used in Chapter 4.
The baseline survival curve in Figure 6.3 shows that 50% of the customers
have made a second purchase within 3 months in the Netherlands, within 6 months in
Belgium and within 7 months in Germany. Approximately one third of the card¬
holders do not make a second purchase within 25 months. The curve will be slightly
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affected by the accounts that were not observed for the whole period of 25 months.
Censored customers can be considered as a lost opportunity, since potentially these
customers could have made more purchases within the time period observed.
T ime
Belgium The Netherlands -+- Germany
6.4.1 Personal data
Personal characteristics are normally used by the lender to estimate the risk of
default and thus to make a decision whether to accept an applicant or not. It is of
interest to see whether this information can provide any insights into the likelihood
of repeated purchase. The parameter estimates from applying stepwise proportional
hazards using just the personal data are in Table 6.3 column 1. The hazard ratios
(exponentiated parameters, sometimes referred to as Relative Risk or Risk Ratio) are
given in Appendix, A25.
There are notable similarities and also differences between countries. 'Home
Phone Given' indicates higher chances of making the second purchase in Germany,
but it is not significant in the other two countries. Number of children is insignificant
for Belgium, in Germany families with a greater number of kids are more active
buyers, and in the Netherlands the customers that make the second purchase fastest
are those that do not provide any information about their children.
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Whilst for Belgium and Germany widows are more active spenders on the
card, marital status variables are not significant in the Netherlands. For all three
countries those in rented accommodation and only recently at address are more likely
to make a further purchase on the card. Self-employed people seem to be poor buyers
across the three countries. Type of business appears to be significant in Belgium, but
since there is no explanation behind the code used by the lender, it is impossible to
match the categories selected in the Belgian model with other countries. For the
Netherlands those working in catering and retailing are more active users than those
that receive benefit or work through an agency. And in Germany education,
healthcare and service workers are less likely to make the second purchase than the
other professional groups.
Applicant's Age, which is normally found highly significant in estimating
default (Crook (1997)), does not enter the Belgian model. In the Netherlands people
between 22 and 30 are less likely to make the second purchase, while in Germany the
chances of making the second purchase first, increase with age, but after 30 start to
go down. Longer years on job are associated with less likelihood of the purchase for
Germany and the Netherlands, whereas in Belgium Time on Job is not selected into
the model.
Table 6.4 presents the application variables ranked in the order of
significance, when several variables of one characteristic entered the model, only the
most significant one was selected in order to simplify the comparison. It is
interesting to note that top rows are taken by occupation, type of business and
residential status.
However, the variation accounted for by the application model is modest. As
can be seen from Table 6.6 the difference in Log Likelihood between the application
model and no covariates model is only from 99 (Belgium) to 224 (Germany).
Looking at the prediction results (Table 6.8) one cannot say that personal data is a
powerful predictor. With AUROC ranging between 0.553 (Belgium) and 0.571
(Germany) the performance of the personal data models is only marginally better
than the random classification into two classes. So additional information is needed
in order to make better decisions on the retention of customers.
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Table 6.4 Personal characteristics ranked in order of importance
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Occupation: Self-employed Number of kids - no info Occupation: Self-
employed
Type of business - 21 Occupation: Self-
employed
Type of business: Service
Marital status-Widowed Residential: Renting Residential: Renting
house/flat house/flat





Spouse age: 35-47 Age: 21 - 29
Age: 22-31 Home phone given
Time on job: 3y -lOy Kids: 3+
Spouse age: 40-62
Time on job: 7.5y -lOy
Time at address: 6m - 2y
6.4.2 Purchase data
Information about the first purchase made or about the intended first purchase
expands the scope of the analysis to include such characteristics as the nature of the
initial product, its price, agreement type, date of payment and whether the customer
is taking out insurance on either the card or credit. The results of fitting both
personal and purchase data together using the stepwise model are presented in Table
6.3 and Appendix, A25, column 2.
It is notable that the variables previously included appear again with only
minor modification in the parameter estimates, suggesting there are no apparent
problems with collinearity. For Belgium, the main changes are the introduction of
Age and Spouse's Age, and the downgrading of Time at Address. Younger
individuals are more likely not to make a second purchase as are those without a
spouse, and hence the effect on Time at Address is seen.
For the Netherlands, Marital Status appears, and single/ widowed group
shows lower chances to make a purchase (unlike Belgium and Germany). More age
categories enter that show the increasing tendency for purchase with increasing age.
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In Germany some application variables leave the model (e.g., Marital Status),
indicating that this information is replaced by the information contained in the
purchase variables. There are changes in the age categories selected, but the trend
remains unchanged: younger and older customers are poorer buyers compared to
middle-aged customers.
Nearly all purchase variables enter. Not taking card insurance seems to be an
indicator of less likelihood of further purchase for the three countries. No credit
insurance implies a greater chance of purchase for Belgium and the Netherlands, but
is not selected by the German model. Product type is highly significant. Those
buying computers seem to have relatively lower potential for a subsequent purchase.
In Belgium phone buyers exhibit the higher chances for the second purchase,
whereas in Germany and the Netherlands the higher likelihood for the repeated
purchase is associated with the initial purchase of a TV or video. Those who buy
lower cost items initially are more likely to make the second purchase on the card.
This may be explained by the fact that they need less time to repay the cost of a
product.
The payment date has a varying effect. In Belgium those making payments
later in the month are more likely to use the card again, but Germany shows the
opposite trend. For agreement type those using budget plans in Belgium are much
more likely to make further purchases on the card, but less likely to do so in
Germany. In the Netherlands agreement type was found to be strongly associated
with payment date, that is why, the two characteristics were combined together.
Those with budget agreement making payments on the 1st day of the month have the
highest chances for a repeated purchase, chances of deferred agreement schemes are
slightly less, but still higher if compared to other agreement types.
But for all three countries agreement type, payment day and product price are
the most powerful discriminators that outweigh the application variables in
significance (Table 6.5). The model fitted accounts for considerably more variation
than the previous model. The range of improvement (Table 6.6) is between 979
(Belgium) and 7097 (Germany). This translates into quite considerable increases in
predictive accuracy (Table 6.8a) from 0.553 to 0.689 (Belgium) and from 0.571 to
0.812 (the Netherlands).
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Table 6.5 Personal and purchase variables ranked in order of importance
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Agreement type - budget Agreement*pay date:
budget*01
Pay date 01
Price < =10,000 BF Product: computers Price: under 750
Pay date 14,15 Price: under 400 NLG No card insurance
Age : under 21 No card insurance Agreement type -
budget
Self-employed Age: under 22 Kids: 3+
No credit insurance Occupation: Self-employed Residential: Renting
house/flat
Marital status-Widowed Residential: parents Home phone given
Product type- computers Home phone given Product: kitchen
Type of business - 21 No credit insurance Age: 55+








No card insurance Marital status: Single,
widowed
Time at address: 6m -
2y
Time at address : 6 mths -
1 yr
Spouse age: 35-47
Time on job: 1 yr Time on job: 1.5 - 3y
6.4.3 Transactional information
6.4.3.1 Credit availability
After the credit limit is assigned and the card is issued, the transactions are
recorded on a monthly basis. It is of interest to see how much behavioural measures
add to the predictive accuracy of the models.
Variables representing the customer's behaviour vary with time and therefore
there is a need to decide how they should be fitted into the model. At the point of
initial purchase it is possible to calculate the difference between the outstanding
balance and the credit limit. This variable is called 'amount to spend', (ATS), and
represents the credit availability to the customer when s/he first enters the credit
agreement.
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There are several modelling options. First, one can use ATS at the time of the
first purchase, period 1. This value of ATS is denoted as ATSi. The results when
using this variable are presented in Table 6.3, column 3.
However, it seems more likely that the most recent ATS will provide a better
explanation for an individual's second purchase. Hence the second model
contemplated was to include the ATS for the period preceding the second purchase
into the model as a time-varying variable, ATSt-i. Here one can use the training
sample for the whole period of observation to estimate the parameters of the static
application variables and time-varying ATSt-i. This means that at each stage of partial
likelihood estimation a different value of ATS will be entered into the model and that
will be done for all 25 periods. The results of fitting this second model are given in
Table 6.3, column 4.
Introduction of either ATSi or ATSt-i results in a small number of variables
leaving the model, e.g. Applicant's Age for Belgium, Spouse's Age for the
Netherlands and Occupation for Germany. But overall, the parameters remain
unchanged. For all three countries ATS variables are significant and have a major
effect. As expected, those with higher values of ATS are more likely to make the
second purchase.
The reduction in the magnitude of Log Likelihood (Table 6.6) indicates that
most recent ATS is superior to the ATS at the point of first purchase. For ATSi the
reduction as compared to the 'Personal + Purchase' model ranges from 94 (the
Netherlands) to 298 (Belgium). Time-varying ATSt.i leads to a reduction of 478 (the
Netherlands) to 1508 (Germany), emphasising the importance of recent ATS over
initial ATS.
Looking at all models that incorporate the information sequentially, as it
arises, it is possible to conclude that for Belgium the most marked improvement in
the model fit is observed when the first purchase information is added and when the
most recent ATS enters the model. For the Netherlands and Germany the
improvement is the most notable one with purchase characteristics available.
Although ATS also decreases the magnitude of Log Likelihood, it cannot really
match the scale of improvement obtained from knowledge about the characteristics
of the initial purchase.
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Table 6.6 Log Likelihood statistics for models with different levels of
information
Model Log L df Log L difference12
Belgium
No covariates -120280
Personal data -120181 9 99
Personal+purchase -119202 23 979
Personal+purchase +ATSi -118904 23 298
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -117999 20 905
The Netherlands
No covariates -161015
Personal data -160873 12 142
Personal+purchase -157876 27 2997
Personal+purchase +ATSi -157782 26 94
Personal+purchase +ATSt.i -157304 25 478
Germany
No covariates -369628
Personal data -369404 16 224
Personal+purchase -362307 20 7097
Personal+purchase +ATSi -362106 25 201
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -360598 24 1508
An alternative approach to fitting the model with time-varying ATSt-i over 25
months would be to re-estimate the model at each time period, as was suggested by
Stepanova (2001) and Stepanova and Thomas (2001). Thus for every time period t
the model is fitted to the training risk set which only includes accounts that have
survived up to this period. The approach has an advantage of giving a snapshot of
parameter estimates at each month, so it is possible to see the dynamics of the
parameter changes. However, since, as the baseline survival curves (Figure 6.3)
show, the second purchase is made fairly quickly, the risk set will be shrinking
rapidly, and after 12 months there will be 40% or even less remaining of the original
sample. So the decision was made to estimate the parameters for the first 10 months,
the period of the greatest interest, because the majority of events take place within
this period.
12 The difference is taken between the models in 'adjacent' rows, e.g., LL difference for
'personal+purchase' model is the LL taken from the LL of the 'personal' model
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The score (fi'x) from the 'Personal+Purchase' model was used at each time
period instead of the list of personal and purchase variables. This has the limitation
of loosing any time-varying patterns that may exist between behavioural variables
that were allowed to change with time and personal and purchase variables that were
entered into the model as a single 'application score'. But the gain was a much
higher speed of estimation and, besides, the main objective was to look at how
parameters of behavioural variables change over time.
For Belgium, the initial coarse-classification of ATS involved 5 categories.
Since the number of people falling into the category of 'No amount to spend' was
rapidly going down with time, it was decided to group this category with 'Over credit
limit'. For the Netherlands and Germany ATS was split into 4 categories in both the
'total observation period' model and the 'specific time period' model.
As can be seen from Figure 6.4 in all three countries two categories with the
higher values of ATS (groups 3 and 4) demonstrate a roughly proportional effect at
each time point. But in Belgium and the Netherlands these groups deviate from 0,
indicating the increasing importance with time and decreasing chances for the second
purchase. In Germany these two groups converge to 0. Group 2, the group with the
smaller ATS values, stays proportional to groups 3 and 4 most of the time in
Belgium and Germany, but closer to period 10 crosses these other two lines. This can
be an indication of increased variability because of the shrinking risk set. Groupl
'Over credit limit' shows a very different behaviour, these accounts are becoming
less and less likely to make the 2nd purchase.
In the Netherlands Group 2 deviates from 0, but from month 4 to 9 it stays
relatively flat, indicating that accounts with this ATS have a relatively time-invariant
propensity for 2nd purchase for this period, that goes sharply down at month 10. It is
interesting to note that 'Over credit limit' fluctuates between -0.4 and -0.6 up to
month 8 then goes closer to 0. This indicates that accounts that spend beyond their
limits have a relatively unchanging probability of making the 2nd purchase during
the first 8 months.
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Figure 6.4 Parameter estimates for Amount to Spend within 10 months.
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6.4.3.2 Delinquency status and repayment dynamics
Delinquency status was recorded on a monthly basis, starting from the month
of the initial purchase until the end of the observation period. So starting from period
2 it was possible to use the delinquency status from the previous period. It was also
possible to observe the repayments dynamics, by looking at how much of the
outstanding balance was repaid in the previous month. For each period of time (t > 2)
three more variables were added: an indicator of 1 missed payment, an indicator of 2
or more missed payments (our definition of default), and percent repaid of the
outstanding balance at the period preceding the purchase.
The model with time-dependent behavioural variables was fitted to the risk
set of cardholders that make the purchase at period 3 and beyond. The parameter
estimates and hazard ratios are shown in Table 6.3 and Appendix A25, column 6.
Both delinquency status variables are highly significant for all three countries and
have a major effect on the time to the 2nd purchase. Percent repaid was not selected
into the model in Belgium, but turned significant in Germany and the Netherlands.
Figure 6.5 shows that the parameter estimates of application score decrease
with time for all three countries, although the character of the decrease is different.
For Belgium it happens gradually, for the Netherlands it drops abruptly between
periods 3 and 4 and then stays flat, for Germany it starts to decrease from period 7.
This is expected since the information becomes more historic. This highlights the
difference between this investigation and previous work on defaults on fixed terms
loans, (see Stepanova (2001), Stepanova and Thomas (2001)).
The behavioural aspects, on the contrary, become of greater importance over
time. The only behavioural variable that does not entirely follow this general pattern
is '1 missed payment' that gets closer to 0 for Germany and the Netherlands.
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6.4.3.3 Testing for the Markov property
The analysis presented above rests on the assumption that it is the most recent
behavioural information that is of greatest value. This is equivalent to saying that
only the status at period preceding the purchase is important, and the information
before this point is irrelevant.
An investigation of whether this assumption holds was undertaken for ATS.
The model was fitted with ATS two periods before the purchase and both ATS one
and two periods before the purchase. Table 6.7 compares the Log Likelihood
statistics for the model with ATSt-i and ATSt-2 applied to the sample of cardholders
that make the second purchase starting from period 3.
Table 6.7 Log Likelihood statistics for the ATS lagged and not lagged.
Model Log L df
Belgium
No covariates -72778
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -71590 23
Personal+purchase +ATSt-2 -71678 24
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i+ATSt.2 -71183 22
The Netherlanc s
No covariates -75997
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -79973 26
Personal+purchase +ATSt-2 -80086 25
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i+ATSt-2 -79822 29
Germany
No covariates -253266
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -245524 22
Personal+purchase +ATSt_2 -246039 22
Personal+purchase +ATSt_i+ATSt-2 -245479 25
The inclusion of ATSt-i and ATSt-2 results in quite notable increases in the
amount of variation accounted for, and both variables are significant. This suggests
that ATS has a more complicated behaviour than a first order Markov chain.
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One possible solution of incorporating the behavioural information from all
time periods preceding the event is suggested in Stepanova (2001). The model is re-
estimated for each period of time, but each time the application score is replaced by
the resulting score from the previous period model. In this way all preceding
information is accumulated in one variable. However, it was found that this resulted
in high correlation between variables, and therefore an unstable performance.
Therefore, the inclusion of historic information was not pursued further.
6.5 Predictive performance of national models
The predictive ability of the models was tested on hold-out samples taken
from risk sets for periods 1 to 6. This was done in order to see how the performance
of different models changes with time. At month 1 (initial purchase) we had a full
risk set, since no one could have made the second purchase yet. This risk set, R], was
split randomly into a development (70%) sample, D/, and a hold-out sample, Hj. The
models ('Personal', 'Personal+purchase', 'Personal+purchase + ATSi', 'Personal +
purchase +ATSt-i' and 'Application score +ATS(s)' for 5=1) were developed on D\
to predict time to the second purchase, T> 2, and tested on H\. The results are given
in Table 6.8. The number in brackets gives the number of observations in the hold¬
out sample.
Then at month 2 a risk set, R2, contained only accounts that did not make a
second purchase in this month, those accounts that did make a purchase were
removed from the risk set. The risk set, R2, was split randomly into a development
(70%) sample, D2, and a hold-out sample, H2. The development sample, D2, was
used to build the models 'Personal + purchase + Zt.1' and 'Application score
+ATS(5)', 'Application score + Z(s)' for 5=2 to predict time to the second purchase,
T > 3, with Z denoting all behavioural characteristics. These models together with
those developed on £>/ ('Personal', 'Personal+purchase', 'Personal+purchase +
ATSi', 'Personal + purchase +ATSt-0 were tested on H2. The cut-offs were set so
that the number of predicted purchases was equal to the number of actual purchases
in the corresponding hold-out sample.
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The same procedure continued up to month 6. We decided to stop after period
6 because, firstly, the size of the hold-out samples was becoming smaller with every
time period, and, secondly, the majority of events occurred within the first 6 months.
For all the models, except for 'period-specific' ones ('Application score
+ATS(s)', 'Application score + Z(s)'), the same set of parameters was applied to
each of the hold-outs (Hi to //g). 'Period-specific' models contained sets of
parameters, with each set corresponding to a certain time period.
For example, for Belgium the entry in column H4 (4688) for 'Application
score + Z(s)' model corresponds to
where s = 4. The parameter estimates for period 4 are used to predict T > 5 using the
data available at period 4 (application score, ATS, delinquency status, percent
repaid). The hold-out sample at period 4, H4 , contained 4688 observations.
The results in Table 6.8 indicate that at the period of the first purchase the
best prediction for T > 2 is obtained by including the Amount to Spend available
right after the first purchase. This may be helpful in identifying customers that are
going to make the second purchase immediately in the next period. However, for the
Netherlands and Germany the difference is not as pronounced as for Belgium, so one
can argue that early purchases can be successfully identified from the personal and
the first purchase information.
As time progresses, behavioural information enhances the predictive power.
For example (Table 6.8a), for Belgium the difference in the area under the ROC
curve between 'personal, purchase' model and 'personal, purchase, behavioural
information Zt_i' (0.643 - 0.641)= 0.002 for holdout 2, whereas for holdout 6 the
difference is (0.648-0.586)=0.062. This reinforces the view that over time the
behavioural information becomes more important. The model with the best result for
each holdout is identified in bold. For the full risk set (Hi) the best prediction is
achieved by using personal and the first purchase information and initial ATS.
Subsequently, the model that uses all behavioural information becomes a leader. For
Belgium and the Netherlands 'specific time period' models outperform 'total
observation period' models, but the German dataset shows the contrary result.
169
















Personal 0.553 0.548 0.547 0.546 0.543 0.537
Personal+purchase 0.689 0.641 0.620 0.604 0.594 0.586
Personal+purchase +ATSi 0.715 0.652 0.626 0.608 0.596 0.586
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i 0.710 0.662 0.638 0.621 0.610 0.600
Application score+ATS(s) 0.706 0.670 0.654 0.649 0.641 0.635
Personal+purchase +Zt_i 0.643 0.638 0.658 0.647 0.648















Personal 0.571 0.557 0.546 0.523 0.517 0.513
Personal+purchase 0.812 0.771 0.702 0.621 0.611 0.602
Personal+purchase +ATSi 0.820 0.776 0.709 0.629 0.620 0.611
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i 0.815 0.783 0.709 0.621 0.611 0.603
Application score+ATS(s) 0.819 0.784 0.712 0.645 0.640 0.641
Personal+purchase +Zt_i 0.778 0.700 0.633 0.632 0.626















Personal 0.553 0.548 0.541 0.537 0.534 0.533
Personal+purchase 0.774 0.752 0.728 0.704 0.693 0.684
Personal+purchase +ATS] 0.780 0.757 0.731 0.708 0.695 0.687
Personal+purchase +ATSt_i 0.774 0.759 0.738 0.716 0.704 0.694
Application score+ATS(s) 0.768 0.750 0.730 0.711 0.699 0.692
Personal+purchase +Zt_i 0.766 0.751 0.746 0.739 0.738
Application score+Z(s) 0.764 0.743 0.734 0.726 0.728
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Personal 39.34% 44.62% 45.86% 46.16% 46.68% 46.98%
Personal+purchase 30.70% 37.72% 40.40% 42.54% 43.18% 43.58%
Personal+purchase +ATS] 28.10% 37.14% 40.70% 42.36% 43.82% 43.68%
Personal+purchase +ATSt_i 28.20% 36.64% 39.60% 41.64% 42.28% 42.82%
Application score+ATS(s) 29.46% 36.62% 37.50% 39.08% 39.32% 39.84%
Personal+purchase +Zt_i 38.50% 39.54% 38.44% 38.54% 38.02%















Personal 35.58% 44.36% 46.98% 45.90% 44.50% 42.26%
Personal+purchase 21.16% 27.84% 34.16% 38.68% 38.36% 37.52%
Personal+purchase +ATS] 20.76% 27.82% 34.34% 38.52% 38.20% 37.52%
Personal+purchase +ATSt_i 21.00% 27.52% 34.38% 38.82% 38.14% 39.52%
Application score+ATS(s) 20.82% 27.82% 34.20% 36.76% 35.96% 34.38%
Personal+purchase +Zt_i 28.48% 34.66% 37.08% 36.50% 35.12%















Personal 42% 46.08% 46.92% 46.84% 45.90% 44.34%
Personal+purchase 29.02% 32.00% 33.90% 35.06% 35.06% 34.10%
Personal+purchase +ATS] 28.62% 31.44% 33.48% 34.78% 34.60% 33.68%
Personal+purchase +ATSt_i 28.98% 31.18% 33.18% 34.28% 34.08% 33.48%
Application score+ATS(s) 30.02% 32.42% 33.50% 33.88% 33.92% 33.08%
Personal+purchase +Zt_] 30.36% 31.66% 31.36% 31.24% 30.02%
Application score+Z(s) 31.08% 32.80% 32.98% 32.68% 31.08%
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6.6. Good versus Bad
The initial formulation ignored the impact of default, although it was
accounted for when the behavioural information that included delinquency status was
included into the analysis. The increase in predictive power of models with
behavioural information that was observed over time suggested that delinquent
accounts were less likely to make further purchases, as one would expect.
It would be useful to know whether there is a difference between those who
miss two consecutive payments within the observation period (Bads) and those who
do not (Goods). Figure 6.6 gives baseline survival curves for Goods and Bads for
three countries, and confirms that Goods have higher chances of making the second
purchase.
Whilst survival curves for Goods exhibit different behaviour across the
countries, especially for the Netherlands, survival curves for Bads nearly overlap,
thus indicating certain similarity (Figure 6.7).
The sample was split into non-defaulters, Good, and defaulters, Bad. The
Bads were divided into Bads after 2nd purchase and Bads before 2nd purchase. This
last group would be considered censored in the competing risks formulation, but in
fact, these are the customers that were delinquent, but then recovered and made the
second purchase, and they constitute nearly 10% of all Bads and over 15% of Bads
that make the second purchase.
Table 6.9 Number of 'Bads before/after the second purchase'
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Bads lp 1450 3448 4380
Bads after 2p 1212 3482 3963
Bads before 2p 422 659 566
Total 3084 7589 8909
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Figure 6.6 Baseline SDF by country for Good/Bad with 95% confidence
intervals, personal data
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Figure 6.7 Baseline SDF for Good/Bad with 95% confidence intervals,
personal data
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Separate models were applied to each of the samples using personal, purchase
and time-varying ATS variables. One should, however, treat the results with a degree
of caution since as usual the number of defaulters is low. This will affect the quality
of estimation and also the variables that will be deemed significant. Since the groups
were small the estimation was done on training and hold-out samples combined.
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The results are presented in Table 6.3 and Appendix A25, columns 7 to 9.
There are differences between the models arising from each sample. As might be
expected the models for the Goods are similar to that previously seen. In Belgium,
both categories of Bads are associated with 'Phone given', whilst those that default
before purchase have a new entry - number of children. Residential status, Industrial
sector, Card and Credit insurance do not appear in the models for the Bad sample.
In the Netherlands phone indicator appears for 'Bads before'. Spouse's Age
is important for both groups of Bads. No credit insurance signals higher chances of
the next purchase for 'Bads after', whereas 'credit insurance 8'13 indicates shorter
time to the second purchase for all Bads. 'Bads after' that enter into the budget
agreement with payment date other than the first day of the month, are faster buyers,
and that is different from Goods and 'Bads before' falling into the same category.
In Germany, whether 'Phone given' is irrelevant for Goods and 'Bads
before', but for 'Bads after', it indicates higher chances of the purchase. The full-
time occupation is significant for 'Bads after'. 'Bads before' have higher chances of
purchase, if they have a job in education, healthcare and their spouse is between 40
and 62, contrary to models estimated for the whole sample, where these categories
were associated with lower chances of further purchase. The price of the first
purchase shows a different trend for 'Bads before' - lower price corresponds to
longer times to the next purchase.
So there does seem to be clear differentiation between the Good and the Bad
payers, and equally there seem to be differences between the models for those who
default before purchase and after. For credit control it means that longer estimated
times to 2nd purchase signal not only a low purchase propensity, but also a higher
default risk, so these accounts should be given extra attention. If missed payments
are observed, the account may or may not recover. In the latter case it will be
eventually written off. In the former case the lender will know that the customer will
take longer time to the next purchase. So when (and if) the customer recovers, the
time to the next purchase should be estimated using a different model. In case there
was no 2nd purchase on the account, it should be a model for Bads who default before
the 2nd purchase.
13 No explanation for this category is available
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6.7 Generic model performance
The generic model was developed on the aggregated dataset that was
composed of the samples from the three countries. The composition of the generic
sample is presented in Table 6.10. The proportions of different countries were kept
roughly the same so none of the countries could dominate the generic model.
Table 6.10 Generic sample composition
Good Bad
2-nd Censored % 2-nd Censored %
purchase Censored purchase Censored
Belgium 16640 6057 26.69% 1632 1449 47.03%
The 15818 4060 20.42% 3371 2805 45.42%
Netherlands
Germany 15621 7475 32.36% 1546 1503 49.29%
Sub-total 48079 17592 26.79% 6549 5757 46.78%
Total 77977
As before, 70% of 77977 observations were used as a training sample, the
remaining 30% were reserved for testing the predictive ability of models. Several
generic models were developed, each utilising different levels of information, so that
they can be matched against the national models.
The results are summarised in Table 6.11. 'Personal' model demonstrates
some of the trends that were observed in the national model: people in rented
accommodation and recently at address are likely to make the purchase faster than
home owners and those with longer years at address. The self-employed category is
significant as before, and indicates lower chances for the next purchase. Number of
kids and type of business are also significant and have a major effect on the time of
the second purchase.
At the same time, there are some differences compared with the patterns of
national models. Indicators of both home phone and employer's phone appear. Home
Phone indicates higher chances of the purchase whereas employer's phone signals
the contrary. Age, Spouse's Age and Marital Status are not selected into the model,
which is not surprising given the controversial behaviour of these characteristics
across the countries. Spouse's Age and Marital Status will appear at later stages
when more information will be added and so will Time on Job. Only one age
category will appear and only in one model.
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Purchase variables are highly significant as before, with the most important
being Payment Date and Agreement Type. It is interesting to note that budget
agreement type signals higher chances of further purchase than other agreement
categories, obviously the result of Belgium and the Netherlands dominating over
Germany.
ATS is also significant and shows the same trend, when higher value of credit
availability corresponds to a quicker next purchase. Figure 6.8. shows that
importance of application characteristics decreases with time, and importance of
transactional data, on the contrary, increases, as was observed before.
Figure 6.8. Parameter estimates for behavioural data in generic model
ATS
PERIOD
PLOT AAA Over limit O O O 0-150 e-B-B 151-500
501-800 801-1200
Application score, Delinquency, Percent repaid
2 "
1 2 3 4 5 B 7 8 9 10 1 1 12
PERIOD
PLOT AAA Aplication score O C> O 1 missed payment
□ □ □ 2+ missed payments T F F Percent repaid
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Table 6.13 shows the reduction in magnitude of Log Likelihood as more
information is added into the analysis. Here the most significant reduction arises
from incorporating the first purchase information in the analysis.
Table 6.13 Log Likelihood statistics for models with different levels of
information
Model Log L df Log L difference
No covariates -402668
Personal data -402239 15 429
Personal+purchase -398875 29 3364
Personal+purchase +ATS1 -398542 31 333
Personal+purchase +ATSt-i -397916 35 625
The prediction was tested, first, on a set of generic aggregated hold-out
samples, each sample corresponding to a relevant generic risk set for a time period T,
using the same principle as in the previous section. Due to the larger risk sets, it was
possible to extend the test to a longer period of time - 12 months (Table 6.12).
The results are in line with the prediction results demonstrated by the national
models. Each level of information increases the predictive ability of models, with
models using the complete range of application and behavioural data giving the best
prediction (marked in bold). The importance of behavioural information increases
with time, e,g, H2 the difference between 'Personal + purchase' and 'Application
score + Z(s)' model is 0.720-0.704=0.016, for ///? the same difference is 0.684-
0.586=0.098. When behavioural information is limited to ATS, 'specific time period'
models consistently outperform 'total observation period' models. With all
behavioural information included, the superiority of the 'specific time period'
approach becomes less evident, but even in the periods when 'total observation
period' models give better prediction, the 'period-specific' models perform only
slightly worse.
Each of the generic models was tested on the sets of national hold-out
samples to see how their classification accuracy compares to that of national models
across the countries. The results are shown in Figures 6.9-6.11. Each country
demonstrates a distinctly different pattern.
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182



























Personal+purchase +Z■t-i Application score+Z(s)
-♦-National Generic
183
Figure 6.11 Generic versus German national model. Change in AUROC over time
Personal+purchase Personal+purchase +ATS!
Personal+purchase +ATSf.i Application score+ATS(s)
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n 7R
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For Belgium, the performance of national models, in general, deteriorates
with time. In comparison, generic models show increasingly better classification
accuracy, and at later time periods reach the level of performance of national models,
or even outperform them. This can be attributed to the size of the samples on which
the models were developed. The Belgian population was the smallest one in the
analysis, so in this case the generic model had an advantage of a larger size of the
training sample. Poor early performance of the generic model can be explained by
the possible fact that early purchasers are different from the rest, and these
differences are captured by the national model, but not by the generic model.
For the Netherlands, both generic and national models show considerable
deterioration in performance. There is a sharp drop up to month 4, after this point the
performance stabilises. The survivor function for the Netherlands in Figure 6.3
demonstrated exactly the same pattern: a rapid decline in the first 4 months, and then
a smooth decrease after this point. The performance deteriorates in line with the
changes in the size of the risk set over time. The national models consistently show
superior performance, but the gap between the models becomes less as more
information is added. The 'Personal+ purchase+ Zt.\ demonstrate nearly identical
performance.
Germany also demonstrates a decline in performance over time, but not as
pronounced as the Netherlands or Belgium. The generic models give the closest
performance to that of national models as compared to other two countries.
Overall, all three countries show that additional information makes the
predictive performance more stable in time. It also diminishes the gap between the
national and generic models, although this is not particularly evident for Germany.
But in Germany the generic models perform reasonably well already at the level of
'personal+purchase' data. This emphasises the fact that generic scoring is highly
dependent on the scope of information available. When all major predictors are
included into the model, there will be a very slight difference between national and




This Chapter presented a unique exploration of customer behaviour in using
the retail card in three different countries. Modelling time to the second purchase
when using a retail card was not addressed in the literature before. Knowledge of
time to the second purchase will help in setting credit limits and retaining customers.
The Chapter demonstrated for the first time how different types of data could be used
and the value of each type in explaining the time to the next purchase.
Each level of information was found to enhance the modelling with a greater
volume of variation accounted for and with better prediction results. It was found
that purchase and transactional information was the most important, with variables
that seem to have major effects being the Agreement Type and Amount to Spend.
Amount to Spend was not explored by previous studies. It was established that ATS
did not act as a first order Markov chain with the most recent value having the major
effect. Whilst the customer required a positive credit balance before repeatedly using
the card, it was also important how the customer got to this stage.
The importance of behavioural information increased with time and
application information lost its discriminating power over time. Hence, the inclusion
of behavioural information led to a better and stable performance over time.
The use of the card also indicated the likely behaviour of the individual.
Defaulters were less likely to use the card than non-defaulters. This is partly imposed
by lenders, since those in arrears with payments cannot use the card, hence they take
longer time to the second purchase. There seemed to be differences between models
built separately for Goods and Bads. For the Bads there was also a difference
between those that defaulted before the second purchase and those that defaulted
after the second purchase. Such differences may also help in identifying patterns so
that action can be taken to protect the lender.
There were unique national patterns revealed across the countries with each
level of information added. The performance of the generic model was not so
impressive as when used to predict default as in Chapters 4 and 5. But it was shown
that additional information diminished the gap in predictive ability between national
and generic models. Hence, the need for further harmonisation of the information
across the European countries is emphasised once again.
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Chapter 7. Conclusions and extensions
This thesis has investigated the problem of using a single generic model to
score several different populations. The problem has been viewed in the context of
the integration of the European Union into a single market in consumer credit, with
the following questions being addressed:
- Why generic credit scoring models may be needed in an integrated Europe?
- Are there any legislative restrictions on information that can be used in generic
scoring models?
- What is the impact of these restrictions for lenders and borrowers?
- Are generic models competitive with customised models?
- Can we incorporate a time dimension into generic scoring?
- Can generic scoring be used in other applications, apart from predicting default?
This thesis presented the most thorough investigation of these questions to
date, and many of these questions have not been previously addressed in the
literature. The following sections will summarise the answers.
7.1 Why generic credit scoring models may be needed in an integrated
Europe?
The European Union originated from an idea of combining several small and
medium sized countries into one power, or even superpower, in order to enhance
economic and political competitiveness of the Union members. The creation of
internal single market in financial services is viewed as an important part of this
process. It is envisaged that a free flow of credit across the nation states will foster
competition and therefore, will strengthen the financial institutions and bring
prosperity to consumers.
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It should be noted that at present the integrated market in consumer credit is
not yet a reality. But there is a great political desire and persistent work in progress to
make this happen.
Financial institutions within the Union have a right to extend credit to
residents of all Member States of the Union, although they are not obliged to do so.
Those institutions that will offer credit on an international basis will gain the arising
market opportunity. Obviously, there are risks associated with this opportunity.
Credit applicants from foreign countries may present an unknown risk or a risk that
is different to the risk of home country applicants.
There is always a possibility to segment the population on the basis of
nationality/ country of residence and to apply tailored risk assessment procedures to
each segment. This may be an expensive and complicated strategy, with potentially
fifteen different models to develop and maintain for existing EU members, plus more
models for new members that will join the EU in the future. An alternative is to use a
generic model, or to split the whole European market into three or four more or less
homogeneous segments.
Apart from the common sense perspective, there may be a legal requirement
to assess the credit risk without making distinctions between residents of different
European countries. One cannot say definitively that there is such a requirement at
present, since there is no explanation at the European level of what exactly
constitutes discrimination in credit scoring. That is why the principle of non¬
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, the EU fundamental principle, is open
to interpretation by the national authorities. And history shows that this principle can
be interpreted as a prohibition to use nationality as a variable in credit scoring
models. This brings us to the next question whether there are other variables that
potentially cannot be included into credit scoring models.
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7.2 Are there any legislative restrictions on information that can be used in
generic scoring models?
Whilst in the USA there is a specific legal act that gives the list of
characteristics that cannot be used when making lending decisions (ECOA), in
Europe the situation is far from straightforward. Restrictions on information should
be inferred from general anti-discrimination and data protection provisions that differ
from country to country, as has been shown in Chapter 2 of this thesis. So lenders
extending credit to applicants outside the lender's country of registration should take
into account all these varying requirements.
In general, the law does not distinguish between 'subjective' and 'objective'
discrimination, instead the distinction is made between 'purpose' and 'effect'. The
use of certain information in credit scoring models can be regarded as an action with
the 'purpose' of separating certain groups from the others. That is why 'non¬
discrimination' is often interpreted as equivalent to 'making no distinction', and
therefore, the use of information that allows an organisation to make such distinction
is prohibited.
Race, nationality, and gender are already subject to anti-discrimination
regulations at the European Union level. Disability and religion are included into the
scope of law in many countries. Age is most likely to follow. But there is significant
scope for different interpretations, so case law becomes extremely important. We are
not aware of any cases against lenders in Europe, apart from the case in France that
was discussed in Chapter 2.
Whilst the question of what exactly can be used in credit scoring models in
Europe remains open, the related question is whether one should worry about the
prohibition of information at all. Is there any effect from prohibition?
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7.3 What is the impact of restrictions on information for lenders and
borrowers?
This thesis reviewed a substantia] number of studies on the effects of
prohibition on information in credit scoring models and concluded that prohibition
was detrimental for both lenders and borrowers. If prohibited information has a
significant association with the default probability, removing this information from
the model will have the following implications. First, it has been shown that some
protected groups are good credit risks, but without the relevant information in the
model they are not given 'credit' for being good. Second, the acceptance rates are
higher for protected groups if the lender has an ability to segment or separate these
groups, especially if these groups are significantly different from the rest of
population. Third, the lenders may not be able to achieve the same level of
classification accuracy, which will increase the level of bad debt, and the resulting
increased cost of credit will be passed on to the consumer.
7.4 Are generic models competitive with customised models?
Previously published research showed the superiority of customised models.
This thesis used a unique dataset that was particularly suited for a comparison
between customised and generic models. The generic model was found to perform
well. In predicting default the generic model demonstrated only a very slight
inferiority in prediction as compared to national models developed on the same set of
characteristics.
Several reasons may serve as an explanation for this result. First, only one
type of credit product was used in the analysis. Second, the investigated countries
were close in geographical and socio-economic terms. General trends in behaviour of
good/bad classes were traced across the countries, and the differences observed were
compensated by the flat maximum effect. Third, the generic model was developed on
a heterogeneous sample that equally represented the national populations. Such an
approach is not without limitations. If one assumes that the distinction between
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countries is not allowed, then it will not be possible to construct a sample that will
represent the countries equally. Still we believe that the approach taken in this thesis
was justified, otherwise the smaller nations would be dominated by a larger one and
there would be a 'German' model instead of a 'generic' one.
It should be noted that additional information increases the predictive ability
of models, so the performance of generic models depends to a larger extent on the
scope of information available. Therefore, harmonisation of data and data collection
procedures becomes important.
7.5 Can we incorporate a time dimension into generic scoring?
It has been shown that there was practically no difference in classification
accuracy achieved by logistic regression and survival analysis modelling techniques
in predicting default. Further, different parametric AFT approaches and the semi-
parametric Cox PH model produced very similar results. This was observed both for
generic and national models. Survival analysis generic models predicted as well as
the logistic regression models.
It was suggested that exponential distribution offered a suitable fit for the
analysed dataset, therefore, implying that the hazard was constant throughout 25
months. That is why survival analysis and logistic regression demonstrated close
results in prediction. This is different from the results of previous studies conducted
on fixed term loans, suggesting that revolving credit may have a more random
character.
Since both survival analysis and logistic regression demonstrate similar
prediction, the decision as to which approach should be used depends on the
additional advantages each approach can offer. The main advantage of survival
analysis is its ability to generate predictions that give the probability of 'survival' in
any specific time period, without the necessity of re-estimating the model to fit this
time period, as is the case with logistic regression.
In spite of the observed differences in survival patterns between the countries,
the survival analysis generic models performed well, therefore, a time dimension can
be incorporated into generic scoring.
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7.6 Can generic scoring be used in other applications, apart from predicting
default?
The estimates of time to default can be used as a basis for estimating the
profit a customer will generate, see Stepanova (2001). But in the context of revolving
credit it is necessary to predict the repeated usage of the product in order to calculate
the profit. It was shown that generic scoring can be used to model not only time to
default, but also time to the second purchase that was selected as a measure of usage.
Several types of information (personal, purchase and behavioural data) were
included into analysis sequentially and the value of each type was investigated.
Purchase and transactional information was found to be most important with the
value of transactional information increasing over time.
The differences in purchasing behaviour between delinquent and non-
delinquent accounts were observed, and also between accounts that get into
delinquency before the second purchase and after it. It is interesting to note that the
survival curves for delinquent accounts appeared to be very similar across the three
countries, whilst for non-delinquent accounts they demonstrated significant
differences.
The generic models performed well, but the difference in predictive accuracy
between them and national models was more pronounced than in predicting default.
However, inclusion of additional information, behavioural information in particular,
brought the performance of generic models closer to that of national models. This
finding emphasises once again the importance of information. The availability of
information is crucial and, hence restrictions on its use are anti-consumer, and
harmonisation of information across Europe is highly desirable.
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7.7 Implications of the research
7.7.1 Implications for academics
Following the paper by Platts and Howe (1997), this thesis opens a new
direction of inquiry which can be defined as comparative or cross-cultural credit
scoring. In comparison to the above mentioned paper, the thesis presents a thorough
investigation of the national credit risk patterns in three European countries. A
unique dataset has been used in the analysis with a tighter control over the type of
credit product than in the previous study, and the combination of countries explored
by the thesis has not been investigated before.
The thesis provides the first comparison of legal restrictions on the data used
in credit scoring between the USA and EU and within the EU, and investigated the
impact of these restrictions for lenders and borrowers. It also gives a thorough review
of literature on generic models and related issues.
In contrast to previous findings the generic model has demonstrated only a
slight loss in predictive accuracy compared to national models suggesting that
generic scoring will work successfully for certain groups of countries provided there
is enough information in common.
The generic model was tested under different modelling techniques and in
different applications. The thesis investigated time to default and time to the second
purchase across the three countries. This type of comparison has not been reported in
the published literature. Exponential distribution was found to be suitable for
modelling time to default, implying that revolving credit may have a more random
character as compared to fixed-term loans. But this finding needs to be tested on
other datasets.
Time to the second purchase has not been investigated by previous research
in the context of retail credit. The thesis has examined the value of different types of
information in modelling time to the second purchase and how this value changes
over time. It also found differences in purchasing behaviour between delinquent and
non-delinquent accounts, and that the majority of defaults and purchases happened
relatively early in the credit lifecycle. These findings can serve as a basis for further
research of revolving credit.
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7.7.2 Implications for business community
The thesis offers a valuable source of information for lenders that extend
credit across the EU or are going to do so. To begin with, there are considerations of
legal compliance of credit scoring models. Lenders offering credit to borrowers in
other EU countries have to ensure that they comply with regulations of these MS.
At present the use of generic models is limited to situations when there is no
data available for building a customised model (e.g., new product development,
expansion into a new market). This thesis has demonstrated that for certain countries
national models can be replaced with a generic model with only minor loss in
predictive accuracy. The loss in predictive power depends on the scope of
information included into the model, therefore, lenders should consider harmonising
application data across the countries that they offer credit to.
It also has been shown that switching from logistic regression to survival
analysis leads to no loss in predictive power of national and generic models, but at
the same time offers a possibility for profit scoring. It also allows for debt
provisioning and cash flow forecasting. It provides insight into timing of events and
thus gives information when certain actions should be planned.
With the growing competition among lenders, retention of customers
becomes increasingly important. This thesis demonstrated that 'purchase scoring'
can be helpful in identifying 'slow spenders' and in providing information for setting
and adjusting credit limits. Besides, the observed differences between delinquent and
non-delinquent account, as demonstrated in Section 6.6, suggest that if a customer
falls behind with payments but then recovers, his/her subsequent behaviour should be
assessed by a different model.
Overall, it was shown that generic scoring is a viable option suitable for
different applications.
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7.7.3 Implications for policy-makers
This thesis identified some important aspects that have to be addressed to
allow for effective risk assessment of applicants for credit from different EU
countries. Throughout the thesis the need for further harmonisation of information
used in credit scoring has been constantly emphasised. In particular, harmonisation
of CRA data should be considered. If lenders are unable to receive and match the
CRA records from different countries, this can create a serious obstacle to a free flow
of credit across nation states.
Equally important is the need to reconsider what constitutes discrimination in
credit scoring, and what is an appropriate balance between 'equal treatment' and
'responsible lending'. The absence of coherent and clear explanation of what can and
cannot be used in credit scoring models does not contribute to creation of an
integrated market either.
But a warning should be given against the use of a straightforward prohibitive
approach in eliminating discrimination in credit markets, since it was shown that
bans on information in credit scoring proved to be detrimental to both lenders and
borrowers.
7.8 Further research
There are broadly four directions that the research conducted in this thesis
can be extended. First, there is a need to explore more European countries in order to
identify similarities and differences in credit risk patterns across Europe.
Second, it was shown that both types of events investigated (default and the
second purchase) occur early in the lifetime of an account. One of the possible
approaches to modelling early events would be to use frailty models which assume
that there is some unobserved quality that distinguishes these events from the rest. A
random effect variable is introduced that describes excess risk for certain groups of
borrowers. The penalised Cox model can be used as a modelling tool (Therneau and
Grambsch (2000)). This can be an alternative approach to the parametric one
presented in Hand and Vinciotti (2003).
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Third, it would of interest to further investigate the propensity of credit
applicants to use the revolving credit product. This thesis looked into one possible
approach, whilst there are other approaches possible: estimating the number of
purchases, the total value of purchases, modelling multiple events. It is also
necessary to explore the ways to combine modelling of default and purchase. Multi-
state modelling (Therneau and Grambsch (2000)) can be a possible way forward in
this direction.
Fourth, the performance of generic models is sensitive to the scope of
information available, hence, exploration of additional sources of predictors can be
pursued. One obvious source of information is CRA, and the research into how the
CRA information can be harmonised across the EU is highly important. The absence
of such information creates a major constraint on the way towards the integrated
market in consumer credit. Another possible way to incorporate more information is
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Table A1. Characteristics available for analysis
Characteristic Belgium Netherlands Germany
Application
1 Telephone X X X
2 Residential status X X X
3 Marital status X X X
4 Occupation X X X
5 Age X X X
6 Time at address since 18 X X X
7 Time in employment X X X
8 Time at bank since 18 X X
9 Type of business X X X
10 Occupation of spouse X X
11 Credit card type X X
12 Agreement type X X X
13 No of children/dependants X X X
15 Spouse age X X X
16 Goods code X X X
17 Identity X X
18 Language X
19 Postcode current address X X X
20 Total addresses given X
21 Employer's phone X X X
22 Card insurance X X X
23 Credit insurance X X X
24 Product insurance X
25 Goods price X X X
26 Initial instalment X X
28 Payment date X X X
29 Fast decision X X
31 Section number X
32 Dealer number X
33 Original balance X
34 Override code X X
35 Underwriter X X
36 Retailer X X
37 Time in benefit X
38 Type of bank account X
39 Bank name X
40 Nationality X X
41 Bank sort code X X
42 Postcode previous address X
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43 Time at previous address X X
Characteristic Belgium Netherlands Germany
44 Spouse indicator (yes, no) X X
45 2-nd cardholder X
46 Time at previous job X X
47 Deposit X X
48 % deposit X X
49 Requested credit limit X X
50 Given credit limit X X
51 Credit limit live revolving X
52 Credit limit live store cards X
53 Loan amount X X
54 Credit as % of goods price X
55 Term of loan X
56 Income 1st applicant X
57 Income co-app X
58 Mortgage/rent X
59 Other costs X
60 Instalment paid X
61 Type of service (phone, budget, etc.) X
62 Type of bank (normal, post, giro) X
63 Card status (live, lost, stolen, etc.) X X
64 East/West indicator X
Bureau
65 Total contracts X X
66 Time first registration X X X
67 Time since last registration/most recent
account (H)/
X X
68 Total contracts normal balance X
69 Total contracts in arrears X
70 Total amount of credit/credits ever X X
71 Total amount of liability X
72 Total amount of reduction X
73 Mortgage loan marker X
74 No of live cards + revolving X
75 No of paid-up cards + revolving X
76 No of paid fixed term accounts X
77 Bureau negative X X
78 Number of live fixed term accounts X
79 Total A accounts X
80 Total A+ accounts X
81 Total outstanding balances X
82 Known at bureau X
83 Total A accounts opened X
84 Total A accounts closed X
85 Total A+ accounts opened X
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86 Total A+ accounts closed X
Characteristic Belgium Netherlands Germany
87 Time since last bad A opened X
88 Time since last bad A+ opened X
91 No of live HP X
92 No of live revolving accounts X
93 No of live card accounts X
94 No of live extensions X
95 No of live overdrafts X
96 No of live loan accounts X
97 No of live mortgage accounts X
98 No of live other accounts X
99 No of good paid up HP X
100 No of good paid up revolving accounts X
101 No of good paid up card accounts X
102 No of good paid up extensions X
103 No of good paid up overdrafts X
104 No of good paid up loan accounts X
105 No of good paid up mortgage accounts X
106 No of good paid up other accounts X
107 Outstanding balance HP accounts X
108 Outstanding balance live extensions X
109 Outstanding balance live overdraft accounts X
110 Outstanding balance live loan accounts X
111 Total live bureau X
112 Total closed bureau X
113 Last bad A X
114 Last bad A+ X
115 No new accounts in last 6 months X
116 Bureau time known X
117 Credit enquiries last 10 days X
118 Bureau quantity 1 X
119 Bureau quantity 2 X
120 Bureau quantity 3 X
121 Bureau quantity 4 X
123 Bureau amount X
124 Bureau low process X
125 Bureau major negative X
126 Bureau minor negative X
128 Total no credits still open X
129 Total amount credits repaid X
130 Bureau score X
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Table A2. Attribute coding by country
Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Telephone NOT GIVEN 0,N 3 0 0
GIVEN Y,1 1 1 1
SECRET 2 2 2
MOBILE 3 4 3 3
NO INFO " ",X
tt tt it tt tt it
Residential HOMEOWNER 1 02 1 1
status RENTED
HOUSE
2 01 2 2
RENTED FLAT 3 03 3 3
RENTED ROOM 4 07 4 4
LIV w PARENT 5 04 5 5
CARAVAN 6 05 6 6
HOUSE BOAT 06 7
OTHER 99 99
NO INFO tt tt tt it tt it it tt
Marital status MARRIED 1 1 1 1
SINGLE 2 2 2 2
DIVORCED 3 3 3 3
WIDOW 4 5 4 4
LIVING TOG 5 4 5 5
LIV TOG REG 6 6
NO INFO it it
it tt
Time at address with Parents 9999 9999
Time in No Info 9991
employment Part-time 9992 9992
Military 9993 9993
Benefit Work 9994 9994
Agency 9995 9995
Retired 9996 9996 9996 9996
Housewife 9997 9997 9997 9997
Student 9998 9998 9998 9998
Jobless 9995 9999
Allowance 9999 9999
Spouse age No spouse 99 999 999 999
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Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Occupation Employed/Full¬
time
01 01 01 1
Self Employed 03 02 02 2
Retired 05 03 3
Housewife 04 20 04 4
Student 06 05 05 5
Military Service 06 06 6
Allowance 1 07 07 7
Allowance 2 08 08 8
Allowance 3 09 09 9
Arb prv mit 10 10
Witwen rente 11 11
Benefit 21 20
Ben Wrk <50 09 21
Ben Wrk >50 10 22
PT 02 30
PT 0-8 Hrs 11 31
PT 9-32 Hrs 12 32
PT 33-40 Hrs 13 33
Agency 00 40
Agency < 1Y 07 41
Agency > 1Y 08 42
No Info 0 tt tt tt tt tt tt
Credit No Info I! tt tt tt it tt tt tt
insurance No insurance 0 0 0, N 0
Credit insurance 1 1 1 1







Card insurance No Info tt tt tt tt tt tt it tt
No insurance 0 0 0 0
Card insurance 1 1 1 1
Other 2 2 2 2
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Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Type of Industry 01 01 09 1
business Officials 02 02 2
Building Ind 03 03 12 3
Pub Trs/Post 04 04 4
Prof Soldier 05 05 5
Health Care 06 06 11 6
Education 07 07 7
Bank/insurance 08 08 02 8
Catering 09 09 06 9
Shop Employee 10 10 10 10
Cleaning Age 11 11 11
Agrarian Sec 12 12 08 12
Harbour Ind 13 13 13
Road Transport 14 14 14
Shipping Ind 15 15 15
Aviation 16 16 16
Craftsman 17 17 17
Business 18 18 18
Service prof 19 19 19
Computer Ind 20 20 20
Aus/Erz/Lehr 04 27
High Tech 03 20
Emp Gov Sub 21 21
Offentlichtr 01 22





Benefit AAW 51 51
Benefit ABW 52 52
Benefit AOW 53 53
Benefit AWW 54 54
Benefit RWW 55 55
Benefit WAO 56 56
Benefit WW 57 57
Benefit WWW 58 58
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Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Type of
business
Benefit ROA 59 59
Benefit VUT 60 60




Indep Means 65 65
Housewife 66 66
Unknown 99 99 25 99
Employer's
phone
No Info II I! M II it tt
No Info M tt ?l M tt tt tt it
Not Given 0 2 0 0
Given 1 1 1 1








CARD APPLICA 00 00 CA 0
MONO TV 01 1
COLOUR TV 02 1
TV 01 01 1
VIDEO RECORD 03 02 02 3
TV/VIDEO COM 04 08 03 4
HIFI RADIO 05 03 05 5
MICROWAVE 06 16 11 6
COOKER 07 15 14 7
FRIDGE 08 10 12 8
WASHING
MACHINE
09 11 13 9
VACUUM CLNR 10 17 10
DISHWASHER 11 14 11
HEATER 12 12




CD PLAYER 15 04 15
FREEZER 16 13 16
HSEHLD
GOODS
17 18 19 17
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Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
VID/CAS TAPE 18 07 18
COMPACT DISC 32 07 18
FAX 32 19
PHONE FAX 19 25 19
MOBILFUNK 24 19
TELEPHONE 30 19
OTHR PHONES 20 33 20





OTHERS 25 19 25
BEDROOM
FURN
26 40 33 26
DINING FURN 27 41 26
LIVING FURN 28 42 34 26
KITCHEN FURN 29 36 26
FIRNITURE 49 30 26
BEDDING 30 61 30





















Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Goods code PIANOS 46 60 46




CAMERAS 49 21 49
NEVER USED 50 50
SCANNER 51 22 51
MENS SHOES 52 52
LADIES SHOES 53 53
CHILD SHOES 54 54




MEN/CHL FASH 57 57
MOPEDS 58 50 58







CHILD CLTHS 72 61







COMPUTERS 66 27 20 66
DBLE GLAZING 67 67





BEACHWEAR 71 77 71
LINGERIE 72 76 72
IND/CLOTHES 73 73
HSEHLD TEXTL 74 74
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Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic







JEWELLERY 78 83 78
79 79 79
STONE CLAD. 80 80
81 81 81
BLDG MATLS 82 67 50 82
83 83 83
PARFUMERIE 84 81 84
CAR RADIOS 85 06 85





MISC OTHERS 89 89 89
CARAVANS 90 90
FRONT TENTS 91 91
92 92 92
93 93 93
94 94 91 94
95 95 94 95
96 96 95 96
CODE 97 97 97 97
NEVER USED 98 98
OTHERS 99 90 99
LAMPS 05 31 101
STOVE 36 102










Characteristics Attributes Belgium Netherlands Germany Generic
Goods code CURTAINS 45 60 113
PHOTO EQUIP 20 26 114






OFFICE MAC 34 120




TOOLS 68 52 124
MISC DIY 69 124





NO INFO II ll it ll
Table A3. Coarse-classification by country. Home telephone.
BELGIUM NET!HQERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
Given 0.03 1 Given 0.16 1 Not
given
-0.80 1
Not given -0.55 2 Secret 0.24 1 Given 0.07 2
Mobile -0.48 3 Not
given
-0.67 2 Secret -0.32 2
Mobile -1.00 2
Table A4. Coarse-classification by country. Employer's telephone.
BELGIU]M NET!HERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP





Given -4.01 2 Given -1.00 2 Given -0.06 2
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Table A5. Coarse-classification by country. Residential status.
BELGIU1VI NET]HERLANDS GERMANY


































-0.56 4 LIV w
PARENT









Table A6. Coarse-classification by country. Credit insurance.
BELGIU]M NET]HERLANDS GERMANY















Other -3.51 2 Other 4 -0.59 2
Other 6 -0.02 2
Other 8 0.13 3
Other 9 -0.27 2
Table A7. Coarse-classification by country. Card insurance.
BELGIU]M NET]HERLANDS GERMANY

















Table A8. Coarse-classification by country. Occupation.
BELGIUM NET!HERLANDS GERMANY





-0.04 3 Retired 0.86 1





















1.72 4 Ben Wrk
<50
0.37 4 Student -0.03 3


























Table A9. Coarse-classification by country. Type of business.
BELGIUM NET!IIERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP








Catering -0.54 1 Catering -0.36 2 Media -0.29 2



































-0.14 3 Industry 0.05 4





Industry -0.13 3 Industry -0.12 3 Offentlicht
r
0.28 5









-0.08 4 High Tech 0.48 6
Service
prof
0.00 4 Business -0.03 4 Health
Care
0.44 6
21 0.08 4 Unknow
n










0.19 4 16 0.42 7
Officials 0.24 5 Bank/ins
urace
0.22 4 Unknown 0.76 7
Health
Care























































Table A10. Coarse-classification by country. Goods code.
BE]LGIUM NETHERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP





-0.98 2 93 -0.92 0
LAWN
MOWERS





-0.35 2 TOOLS -0.22 0





OTHERS -1.03 1 MOPEDS -0.19 3 97 0.13 0
BEDROOM
FURN
-0.76 1 OTHERS -0.10 3 MOBIL-
FUNK
-1.05 1
CYCLES -0.76 1 HIFI RADIO -0.09 3 PHONE
FAX
-0.85 1
MOPEDS -0.64 1 MISC
BROWN G
-0.03 3 CYCLES -0.82 1
OTHR
PHONES












0.07 4 HIFI RADIO -0.43 2
LIVING
FURN
-0.47 2 ORGANS 0.11 4 VIDEO
RECORD
-0.26 3

















0.28 4 OTHERS -0.04 3
TV/VIDEO
COM






































CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP









0.49 5 HIFI RADIO 0.28 5
























0.32 6 DRIER 0.58 5 COOKER 1.74 5















0.55 7 FREEZER 0.85 6
DISHWAS
HER
0.60 7 CODE 97 0.88 6
LADIES
CLOTHES
0.82 7 SUNBEDS 1.10 6
FREEZER 0.83 7 COMPUT
GAME
-0.50 7
SUNBEDS 1.26 7 LADIES
CLOTHES
-0.46 7























Table A11. Coarse-classification by country. Payment date.
BELGIUlM NET]HERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
14 -2.92 1 01 0.34 1 01 0.14 1
22 -3.83 2 08 0.38 1 08 0.08 1
01 -3.95 3 15 0.28 2 15 -0.05 2
15 -3.99 3 22 -0.01 3 21 -0.40 3
00 -4.21 4 00 -1.15 4 22 -0.21 3
08 -4.21 4 28 -1.68 4
Table A12. Coarse-classification by country. Number of dependants.
BELGIU]M NETHERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
0 -0.13 0 0 -0.77 1 0 -0.19 0
1 0.16 1 1 -0.35 2 1 0.22 1
2 0.28 2 2+ 0.16 2 2 0.51 2
3 0.25 2 Unknown 0.01 3 3 0.24 3
4 -0.24 3 4 0.12 4
5+ -0.41 4 5+ 0.07 4
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Table A13. Coarse-classification by country. Spouse's age. 5% groups.
BELGIUM NETHERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
18 -0.76 1 18 -0.01 1 0 0.43 0
23 -0.12 2 23 0.12 2 0 0.43 0
27 -0.01 3 27 0.10 2 0 0.43 0
30 0.14 4 28 0.17 2 18 -0.09 1
33 0.11 4 30 0.32 2 20 0.02 2
36 0.45 5 31 0.38 3 23 0.12 3
38 0.30 5 32 0.47 3 29 0.45 4
41 0.67 5 34 0.47 3 39 0.66 4
44 0.32 5 35 0.50 3 45 0.77 4
47 0.91 6 37 0.55 3 54 0.80 6
53 1.01 6 38 0.47 3 No
Spouse
-0.27 5












































Table A14. Coarse-classification by country. Time at address. 5% groups.
BELGIUM NETIIERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
No Info -0.50 1 0 -0.52 0 0 -0.62 1
With
Parents
-0.54 1 lm -0.37 0 2m -0.62 1
0 -0.60 1 3m -0.38 0 4m -0.73 1
4m -0.38 2 5m -0.34 0 6m -0.50 2
ly -0.28 2 8m -0.43 0 10m -0.29 2
ly4m -0.29 2 lylm -0.23 1 ly -0.63 2
lyllm -0.09 3 ly3m -0.11 1 ly4m -0.27 2
2y6m -0.26 3 ly7m -0.06 1 ly9m -0.13 2
3ylm -0.21 3 2y -0.33 1 2ylm -0.43 2
3y9m -0.05 4 2y4m 0.05 1 2y7m -0.10 3
4y7m 0.11 4 2yl0m -0.19 1 3y -0.19 3
5y7m 0.20 5 3y4m 0.06 2 3y9m 0.16 3
6yl0m 0.28 5 4ylm 0.20 2 4y6m 0.04 4
8y4m 0.55 6 4yllm 0.04 2 5y8m 0.16 4
9yllm 0.49 6 5yl lm 0.19 2 7y6m 0.19 4
1 ly8m 0.51 6 7y2m 0.28 2 9y7m 0.40 5
14y5m 1.09 6 9ylm 0.41 3 12y3m 0.54 5
18ylm 0.98 6 1 lylm 0.52 3 16y2m 0.74 5
22ylm 0.87 6 14y5m 0.67 3 22y2m 0.81 6
31y4m 1.50 6 19y8m 0.83 3 53y 1.29 6
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Table A15. Coarse-classification by country. Time on job. 5% groups.
BELGIUM NETHERLANDS GERMANY
CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP CHAR-C WOE GROUP
0 -0.78 1 0 -0.45 1 0 0.86 0
5m -0.55 2 3m -0.55 1 lm -0.70 1
10m -0.58 2 5m -0.47 1 3m -0.74 1
ly4m -0.42 2 8m -0.32 2 5m -0.65 1
2y -0.29 3 11m -0.31 2 7m -0.63 2
2y7m -0.28 3 ly3m -0.26 2 11m -0.51 2
3y4m -0.17 3 ly7m -0.23 2 ly4m -0.40 2
4y2m -0.29 3 2ylm -0.26 2 2y -0.37 2
5y5m 0.03 3 2y8m -0.11 3 2y5m -0.44 2
7y2m 0.39 4 3y3m -0.09 3 3y -0.42 3
8y9m 0.27 4 4ylm 0.06 3 3y8m -0.32 3
10y5m 0.48 5 5y2m 0.09 3 4y8m -0.08 3
13y2m 0.67 5 6y7m 0.23 4 6y 0.29 4
17y7m 0.88 6 8y2m 0.30 4 7y7m 0.48 4
21y3m 1.13 6 9ylml 0.32 4 9y5m 0.72 5
27yl0m 0.94 6 12y6m 0.45 4 13y6m 0.65 5
32y 1.09 6 16y9m 0.60 5 22y5m 0.86 5
Retired 0.83 6 21y 0.72 5 Agency 0.83 6
House¬
wife
0.11 7 3 ly -0.13 5 Retired 0.12 6
Allow¬
ance




Table A16. Coarse-classification by country. Goods price. 5% groups.
BELGIUM NETHERLANDS GERMANY
BF WOE GROUP NLG WOE GROUP DM WOE GROUP
0 0.35 0 0 0.01 0 0 -0.10 0
6000 0.02 1 100 -1.00 1 450 -0.51 1
8990 0.03 1 415 -0.60 1 557 -0.42 2
9998 -0.07 1 565 -0.25 2 649 -0.35 2
11998 -0.06 1 700 -0.23 2 700 -0.25 3
13500 0.12 2 837 -0.02 2 799 -0.28 3
14998 0.16 2 1000 0.04 3 899 -0.19 3
16995 0.24 2 1154 0.19 3 999 -0.07 4
18000 0.01 2 1350 0.03 3 1099 -0.10 4
19990 0.09 2 1568 0.15 3 1214 0.00 4
20385 0.50 3 1858 0.21 3 1382 0.12 4
22995 0.24 3 2146 0.05 3 1499 0.13 4
24998 -0.03 4 2500 0.13 3 1638 0.09 4
27588 -0.07 4 2800 0.39 4 1800 0.19 5
30000 0.21 5 3020 0.42 4 1999 0.26 5
34792 -0.27 6 3229 0.43 4 2139 0.17 5
39974 -0.35 6 3631 0.49 4 2399 0.33 5
40000 -0.55 6 3996 0.50 4 2761 0.21 5
50000 -0.03 7 4596 0.23 4 3459 0.14 5
60000 0.05 7 5362 0.33 4 90000 0.22 5
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A17. Binary variable coding for Belgium






rstatl=0; rstat2=0; rstat3=0; /*Residential status*/
select (rstat);











































































































































toj 1=0; toj2=0; toj3=0; toj4=0; toj5=0; toj6=0;
select (toj_g); /*Time in employment*/













Additional variables for 'full information' model
agreeml=0; agreem2=0; /*Type of agreement*/
select (agreem);
when (X) 1) agreem 1=1;
when (X)2','47','60') agreem2=l;
















































































































A18. Binary variable coding for the Netherlands
ephone0=0; /*Employer's phone given*/
select (ephone);
when (2) ephone0=l; /*telephone not given */
otherwise;
end;
phone 1=0; /*Home phone given*/
select (phone);
when (1,2) phonel=l; /*given, secret */
otherwise; /*mobile, not given, missing */
end;
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rstat3=l; /*rented house */
rstat4=l; /*home owner*/
rstat2=l; /*rented flat, no info */
rstat1=1; /*living with parents */
/*caravan, rented room, missing */








mstat2= 1; /*widowed, living together reg*/
mstat1=1; /*divorced, living together */
/*single, missing */








otherwise; /* <53+ */
end;
btypel=0; btype2=0; btype3=0; btype4=0; btype5=0; btype6=0;
select (btype); EBusiness type*/
when ('63') btypel=l; /*agency*/
when ('05','09','12','51','62','55') btype2=l; /*military prof, catering,
farming, benefit AAW, RWW, student+job*/
when ('10','01','17','03','14') btype3=l; /*industry, building trd,
shopwork, road trp, manual wrk */
when ('99','18','20','08','19','11') btype4=l; /*unknown,
businessman, cleaning, computer ind, bank/ins, service ind */
when ('16','07','66','06','02','04') btype5=l;
/*airman, education, housewife, pub health, gov off, pub trans*/
when ('53','60','64') btype6=l;
/*benefit AOW, VUT, pensioner*/
otherwise; /*military serv, emp gov sub, dock wrk, seamen, benefit WWW,
ROA, indep means, benefit WW, ABW, WAO, AWW*/
end;
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gcodel=0;gcode2=0; gcode3=0; gcode4=0; gcode5=0; gcode6=0;
select (gcode); /*Goods code*/
when ('64') gcodel=l; /*car equip*/
when ('00','44',30) gcode2=l; /* card app, carpets,
telephone*/
when ('50', '19', X)3', T)9', '51', '16', T)6) gcode3=l;






/*pers loan, dishwasher,freezer,misc97, sun lamps */
otherwise; /*small categories, misc music,organs,misc elct, tv, video*/
spagel=0; spage2=0; spage3=0; spage4=0; /*Spouse's age*/
select;








when (0) cardi0=l; /*no insurance */
otherwise;
end; /insurance */
credi0=0; credil=0; /*Credit insurance*/
select;
when (credi=0) credi0=l; /* no insurance */
when (credi=8) credil=l; /* credi 8 */
otherwise; /insurance, other */
end;





otherwise; /* 00, 28 */
end;
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tad 1=0; tad2=0; tad3=0;
select;
when (6<tad<207) tad 1=1;
when (206<tad<900) tad2=l;
when (899<tad) tad3=l;













gprl=0; gpr2=0; gpr3=0; gpr4=0;
select; /*Goods price*/
when (0<gpr<500) gprl= l;















/*part-time, bw, hw, benefit */
tojl=0; toj2=0; toj3=0; toj4=0; toj5=0;
/*Time in employment*/select;
when (toj<7) toj 1=1
when (6<toj<207) toj2= 1
when (206<toj<600) toj3=1




^Interactions between Goods Code and Payment Date*/
if gcode_g=l and pdate_g=l then gcpdll = l; else gcpdll=0;
if gcode_g=l and pdate_g=2 then gcpdl2=l; else gcpdl2=0;
if gcode_g=l and pdate_g=3 then gcpdl3=l; else gcpdl3=0;
if (gcode_g=l and pdate_g=4) or (gcode_g=3 and pdate_g=4)
or (gcode_g=4 and pdate_g=4) or (gcode_g=5 and pdate_g=4) then gcpdl4=l; else
gcpdl4=0;
if (gcode_g=2 and pdate_g=l) or (gcode_g=2 and pdate_g=3) then gcpd21=l; else
gcpd21=0;
if gcode_g=2 and pdate_g=2 then gcpd22=l; else gcpd22=0;
if gcode_g=2 and pdate_g=4 then gcpd24=l; else gcpd24=0;
if gcode_g=3 and pdate_g=l then gcpd31=l; else gcpd31=0;
if gcode_g=3 and pdate_g=2 then gcpd32=l; else gcpd32=0;
if gcode_g=3 and pdate_g=3 then gcpd33=l; else gcpd33=0;
if gcode_g=4 and pdate_g=l then gcpd41=l; else gcpd41=0;
if gcode_g=4 and pdate_g=2 then gcpd42=l; else gcpd42=0;
if gcode_g=4 and pdate_g=3 then gcpd43=l; else gcpd43=0;
if gcode_g=5 and pdate_g=l then gcpd51 = l; else gcpd51=0;
if (gcode_g=5 and pdate_g=2) or (gcode_g=6 and pdate_g=2) then gcpd52=l; else
gcpd52=0;
if gcode_g=5 and pdate_g=3 then gcpd53=l; else gcpd53=0;
if gcode_g=6 and pdate_g=l then gcpd61=l; else gcpd61=0;
if gcode_g=6 and pdate_g=3 then gcpd63=l; else gcpd63=0;
if gcode_g=6 and pdate_g=4 then gcpd64=l; else gcpd64=0;
if gcode_g=7 and pdate_g=l then gcpd71=l; else gcpd71=0;
if gcode_g=7 and pdate_g=2 then gcpd72=l; else gcpd72=0;
if gcode_g=7 and pdate_g=3 then gcpd73=l; else gcpd73=0;
Additional variables for 'full information' model
loan 1=0; loan2=0; loan3=0; loan4=0; /*Loan amount*/
select ;











instal0=0; install=0; ^Instalment paid */
select ;
when (instal=0) instalO=l;
when (0<instal<3000) instal 1=1;
otherwise;
end;











when (2,3,4) paidft2= 1;
otherwise;
end;







































/*Number of new accounts in last 6 months*/
newl=l;
new0=l;
f_burol=0; f_buro2=0; f_buro3=0; f_buro4=0; f_buro5=0;








lastap0=0; lastapl=0; lastap2=0; lastap3=0;






































/*Total A+ accounts */
aplus0=l;
aplus 1=1;
a_acc0=0; a_accl=0; /*Total A accounts */
select (a_acc);
when (0) a_acc0= 1;










deal 1=0; deal2=0; deal3=0; /*Dealer */
select;
when (deal= 16) deal 1=1;





















bankcl=0; bankc2=0; bankc3=0; bankc4=0; /*Bank code */
select (bankc);











































































/*Number of dependants */
end;

















































































/*Time at address */
end;
end;
toj 1=0; toj2=0; toj3=0; toj4=0; toj6=0;
select;
when(0<=toj<=6) toj 1=1







/*Time in employment */
gprice0=0; gpricel=0; gprice2=0; gprice3=0; gprice4=0;








gcodel=0; gcode2=0;gcode3=0; gcode4=0; gcode5=0;
select (gcode); /*Goods code */
when (24',25','43 j gcodel=l;
when( 23', '40', 4)5 j gcode2=l;

















Additional variables for 'full information' model
ininstl=0; ininst2=0; ininst3=0; ininst4=0; ininst5=0; ininst6=0;












































lam_300=0; lam_301=0; lam_302=0; lam_303=0; lam_304=0;











































timepj0=0; timepjl=0; timepj2=0; timepj3=0;
select;

































/*Time at bureau 1*/
t2b 1=0; t2b2=0; t2b3=0; t2b4=0; t2b5=0;
select;


























































































underl=0; under2=0; /*Underwriter */
select (under);
when (1011', 1012', D19) under1=1;
when (DO1',' ) under2=l;
otherwise;
end;



























/*Credit card type */
crcardl=l;
crcard2=l;
















/*Worst bureau credit */
b_credl=l;
b_cred2=l;


























































































/*Number of credit repaid*/
totc0=l;
totcl=l;

















A20. Binary variable coding for the generic model





otherwise; /*secret number */
end;












otherwise; /* other + houseboat*/
end;
mstatl=0; mstat2=0; mstat3=0; /*Marital status*/
select (mstat);
when ('10 mstat 1=1;
when (20 mstat2=l;
when (3','40 mstat3=l;












otherwise; /* insurance */
end;
/*Credit insurance */






otherwise; /* 22, 28, etc */
end;
/*Payment date */







when (X)4', 20', X)2', X)8', X)622', '66', '64', X)7 ^
otherwise; /* 99, 7 ', etc*/
end;







gcodel=0;gcode2=0;gcode3=0; gcode4=0; gcode5=0;gcode6=0; gcode7=0;






when ('66',X)9','14','11', X)7") gcode6=l
when 095','13',97','16',317) gcode7=l




















gp0=0; gpl=0; gp2=0; gp3=0; gp4=0; gp5=0; /*Goods price */
select;
when (gp=0) gp0=0;





otherwise; /* 1000+ */
end;







when (141 l<tad<9999) tad6=l;
otherwise; /* tad=0 */
end;
/*Time at address */
/*Time in employment */toj0=0; tojl=0; toj2=0; toj3=0; toj4=0; toj5=0;
select;
when (0<=toj<7) toj 1=1
when (6<toj<300) toj 2=1
when (211<toj<700) toj3=l
when (61 l<toj<1300) toj4=l
when (toj=9992 or toj=9995 or toj=9998 or toj=9999) toj5=l
when (toj=.) toj0=l














when (T) ephone 1=1;
otherwise; /*not given */ end;
/*Employer's phone given */
259
age1=0; age2=0; age3=0; age4=0; /*Applicant's age */
select;




otherwise; /* <24 */
end;
kids 1=0; kids2=0; kids3=0; /^Number of dependants */
select;
when (kids= 1) kids 1=1;
when (kids=2) kids2=l;
when (2<kids<99) kids3=l;





otherwise; /* Belgium */
end
260


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A23. Parameter estimates of logistic regression models developed on all
information available.
Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Variable Parameter Variable Parameter Variable Parameter
Estimate Estimate Estimate
INTERCEP 0.83 INTERCEP 0.27 INTERCEP 1.79
EPHONE1 0.13
PHONE2 -0.52 PHONE 1 0.78 PHONE1 -0.74
RSTAT1 0.47 RSTAT1 0.24 RSTAT2 -0.17
RSTAT3 0.51 RSTAT2 0.16 RSTAT3 -0.21
RSTAT4 0.56
MSTAT1 0.16 MSTAT1 0.33 MSTAT1 0.23
MSTAT2 0.38 MSTAT2 -0.12
MSTAT3 0.60
OCCUP3 -0.49 OCCUP1 -0.74 OCC3 -0.51
OCCUP4 0.70 OCCUP2 0.20
BUS11 -0.17 BTYPE1 -0.53 BTYPE1 -0.32
BUSH 0.23 BTYPE2 -0.14 BTYPE2 -0.34
BUSH 0.23 BTYPE4 0.14 BTYPE3 -0.13
BUSH 0.58 BTYPE5 0.24 BTYPE5 0.13
BTYPE6 1.14 BTYPE6 0.43
AGE1 0.32 AGE1 -0.47
AGE2 0.60 AGE2 -0.55
AGE3 0.67 AGE3 -0.39
AGE4 0.68 AGE4 -0.29
AGE5 0.78
AGE6 0.97
KIDS 13 -0.53 KIDS2 0.10
SPAGE2 -0.25 SPAGE1 -0.22 SPAGE1 -0.70
SPAGE4 0.23
CREDIO 0.27 CARDI1 -0.38
CREDIO 0.23 CREDI1 -0.23
GP6 -0.37 GPR3 -0.17 GPRICE3 -0.10
GPR4 -0.35
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Belgium The Netherlands Germany
Variable Parameter Variable Parameter Variable Parameter
Estimate Estimate Estimate
GDSC1 -0.45 GCPD21 -0.34 GCODE1 -0.15
GDSC2 -0.55 GCPD24 1.13 GCODE4 0.14
GDSC3 -0.28 GCPD31 -0.17 GCODE5 0.25
GDSC6 0.27 GCPD33 -0.31
PDATE8 0.40 GCPD51 0.18 PDAY1 0.41
PDATE15 0.15 GCPD52 0.48 PDAY2 0.16
TAD1 -0.37 TAD1 0.16 TAD1 -0.29
TAD3 -0.36 TAD2 0.24 TAD2 -0.09
TAD3 0.29
T0J1 -0.23 TOJ1 -0.31 TOJ1 -0.50
TOJ5 0.27 TOJ2 -0.12 TOJ2 -0.31
TOJ6 0.34 TOJ3 -0.19
TOJ6 -0.48
Additional variables
TADDR1 0.14 LOAN3 0.15 NAT1 0.30
CARD1 0.32 LOAN4 0.12 ININST4 0.09
CARD2 0.43 INSTAL0 -0.29 L_CR2 -0.17
PREMPO 0.18 NEGBU3 -0.87 L_CR3 -0.35
TBANK1 -1.18 LIVFT0 0.11 TBANK1 -0.97
TBANK2 -1.02 LIVECR0 0.10 TBANK2 -0.81
TBANK3 -0.76 LASTAO -0.38 TBANK3 -0.56
TBANK4 -0.64 LASTA4 0.17 TBANK4 -0.33
TBANK5 -0.43 LASTA5 0.20 TBANK5 -0.12
TBANK6 -0.34 F_BUR02 -0.28 BTIM5 -0.20
ININST1 0.28 F_BUR04 -0.26 T1B3 -0.28
RETAIL1 0.30 F_BUR05 -0.19 T1B4 0.16
RETAIL2 0.23 LASTAP2 -1.63 T1B5 0.39
AGREEM1 0.32 LASTAP3 -1.36 T2B1 -0.43
AGREEM2 0.32 DEAL2 0.11 BSCOD3 0.27
SPOCC1 0.28 BANKC1 0.31 BSCOD4 0.17
SPOCC2 0.29 BANKC2 0.42 S_DL1 -0.44
BANKC3 0.28 S_DL2 -0.30
BANKC4 0.23 SJDL3 -0.22
NATION1 0.33 THINST1 0.24
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AGR1 -2.67 PDEPO -0.43
AGR2 -2.80 PDEP1 -0.56
AGR3 -0.78 L_INIT2 -0.17



















A24. Parameter estimates of PH model with variable-by-time interactions.
Analysis ofMaximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Risk
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Ratio
PHONE 1 1 -0.289156 0.38408 0.56677 0.4515 0.749
PHONE2 1 0.616004 0.39243 2.46395 0.1165 1.852
PHONE3 1 0.335587 0.39433 0.72424 0.3948 1.399
RSTAT1 1 -0.096635 0.12169 0.63062 0.4271 0.908
RSTAT2 1 0.299970 0.11466 6.84469 0.0089 1.350
RSTAT3 1 0.297436 0.11652 6.51613 0.0107 1.346
RSTAT4 1 0.167680 0.22715 0.54494 0.4604 1.183
RSTAT5 1 0.022395 0.12812 0.03055 0.8612 1.023
MSTAT2 1 0.243539 0.11792 4.26530 0.0389 1.276
MSTAT3 1 0.133539 0.09930 1.80857 0.1787 1.143
CARDIO 1 0.319703 0.12431 6.61379 0.0101 1.377
CARDI1 1 0.647205 0.14583 19.69776 0.0001 1.910
CREDIO 1 -0.500802 0.36247 1.90896 0.1671 0.606
CREDI1 1 -0.001944 0.37818 0.0000264 0.9959 0.998
CREDI2 1 0.069712 0.49254 0.02003 0.8874 1.072
CREDO 1 -0.224565 0.37277 0.36292 0.5469 0.799
PDATEO 1 0.477141 0.15410 9.58773 0.0020 1.611
PDATE1 1 -0.573815 0.08353 47.18759 0.0001 0.563
PDATE2 1 -0.276310 0.09275 8.87520 0.0029 0.759
PDATE3 1 -0.197395 0.08331 5.61349 0.0178 0.821
BUS1 1 -0.216142 0.26851 0.64799 0.4208 0.806
BUS2 1 0.213487 0.13547 2.48337 0.1151 1.238
BUS3 1 0.161330 0.13173 1.49984 0.2207 1.175
BUS4 1 0.112943 0.12463 0.82127 0.3648 1.120
BUS5 1 -0.104166 0.13921 0.55988 0.4543 0.901
BUS6 1 -0.226631 0.13274 2.91502 0.0878 0.797
GCODE1 1 1.354146 0.30526 19.67910 0.0001 3.873
GCODE2 1 0.861345 0.28571 9.08874 0.0026 2.366
GCODE3 1 0.371956 0.28107 1.75131 0.1857 1.451
GCODE4 1 0.230121 0.27852 0.68265 0.4087 1.259
GCODE5 1 0.046510 0.28539 0.02656 0.8705 1.048
GCODE6 1 -0.198110 0.27969 0.50171 0.4787 0.820
GCODE7 1 -0.142556 0.29853 0.22804 0.6330 0.867
SPAGEO 1 1.139280 0.41805 7.42678 0.0064 3.125
SPAGE1 1 1.494603 0.41194 13.16357 0.0003 4.458
SPAGE2 1 1.451881 0.43514 11.13289 0.0008 4.271
SPAGE3 1 1.051538 0.41867 6.30834 0.0120 2.862
SPAGE4 1 1.008686 0.41000 6.05273 0.0139 2.742
SPAGE5 1 1.205015 0.40805 8.72103 0.0031 3.337
GP1 1 0.045755 0.11795 0.15048 0.6981 1.047
GP2 1 -0.214309 0.07907 7.34555 0.0067 0.807
GP3 1 -0.213211 0.07831 7.41318 0.0065 0.808
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Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Risk
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Ratio
GP4 1 0.005139 0.08489 0.00366 0.9517 1.005
GP5 1 0.246872 0.08742 7.97436 0.0047 1.280
TAD1 1 0.346535 0.11938 8.42561 0.0037 1.414
TAD2 1 0.126030 0.10250 1.51194 0.2188 1.134
TAD3 1 -0.046283 0.09746 0.22554 0.6349 0.955
TAD4 1 -0.161948 0.11420 2.01111 0.1562 0.850
TAD5 1 -0.247231 0.11730 4.44251 0.0351 0.781
TAD6 1 -0.485837 0.14409 11.36895 0.0007 0.615
TOJO 1 -0.060962 0.27235 0.05010 0.8229 0.941
TOJ1 1 0.484413 0.11118 18.98454 0.0001 1.623
TOJ2 1 0.209136 0.10226 4.18294 0.0408 1.233
TOJ3 1 0.133371 0.10542 1.60071 0.2058 1.143
TOJ4 1 -0.039505 0.11336 0.12145 0.7275 0.961
TOJ5 1 0.439647 0.19420 5.12498 0.0236 1.552
OCCUP1 1 -0.149708 0.29252 0.26192 0.6088 0.861
OCCUP2 1 0.310002 0.21362 2.10601 0.1467 1.363
OCCUP3 1 -0.034729 0.26173 0.01761 0.8944 0.966
OCCUP4 1 -0.269206 0.19227 1.96046 0.1615 0.764
OCCUP5 1 -0.445539 0.19740 5.09398 0.0240 0.640
EPHONE1 1 0.077853 0.07222 1.16215 0.2810 1.081
A1 1 -0.192912 0.07499 6.61740 0.0101 0.825
A2 1 -0.218345 0.09248 5.57373 0.0182 0.804
A3 1 -0.458729 0.09835 21.75602 0.0001 0.632
A4 1 -0.590038 0.14838 15.81203 0.0001 0.554
K1 1 -0.152477 0.09209 2.74125 0.0978 0.859
K2 1 -0.271019 0.11004 6.06647 0.0138 0.763
K3 1 0.355878 0.12820 7.70580 0.0055 1.427
PHONT1 1 0.020226 0.03563 0.32227 0.5702 1.020
PHONT2 1 -0.007988 0.03656 0.04774 0.8270 0.992
PHONT3 1 0.018073 0.03676 0.24177 0.6229 1.018
RSTATT1 1 -0.007888 0.01106 0.50838 0.4758 0.992
RSTATT2 1 -0.001571 0.01047 0.02253 0.8807 0.998
RSTATT3 1 -0.009050 0.01069 0.71635 0.3973 0.991
RSTATT4 1 0.009054 0.02116 0.18315 0.6687 1.009
RSTATT5 1 -0.001620 0.01184 0.01870 0.8912 0.998
MSTATT2 1 -0.004805 0.01073 0.20067 0.6542 0.995
MSTATT3 1 -0.009135 0.00888 1.05819 0.3036 0.991
CARDITO 1 -0.024107 0.01112 4.70341 0.0301 0.976
CARDIT1 1 -0.046728 0.01335 12.25006 0.0005 0.954
CREDITO 1 -0.002101 0.03548 0.00351 0.9528 0.998
CREDIT 1 1 -0.024462 0.03685 0.44072 0.5068 0.976
CREDIT2 1 -0.031334 0.05568 0.31669 0.5736 0.969
CREDIT3 1 -0.006766 0.03629 0.03477 0.8521 0.993
PDATETO 1 0.002728 0.01469 0.03450 0.8527 1.003
PDATET1 1 0.026674 0.00764 2.18529 0.0005 1.027
PDATET2 1 -0.004846 0.00877 0.30556 0.5804 0.995
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Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Risk
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Ratio
PDATET3 1 0.004916 0.00776 0.40154 0.5263 1.005
BUST1 1 0.014249 0.02352 0.36712 0.5446 1.014
BUST2 1 0.006313 0.01229 0.26402 0.6074 1.006
BUST3 1 -0.001703 0.01197 0.02024 0.8869 0.998
BUST4 1 -0.001301 0.01130 0.01326 0.9083 0.999
BUST5 1 0.009887 0.01250 0.62517 0.4291 1.010
BUST6 1 0.001336 0.01200 0.01240 0.9113 1.001
GCODET1 1 -0.050798 0.02654 3.66292 0.0556 0.950
GCODET2 1 -0.050276 0.02433 4.27165 0.0388 0.951
GCODET3 1 -0.030370 0.02371 1.64090 0.2002 0.970
GCODET4 1 -0.029486 0.02344 1.58213 0.2085 0.971
GCODET5 1 -0.022831 0.02410 0.89775 0.3434 0.977
GCODET6 1 -0.012440 0.02350 0.28023 0.5966 0.988
GCODET7 1 -0.014943 0.02525 0.35012 0.5540 0.985
SPAGETO 1 -0.030341 0.03437 0.77909 0.3774 0.970
SPAGET1 1 -0.040058 0.03377 1.40712 0.2355 0.961
SPAGET2 1 -0.025580 0.03614 0.50111 0.4790 0.975
SPAGET3 1 -0.012838 0.03437 0.13950 0.7088 0.987
SPAGET4 1 -0.014184 0.03352 0.17902 0.6722 0.986
SPAGET5 1 -0.040646 0.03336 1.48453 0.2231 0.960
GPT1 1 -0.020082 0.01179 2.90076 0.0885 0.980
GPT2 1 0.008307 0.00713 1.35813 0.2439 1.008
GPT3 1 0.013496 0.00693 3.79689 0.0513 1.014
GPT4 1 -0.000353 0.00772 0.00209 0.9635 1.000
GPT5 1 -0.007866 0.00796 0.97667 0.3230 0.992
TADT1 1 -0.015853 0.01116 2.01850 0.1554 0.984
TADT2 1 -0.014720 0.00948 2.41180 0.1204 0.985
TADT3 1 -0.006648 0.00896 0.55030 0.4582 0.993
TADT4 1 0.002782 0.01039 0.07172 0.7889 1.003
TADT5 1 0.005565 0.01059 0.27593 0.5994 1.006
TADT6 1 0.008331 0.01284 0.42097 0.5165 1.008
TOJTO 1 -0.022853 0.02571 0.79017 0.3740 0.977
TOJT1 1 -0.003059 0.01001 0.09332 0.7600 0.997
TOJT2 1 0.002830 0.00909 0.09687 0.7556 1.003
TOJT3 1 -0.004337 0.00939 0.21335 0.6442 0.996
TOJT4 1 -0.003617 0.01005 0.12955 0.7189 0.996
TOJT5 1 -0.011756 0.01764 0.44414 0.5051 0.988
OCCUPT1 1 0.018025 0.02656 0.46064 0.4973 1.018
OCCUPT2 1 -0.004110 0.01919 0.04587 0.8304 0.996
OCCUPT3 1 -0.003997 0.02431 0.02704 0.8694 0.996
OCCUPT4 1 0.003287 0.01718 0.03660 0.8483 1.003
OCCUPT5 1 0.010420 0.01759 0.35073 0.5537 1.010
EPHONET1 1 -0.008690 0.00659 1.73797 0.1874 0.991
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Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Risk
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Ratio
ATI 1 -0.007266 0.00701 1.07593 0.2996 0.993
AT2 1 -0.020220 0.00866 5.45781 0.0195 0.980
AT3 1 -0.005508 0.00904 0.37103 0.5424 0.995
AT4 1 -0.011448 0.01365 0.70315 0.4017 0.989
KT1 1 0.007479 0.00838 0.79633 0.3722 1.008
KT2 1 0.025470 0.00952 7.15363 0.0075 1.026
KT3 1 -0.007841 0.01176 0.44436 0.5050 0.992
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Personal, Purchase, ATS,./, ATS,.2
From2nd period- moreinf
Personal, Purchase, ATS,./- Goods
Personal, Purchase, ATS,./-Bads after2ndp
Personal, Purchase, ATS,./-Bads before2p
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Phonegiven
1.100
1.146
1.125
1.114
1.162
1.231
Res:Owner
0.962
Res:entedhou e
1.156
1.156
1.150
1.146
1.164
1.159
1.142
Marital:Widowed
1.116
Kids:1-2
1.055
1.042
1.032
1.059
1.039
1.027
Kids:3+
1.096
1.162
1.152
1.143
1.159
1.141
1.146
1.175
Occup:Full-time
0.870
1.257
Occup:Self-emp
0.811
0.942
0.936
0.931
Typeofbusiness:Service
0.930
Typeofbusiness:Education,healthcare
0.832
0.956
0.957
0.957
0.950
0.962
0.960
1.271
Age
under21
1.066
0.930
1.121
Age
21-29
1.102
1.031
1.030
1.057
1.040
1.074
Age
30-34
1.074
1.040
1.036
Age
40-55
0.970
0.970
0.954
1.000
Age
55+
0.927
0.871
0.866
0.936
0.871
0.870
Spouseage:40-62
0.938
1.622
Timeaddress:upto6
0.957
0.965
0.943
Timeaddress:6 -2y
1.032
Timeonjob:issing
1.075
1.080
1.095
Timeonjob:upt2y
1.038
1.042
1.050
1.092
278
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Timeonjob:2-4.5y
1.043
Timeonjob:4.5y-7.5y
0.967
1.000
Timeonjob:7.5y-lOy
0.944
1.000
Nocardinsur nce
0.805
0.796
0.788
0.857
0.821
0.757
0.873
Price:under750DEM
1.466
1.344
1.351
1.415
1.411
1.412
0.702
Price:751-1300DEM
1.320
1.223
1.232
1.278
1.283
1.273
0.752
Price:1301-1800DEM
1.177
1.120
1.133
1.158
1.155
1.142
Price:1801-2300DEM
1.079
1.047
1.058
1.075
1.072
1.061
Product:kitchen
0.876
0.874
0.870
0.862
0.850
0.836
Product:computers
0.948
0.946
0.939
0.924
0.923
0.906
0.830
Product:household
0.933
Product:video
1.061
1.053
1.051
1.225
1.357
Paydate:01
3.999
4.019
4.037
4.720
5.154
4.560
2.422
2.587
Paydate:08
1.154
1.157
1.152
1.129
1.350
Agreem:budget
0.805
0.827
0.825
0.719
0.780
0.873
0.618
0.053
ATS:overcreditlimit
0.623
0.131
0.016
0.183
0.322
0.050
0.064
ATS:0-250DEM
0.706
0.566
0.314
0.719
0.650
0.407
0.204
ATS:251-500DEM
0.900
0.836
0.606
0.874
0.782
0.603
ATS501-1500DEM
1.071
0.913
ATSt_2~overcreditlimit
1.390
ATS,.2:0-250DEM
1.805
ATS,_2:251-500DEM
1.187
1missedpaym nt
0.016
2+missedpayments
0.010
Percentrepaid
2.565
279
Generic
Variable
Model
Personal
Personal,
Personal,
Personal,
From2nd
Personal,
Personal,
Personal,
Purchase
Purchase,
Purchase,
period-
Purchase,ATS,./
Purchase,ATS,./
Purchase,ATS,_/
ATS/
ATS,/
moreinf
-Goods
-Badsafter2ndp
-Badsbefore2p
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
Employer'shonegiv n
0.939
0.937
0.921
0.923
0.918
0.869
Phonegiven
1.056
1.106
1.088
1.077
1.100
1.308
1.648
Kids:0
0.914
0.869
0.873
0.868
0.817
0.843
0.852
1.412
Kids:1-2
0.906
0.857
0.862
0.857
0.806
0.827
1.515
Marital:ried
1.252
Marital:Single,divorced
0.938
0.944
0.954
0.945
Res:Owner
0.943
0.904
Res:entedhou e
1.038
1.081
1.093
1.093
1.077
1.111
Occup:Full-time
0.939
0.914
0.914
0.940
0.928
0.932
Occup:Self-emp
0.769
0.797
0.800
0.819
0.840
0.841
0.763
Occup:Retired,housewife
0.915
0.865
0.865
0.852
0.865
0.860
Typeofbusiness:Building
0.812
0.960
0.938
0.872
0.952
0.952
0.734
Typeofbusiness:Healthcare
0.875
0.909
0.895
0.893
Typeofbusiness:Indu try
0.878
0.923
0.929
Typeofbusiness:Shop
0.947
0.949
Age:under22
0.947
Spouseage:nospouse
0.956
0.928
0.934
0.958
Spouseage:under26
1.180
Timeaddress:upto6
1.047
Timeaddress:17y+
0.935
0.959
0.957
0.947
0.942
Timeonjob:4-14y
0.957
Timeonjob:14+
0.958
0.961
0.957
0.936
0.921
Timeonjob:Allowa ce
1.447
280
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
Nocardinsur nce
0.773
0.801
0.776
0.849
0.814
0.657
Cardinsurance
0.846
0.896
0.870
0.899
0.908
0.773
Nocreditinsu ance
1.060
1.048
1.075
0.747
Product:heater,TV
0.937
0.929
0.918
0.917
0.959
0.919
Product:hifiradio
1.060
Product:kitchenitems
1.049
Product:cardapp,video
1.071
1.062
1.075
1.075
1.151
Price:0
1.472
1.321
1.387
1.478
1.450
1.239
1.377
Price:1-180EUR
1.644
1.441
1.409
1.491
1.461
1.374
1.514
Price:181-450EUR
1.490
1.289
1.326
1.423
1.390
1.137
0.848
Price:451-650EUR
1.356
1.210
1.247
1.280
1.281
1.125
Price:651-800EUR
1.243
1.130
1.166
1.210
1.198
Price:801-1100EUR
1.136
1.090
1.102
1.128
1.128
Paydate:01
2.330
2.331
2.427
2.929
2.520
2.003
1.575
Paydate:08
1.318
1.312
1.352
1.264
1.351
1.305
Agreem:budgetphonerop
1.803
1.835
1.649
1.649
1.488
2.048
Agreem:budgetoth r
1.563
1.698
1.535
1.522
1.316
1.972
Agreem:def rred
1.615
1.566
1.426
1.336
1.264
2.048
3.888
ATS:overcreditlimit
0.572
0.298
0.402
0.458
0.224
0.097
ATS:0-150EUR
0.845
0.834
0.843
0.934
0.738
0.270
ATS:151-500EUR
0.969
ATS:501-800EUR
1.049
1.036
ATS:801-1200EUR
1.124
2+missedpayments
0.001
Percentrepaid
2.098
281
